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More recently, there has been in some quarters a theological move away from the Penal 
Substitution model of atonement primarily due to the concerns it raises about God’s 
character. This is paralleled by a desire to replace it with a less violent approach to 
soteriology, with the concomitant representation of a less coercive God. This thesis addresses 
the biblical manifestations of divine violence across both Testaments in order to present God 
as one for whom violence is an extrinsic, accommodated function. Divine violence is 
particularly manifested soteriologically, finding its fullest expression, therefore, in the 
atonement. The Christus Victor Model is offered as the one best able to explicate and 
accommodate this divine violence. The main atonement models are assessed, revealing how 
each has sought to engage with, or deny, divine violence.  
Firstly, God and violence are explored in order to provide an ideological, linguistic and 
epistemological foundation for understanding what violence is. Biblical examples of violence 
are then examined including both Testaments along with consideration of the Satan and the 
demonic realm; showing how God utilises violence in order to overcome these ontological 
enemies. Various atonement models are then examined, followed by a consideration of 
metaphor in the context of soteriology and God. Key scholars addressing violence are then 
assessed, followed by a section on the primacy of the Christus Victor atonement model; it is 
then presented as the only one which can fully incorporate the concomitant issues of God’s 
character, divine violence and an actual, evil enemy seeking to confound both God and His 
purposes. Further, the Christus Victor model is presented as the only one which is 
ontological, expressing a view of the atonement that both acknowledges God’s 
incontrovertible use and endorsement of extrinsic violence as well as the need to overcome an 
actual enemy in the Satan.   
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Prolegomena.
1
  
This thesis is about God, atonement, divine violence and the demythologisation of Christian 
views of the Satan and the demonic realm. On the latter, Girard notes that in the period when 
the German theologian Rudolf Bultmann had such great influence, all the theologians who 
were up to date “demythologized” the Scriptures with all their might but, he adds, they did 
not even do the prince of this world the honour of demythologizing him.
2
 On the contrary, 
this desire to demythologize is not so prevalent today with other previously dark entities 
instead subsumed into the modern consciousness via their adaptation from mysterious and 
evil to scientific. Hjelm takes the concept of ‘vampire’ and examines its new and old 
paradigms in film observing that the move of the vampire away from the demonic and 
towards the scientific—a worldview ironically rejected only by the most hardcore 
fundamentalists of any religion—can be seen as an outcome of the sensitivity that a 
religiously and spiritually pluralistic culture engenders.
3
  
The vampire presented as an evil, demonic being, only to be confronted and defeated by the 
forces of good manifest in either the cross or a religious representative is now perceived as 
one suffering from various explicable conditions and faced with a nemesis armed with 
technological devices. Evil not demythologized, but rather re-presented and enculturated in 
postmodern forms. The conjoining of evil and postmodernity often causes societal and 
theological consternation; indeed, in his speculation upon what postmodern society might 
exclude from conversation, for example, Wink concludes,  
Certainly not sex; at least in the more ‘sophisticated’ circles accounts of sexual exploits 
scarcely raise an eyebrow. But if you want to bring all talk to a halt in shocked 
embarrassment, every eye riveted on you, try mentioning angels, or demons, or the devil. 
                                                             
1
 Pannenberg asserts that, “In the presentation of a theme there is nothing unusual about postponing the actual 
treatment in favour (sic) of a few preliminary remarks on the theme itself and the mode of presentation.” W. 
Pannenberg, Systematic Theology, Volume 1, Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1988, 26-27. He cites various 
presentations of Christian doctrine which begin with introductory observations, including the Prologue of 
Lombard’s Sentences, the first quaestio of the theological Summa of Aquinas and Melanchthon’s introductions 
to his Loci communes and his Loci praecipui theologici. We will do likewise.  
2
 R. Girard, I See Satan Fall Like Lightning, Maryknoll: Orbis Books, 1999, 32. 
3
 T. Hjelm, ‘Celluloid Vampires, Scientization, and the Decline of Religion’, C. Partridge and E. Christianson 
(eds.), The Lure of the Dark Side: Satan and Western Demonology in Popular Culture, London: Equinox, 2009, 
105-121, 119. 
2 
 
You will be quickly appraised for signs of pathological violence and then quietly 
shunned.
4
 
In case Wink’s observations appear dated it should be noted that in more recent times various 
invisible and visible forces, or monsters have become part of the postmodern vista and its 
parlance. In an article entitled Monsters: The Theology of Frankenstein, Werewolves, 
Vampires and Zombies Beck notes the various ways in which these monsters have taken on 
new meaning and content as a way of engaging with existential fears as well as confronting 
and understanding the world at large.
5
       
Moving back to the primary focus of this thesis, however, in terms of concerns about divine 
violence, particularly in the atonement –in both ancient and contemporary contexts– these too 
are acknowledged as potentially controversial areas of study and yet ones that should not and 
must not be ignored.
6
 The endeavour to engage with and expound these thorny themes 
requires explicit theological parameters, namely that dogmatics has the presupposition, a 
petitio principii, that there is a God revealed through a Word; spoken, written and incarnated. 
Indeed, ‘God’ is the key-word in theological vocabulary; a theology without God would be 
like Hamlet without the Prince of Denmark.
7
  
Yet, in regard to the quest to remain aloof from a priori perspectives in the face of 
contentious issues, the illusory nature of theological objectivity must be acknowledged; the 
search for “unconditional certainty”8 is now deemed an epistemic fallacy falling victim to its 
own desire for objectivity.
 Indeed, in his assessment of the word ‘hermeneutics’ Davis notes 
that it takes its name from Hermes, a richly ambivalent deity who is both the messenger of 
heaven and the one who blinds those whom he leads into the realm of the dead! The 
metaphorical root of the term should, he warns, “…alert us to the possibility that 
unconscious, archetypal structures may both positively and negatively influence the direction 
                                                             
4
 W. Wink, Unmasking the Powers: The Invisible Forces that Determine Human Existence, Philadelphia: 
Fortress Press, 1986, 1.  
5
 http://experimentaltheology.blogspot.co.uk/2010/10/monsters-theology-of-frankenstein.html 
6
 H. Boersma, Violence, Hospitality and the Cross: Reappropriating the Atonement Tradition, Grand Rapids: 
Baker Academic, 2006, 42. He further postulates that, “The sheer number of articles and books in the last few 
decades implicating traditional models of the atonement in brutality and abuse make it necessary for us to reflect 
carefully on the issue.” Boersma, Violence, 42.  
7
 J. Macquarrie, God-Talk: An Examination of the Language and Logic of Theology, London: SCM, 1967, 99.  
8
 Arguing that scientific endeavour is subjective and prone to aesthetic prejudice and interests, Polanyi notes 
that, “Theories of the scientific method which try to explain the establishment of scientific truth by any purely 
objective formal procedure are doomed to failure. Any process of enquiry unguided by intellectual passions 
would inevitably spread out into a desert of trivialities.” M. Polanyi, Personal Knowledge: Towards a Post-
Critical Philosophy, London: Routledge, 1958, 135.  
3 
 
of our search for understanding.” He concludes that there is a universal assumption that a so-
called ‘right hermeneutic’ could unlock all the mysteries of revelation in unambiguous terms; 
this is, he says, “…a fact that blinds us to the dark side of every hermeneutic.”9 
Again, in a chapter entitled “Certainty as the Way to Nihilism”, Newbigin charts the rise and 
fall of the Western concept of ‘certainty’ from the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries and 
the mathematical physics of Isaac Newton to the individualism and multi-culturalism 
espoused today. He concludes that there is an irony in human history which has sought 
absolute certainty and yet this quest for indubitable certainty has led to what seems to be an 
abandonment of the claim to be able to know the truth.
10
 ‘Detached observers’, reporting 
reality from a safe distance therefore find themselves at the centre of their observation, 
necessarily affecting perceptions and findings, making themselves the “locus of absolute 
truth.”11 Thus, in undertaking potentially provocative theological explorations, instead of 
claiming to work outside such constrictions, it is prudent to admit inevitable agenda and 
involvement; simply making sure that this is not disruptive or intrusive to overall objectivity.  
When examining divine predicates and knowability, including potentially unpalatable 
findings such as the presence of violence, parameters must be set and criteria of 
understanding applied. Those involved in apologetics, dogmatics or theology of course aspire 
to operate in the ‘right way’; the difficulty is to find a universally agreeable understanding of 
this ‘way’. Those advocating biblical theology rightly give primacy to Scripture as their 
yardstick for adjudicating on theological issues, particularly contentious ones; this pre-
eminence is such that possibilities other than those indicated by the Word of God will not 
come into consideration at all.
12
   
Even for those upholding this position there remains a clear and present danger in every 
theological era of ‘letting go’ doctrines which do not appeal to or, in fact, scandalize a 
contemporary audience; such is the case today with divine violence.
13
 For the Christian 
                                                             
9
 C.T. Davis, ‘Seeds of Violence in Biblical Interpretation’, J. H. Ellens (ed.), The Destructive Power of 
Religion: Violence in Judaism, Christianity, and Islam, Volume 1: Sacred Scriptures, Ideology, and Violence, 
Westport: Praeger, 2004, 35-53, 35.
 
10
 L. Newbigin, The Gospel in a Pluralist Society, London, SPCK, 1989, 36. 
11
 Pannenberg, Systematic, Vol 1, 47.  
12
 K. Barth, Church Dogmatics, Volume II – The Doctrine of God, Part 1, Massachusetts: Hendrickson, 2010, 9.  
13
 In his assessment of humanity’s perceived irreducible progress Volf notes that from the Enlightenment 
onwards the optimistic vision of society is that, “…all irrational and anti-social drives will be progressively 
suppressed and violence increasingly eliminated from social life.” M. Volf, Exclusion and Embrace: A 
Theological Exploration of Identity, Otherness, and Reconciliation, Nashville: Abingdon Press, 1996, 279. It 
4 
 
Gospel and its proclamation, however, the danger is not solely one of letting go - but rather of 
seeking a redefinition for a post-modern secular and religious audience – this, however, is a 
potentially disingenuous activity.
 
Finlan, for example, reinterprets what he sees as the salient 
features of the Gospel message in response to his concern that modern proponents have 
overemphasised certain elements at the expense of others, noting that,  
The Incarnation is an essential Christian idea: the Atonement – at least one that entails 
God as Sacrifice Demander and Jesus as punishment-bearer – is not. It is a mistake to 
identify atonement as the central Christian doctrine, although it is central to the Pauline 
tradition, to First Peter, Hebrews, First John, and Revelation. But these books, in their 
entirety, compose only 39 percent of the NT (sic). The main positive function of 
atonement doctrine has been to help transmit information about the Incarnation of the 
divine Son. But that information can be transmitted just as well without atonement, as is 
seen in the Gospels and Acts of the Apostles.
14 
Theological endeavour should and must therefore always have the freedom to arrive at 
potentially difficult findings, even if these contradict previously held views or unsettle 
contemporary audiences.
15
 Theology must be careful not to borrow from elsewhere a 
fundamental outlook or account of society or history and then to see what theological insights 
might cohere with it. No such fundamental account, in the sense of something neutral, 
rational or universal is, however, available and instead theology has to provide its own 
account of the final causes at work in human history on the basis of its own particular and 
historically specific faith.
16
  
Whatever perspectives are chosen and whatever issues prioritised, an agenda is de facto 
taken. So instead of being stultified by myriad options limiting objective reasoning a position 
is chosen, worked with and within, acknowledging its associated weaknesses and celebrating 
its strengths. What cannot be upheld is the illusion of transcending individual particularity, 
exchanging ‘the view from here’ for ‘the view from nowhere’ instead of a ‘view from 
somewhere else’.17 Everyone seeking answers, in whatever field of enquiry, cannot achieve 
                                                                                                                                                                                             
has followed, as we shall see, that in such a social milieu violence will also be perceived as negative and thereby 
removed from theological speculation.  
14
 S. Finlan, Problems with Atonement, Collegeville: Liturgical Press, 2004, 120.  
 
15
 In delineating the pitfalls of the theological task Macquarrie warns that sometimes, “…in a pathetic desire to 
be “contemporary” and “relevant”, [the theologian] reduces the Christian faith to a pale reflection of whatever 
happens to be the currently popular philosophy”. J. Macquarrie, Principles of Christian Theology, London: 
SCM Press, 1977, xi.  
16
 J. Milbank, Theology and Social Theory: Beyond Secular Reason, Cambridge: Blackwell, 1991, 382. 
17
 T. Hart, Faith Thinking – The Dynamics of Christian Theology, London: SPCK, 1995, 64. 
5 
 
‘objectivity’ because it does not exist - the only option is to accept and work within inevitable 
subjectivity.   
Acknowledgement of these limitations and the futility of the fabled ‘view from nowhere’, as 
Nagel called it, are thus essential theological pre-requisites, especially when engaging with 
topics, like divine violence, which engender division and diversity.
18
 This concession does 
not necessitate marginalisation, but acceptance of natural and inherent human shortcomings, 
thereby ultimately producing a stronger theological and epistemological position.  
The utilisation of this model requires academic humility and an awareness that the chief tools 
of theology have always been words and their related concepts with the proviso that words 
are finite, drawn from the pool of language and experience and presented by humans making 
no more claim to have transcended their finitude and sinfulness than can their readers.
19
 
There are, of course, inevitable human problems in trying to understand an infinite, spiritual, 
eternal ‘being’ whose transcendent nature is de facto resistant to definition, let alone one who 
may be manifesting predicates, such as violence, that can be construed as both controversial 
and contradictory.  
In his appeal to personal knowledge Polanyi thus argues against belief in ‘scientific 
detachment’ in which the observer claims impartial objectivity. He proposes, rather, that the 
enquirer acknowledges involvement in their investigation without having to defend against 
subjectivity.
20
 The mistaken aspiration is the belief that one’s subjectivity may be replaced by 
pure objective observation - a position which does not exist.
21
 Consequently, rather than 
eschewing preconceived viewpoints, a commitment must be made to what is perceived to be 
the most effective place from which to work.
22
      
                                                             
18
 Hart, Faith, 48.  
19
 T. Hart, Regarding Karl Barth: Essays Toward a Reading of his Theology, Carlisle: Paternoster, 1999, 174-
175.  
20
 Polanyi posits that, “Such is the personal participation of the knower in all acts of understanding. But this 
does not make our understanding subjective. Comprehension is neither an arbitrary act nor a passive experience, 
but a responsible act claiming universal validity. Such knowing is indeed objective in the sense of establishing 
contact with a hidden reality; a contact that is defined as the condition for anticipating an indeterminate range of 
yet unknown (and perhaps yet inconceivable) true implications.” Polanyi, Personal, vii-vii.   
21
 Vahhoozer warns that those seeking to define ‘postmodernity’ do so at their own peril because whilst 
definitions may appear to ‘bask in the glow of impartiality’ they instead invariably exclude something and are 
therefore complicit in politics. A definition of postmodernity, therefore, “…is as likely to say more about the 
person offering the definition than it is of “the postmodern””. K.J. Vanhoozer, ‘Theology and the condition of 
postmodernity: a report on knowledge (of God)’, K.J. Vanhoozer (ed.), The Cambridge Companion to 
Postmodern Theology, Kevin Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003, 3-25, 3. So too with theological 
endeavour and expression.  
22
 Hart, Faith, 65. 
6 
 
Barth pre-empts Polanyi, stating that the a priori possibility of knowledge of God 
presupposes a place beyond such knowledge from where it can be judged. Acceptance of 
such a neutral ‘place’ of observation also presupposes a theory of knowledge as a hinterland 
where consideration of the truth, worth and competence of the Word of God, on which 
knowledge of God is grounded, can for a time be suspended.
23
 Blumenthal questions the 
viability of such a ‘hinterland’, advising that,  
To be a theologian is to be on the boundary. To be a theologian is to be a voice for the 
tradition. It is to speak its words, to teach its message, and to embody its authority. 
However, there is no single entity one can call the tradition. There is no one message, no 
sole authoritative voice. Rather, the tradition is multivocal, multifaceted; and some of it 
has been repressed. Hence, no one can speak for the tradition in its entirety.
24
   
That which has been ‘repressed’, in relation to divine violence and the demythologisation of 
the Satan, are primary issues in this thesis and the arguments presented will accept the 
contentious nature of even attempting to ascribe violence to an ontologically loving God and 
of the potential re-personification and re-spiritualisation of the Satan; both issues that are 
generating scholarly interest.
25
  
The theologian must, therefore, accept the position of speaking from within a tradition or 
some part of it, garnering whatever authority, epistemic reasoning and evidence is possible 
whilst acknowledging inevitable and necessary limitations and listening to the inner 
resonances of the tradition in order to measure their own music against the inner tones of the 
tradition to the best of their ability, recognising the scale of the task and its endemic dangers 
and pitfalls.
26
 On God, His character and predicates, including divine violence, and of that or 
whom He is contending against and how He might counter and overcome, it is patently not 
possible to say everything; something, however, can be said. That is enough.  
                                                             
23
 Barth, Dogmatics, II, 1, God, 5. 
24
 D. Blumenthal, Facing the Abusing God: A Theology of Protest, Louisville Kentucky: Westminster/John 
Knox Press, 1993, 3.  
25
 Amongst contemporary theologians attempting to address these issues are H. Boersma, Violence, Hospitality 
and the Cross: Reappropriating the Atonement Tradition, Grand Rapids: Baker Academic, 2006; G. Boyd, God 
at War – The Bible and Spiritual Conflict, Illinois: IVP Academic, 1997;  R. Girard, Violence and the Sacred, 
London: Continuum, 1988; C. Gunton, The Actuality of Atonement: A Study of Metaphor, Rationality and the 
Christian Tradition, Edinburgh: T & T Clark, 1998; R. Hamerton-Kelly, Sacred Violence: Paul's Hermeneutic 
of the Cross. Minneapolis: Augsburg Fortress: 1992; M. Heim, Saved from Sacrifice: A Theology of the Cross, 
Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2006; K. Darby-Ray, Deceiving the Devil – Atonement, Abuse and Ransom, 
Cleveland: Pilgrim Press, 1998; J. D. Weaver, The Nonviolent Atonement, Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2001; W. 
Wink, Engaging the Powers: Discernment and Resistance in a World of Domination, Minneapolis: Fortress 
Press, 1992.  
26
 Blumenthal, Facing, 3.  
7 
 
Definition alone cannot, however, be the primary task of theology, but is instead subsidiary to 
trying out the new metaphors and models drawn from general experience in order to express 
aspects of the God-world relation as experienced by people today.
27
 The theologian is not 
merely a processor of abstract, objective facts but one who incorporates elements of poetry, 
interpretation and artistic creativity. Additionally theology includes an inherently heuristic 
element as theologian and theological community explore, grow, experiment and change, 
maintaining an attitude of provisionality in order to facilitate openness to the possibility of 
error, ancient and modern, and the hope of potential break-throughs in the endeavour to better 
know, understand and engage with the living, eternal, God; His purposes and plans and His 
chosen means of achieving them.
28
  
These problems and limitations, however, suggest the potential failure of theological 
endeavour before it begins, relegating it to a finite, subjective, philosophical and linguistic 
exercise steeped in futility.
29
 This is not the case at all. Progress can be made, even with such 
contentious issues as divine violence and God’s battle against evil, by proceeding with 
humility and diligence whilst concurrently acknowledging the scale and parameters of the 
issues and with the application of due provisionality to theological propositions. God-talk 
can, of course, occur but always mindful that language, necessarily and by definition, is a 
limited medium; if human speech is problematic then human speech about God is all the 
more so.
30
 There is certainly more to the truth than words can convey; this does not mean, 
however, that nothing should be said, but rather to say little, carefully and provisionally.   
 
 
 
                                                             
27
 Hart, Barth, 181.  
28
 Commenting on the Patristic era Kelly notes that, “Modern students are sometimes surprised at the diversity 
of treatment accorded by even the later fathers to such a mystery as the Atonement; and it is a commonplace that 
certain fathers (Origen is the classic example) who were later adjudged heretics counted for orthodox in their 
lifetimes. The explanation is not that the early Church was indifferent to the distinction between orthodoxy and 
heresy. Rather it is that, while from the beginning the broad outline of revealed truth was respected as a 
sacrosanct inheritance from the apostles, its theological explication was to a large extent left unfettered. Only 
gradually, and even then in regard to relatively few doctrines which became subjects of debate, did the tendency 
to insist upon precise definition and rigid uniformity assert itself.” J.N.D. Kelly, Early Christian Doctrines, 
London: A & C Black, 1958, 4.  
29
 “In the public mind statements about God are mere assertions which are ascribed to the subjectivity of the 
speaker and the truth claim of which not only needs to be generally tested before it can be accepted but is for the 
most part set aside in advance, the belief being that the testing will lead nowhere and that the truth claims of 
statements about God are not even worth discussing publicly.” Pannenberg, Systematic, Vol 1, 64.  
30
 Hart, Barth, 173. 
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Section 1 - God & Violence  
1.1 The Problem.  
Research in recent decades that implicates traditional models of the atonement in brutality, 
abuse and violence suggests careful reflection be made on the issue.
31
 Whilst each generation 
views and understands itself within the broader context of theological development it also 
does so in relation to previous doctrines and creeds. As thought and human history develops 
the temptation can be to jettison unpalatable ideas due to their impact on current 
sensibilities.
32
 Instead, options should remain open until there is substantive evidence to 
believe otherwise at least in order to challenge the affiliated belief that there has historically 
and theologically been a de facto positive and progressive evolution of human morality, 
understanding and practice.
33
   
The central issue to be addressed in this thesis, therefore, is whether God has, however 
minimally, an intrinsic part of His character that is violent and whether this violence is 
essential in terms of how God both chooses to deal with and reveal Himself to humanity. 
Further, it will be considered if such violence is necessary as God’s chosen means of 
overcoming an actual, ontological enemy, the Satan and a demonic, evil realm. Finally, the 
Christus Victor atonement model will be explored as potentially the best, perhaps the only, 
means of understanding and presenting these features and purposes of God. It will then be 
considered whether divine violence is ontological and soteriologically asserted as the 
essential and only means of The Satan’s demise.  
These issues call into question the very nature of the Christian Gospel and how it should be 
framed; not only in terms of what it is but for whom it is and on what basis. The question 
whether humans are well disposed to embrace a Divine Message that includes violence 
because of problems of palatability is, however, theologically irrelevant to how the Gospel is 
understood and presented. Walker notes that the Gospel is not only the central message of the 
Christian faith: it is both the story and its telling that makes the message become gospel.
34
 
Specifically it is a Gospel detailing a macro-narrative, a salvation history, that presents God 
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as One who urgently desires to be known, perhaps at any cost and by any means, but who has 
an enemy to Himself, His message and its recipients.
 
Most of the New Testament uses of εὐαγγέλιον are in Paul and in almost half of the passages 
where he uses the term he speaks of it in the absolute, not using nouns or adjectives to define 
it, such was the extant familiarity with the term; it remains, however, a somewhat elusive 
word, not compliant to expression in a brief formula. Predominantly it is a nomen actionis 
describing the act of proclamation, praise at the preaching of the Gospel and the beginning of 
activity as an evangelist. This ‘Gospel’, therefore, does not bear witness to merely an 
historical event for the concepts it recounts, namely resurrection and exaltation, are beyond 
the scope of historical judgement, thereby transcending history. Nor is ‘Gospel’ a set of 
narratives and sayings concerning Jesus to be believed and learnt by Christians; on the 
contrary, it is a word and a concept related to human reality and to be perceived as living 
power.
35
 In contrast to its usage in the Old Testament and in Jewish and secular Greek 
literature, where it meant ‘news of victory’ or ‘recompense for a good report’ ευαγγελιον in 
the New Testament denotes news concerning or coming from God.
36
 The biblical noun 
‘gospel’ is beheld in the notion of euangelion, the evangel, or message and is perceived as a 
positive, living message from God that must be treated and relayed with urgency and import. 
A key paradox of these gospel propositions and of atonement doctrine in particular is that 
they present an unusual marriage of primitive concepts of a violent god and the revealed 
teaching of a loving God.
37
 These seemingly mutually exclusive and apparently contradictory 
theological elements being conjoined and in this instance being expressed as ‘good news’ 
represent another key subject receiving attention in this thesis. These difficult issues can be 
framed in terms of whether the marriage of an ancient idea, in this instance atonement and a 
newer one of God’s love, can nonetheless endure or whether they are mismatched from the 
start, incorporating a pouring of new wine into old wineskins.
38
 Certainly these are thorny 
and controversial issues that at best appear to represent a conflicted message and at worst a 
conflicted God. Nonetheless a resolution will be explored in order to avert the accusation that 
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in atonement models little more is being done than to provide mere restatements of the 
happening and not explanations.
39
  
Rather than merely setting up an interpretative and perceptual dichotomy between a message 
of peace and violence it might be asserted that religion is nothing other than an immense 
effort to keep the peace and that the sacred is violence but that if religious man worships 
violence it is only insofar as the worship of violence is supposed to bring peace; religion is 
entirely concerned with peace, but the means it has of bringing it about are never free of 
sacrificial violence.
40
 This linking of violence and peace as necessary corollaries within the 
sacred and the religious is suggestive and will be at the forefront of this thesis.  
It will be argued that the desire to disassociate God with violence has caused the revision of 
significant elements of many theological propositions. This is perhaps particularly true of the 
main atonement models - particularly in regard to God making a deal with or deceiving the 
Devil, or of sacrificing His innocent Son on the cross; indeed, God can only be shielded from 
the violence of the cross at the cost of parting ways with the tradition of the Church.
41
 There 
may be times where such a parting is legitimate, or even necessary; but only after careful 
consideration and because of concern over explicitly non-biblical doctrine or unsubstantiated 
theological perspectives. It should be with great caution that such a parting ever occurred and 
especially if it is in order to match a priori desires that require the delivery of doctrines that 
‘sit well’ with particular personal, doctrinal or historical preconceptions of God. Rather than 
changing theology to match a view of God it is instead apposite to consider how biblical 
theology might change to fit the revealed nature of God, perhaps including His use of, 
association with, endorsement or predicate of violence. Whether the resulting theology is 
palatable or likeable is secondary.  
The atonement is, of course, essential to Christianity and  any doctrine deemed to have such 
primacy must, of course, be thoroughly explored. When a doctrine includes potentially 
problematic ramifications, notably in associating God with violence, then such exploration 
must be undertaken with extreme caution. It must not, however, waver from its findings, 
however unpalatable, unfashionable and shocking they might be.   
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1.2 Religious Use and Understanding of Violence. 
Before considering violence and divine predicates, it is necessary to construct a definition of 
violence as it will be used and understood in this thesis. The definition is our own: violence is 
a potentially irresistible force (whether physical, mental, spiritual or verbal) exerted to 
achieve a desired end.
42
   
Exertion can be positive or negative depending on various factors: the context of the exertion; 
the reason for it; who is exerting and upon whom the exertion is occurring. There is also a 
difference between exertion being manifest as either persuasion or force. It is incorrect to 
correlate these two concepts, perceiving them to have the same meaning, because persuasion 
is not simply force, a point illustrated by the frequency with which people are able to resist 
persuasion. This, in fact, is what makes force force and violence violence: potential 
irresistibility.
43
  
Conversely, whilst violence manifested as persuasion can usually be resisted, this is not 
always the case. Likewise, even violence of the most vociferous and torturous force can still 
be endured, resisted and, in some cases, overcome and redeemed by those subjected to it. An 
outstanding example of such fortitude and overcoming in the face of extreme violence is the 
life and experiences of Primo Levi, the Italian Jew who survived imprisonment in Auschwitz. 
He details numerous stories of individuals and the ways in which they resisted and overcame 
their circumstances in the concentration camp in Moments of Reprieve; Ignatieff notes of 
Levi’s observations that, “In showing us that it was possible to remain a human being in 
conditions of extremity and horror, the author shows us what it is to be a human being.”44 
Such distinctions highlight the difficulty in proffering a definitive classification on violence; 
what is offered instead is a broad schema that best represents the usual understanding of 
violence, its purpose and parameters.  
 
                                                             
42
 Acknowledgement is given to the works which helped the construction of this definition. Most notably, W.T. 
Cavanaugh, The Myth of Religious Violence: Secular Ideology and the Roots of Modern Conflict, Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2009; K.R. Chase, ‘Introduction’, K.R. Chase and A. Jacobs (eds.), Must Christianity 
be Violent? Michigan: Brazos Press, 2003, (9-19) and in particular, B.B. Lawrence, ‘General Introduction: 
Theorizing Violence in the Twenty-First Century’, B.B. Lawrence and A. Karim (eds.), On Violence: A Reader, 
London: Duke University Press, 2007. Lawrence concludes that, “There is no general theory of violence apart 
from its practices. In other words, theories of violence must be as varied as the practices within which they 
occur; shadows abound, but rays of light also glimmer, and they, too, must be noted”. Lawrence, Violence, 7.  
43
 A. Jacobs, ‘Afterword’, K.R. Chase and A. Jacobs (eds.), Must Christianity be Violent? Michigan: Brazos 
Press, 2003, 224-235, 234.  
44
 M. Ignatieff, Preface to P. Levi, Moments of Reprieve, London: Penguin, 1986, 3.  
12 
 
1.2.1 Persuasion and Coercion.  
The feature, in terms of the means of violence and human response, is developed by Foucault 
who argues that there is both a blurred line and a possible nuance between persuasion and 
coercion.
45
 He idealises a violent past that inflicted the worst kind of government-sanctioned, 
torturous violence in order to discipline and punish the individual, warning society against 
perpetrating anti-social activities.
46
 By inference Foucault concedes the appalling nature of 
such public violence, nonetheless preferring this to his feared alternative of a modern world 
which instead punishes and subdues its subjects using modern controlling techniques such as 
psychological therapy with its concomitant self-disciplining and self-policing.
47
 At least in the 
‘good old days’, he argues, the violence was not secret and therefore not illusionary or 
insidious, but rather clear, blatant and intelligible. People therefore knew where they stood in 
regard to violence and punishment and were under no illusions as to either the reasons for it 
or the need for its public implementation.
48
  
1.2.1.1 The ‘Violence’ of Conversion.   
A strict construction of Foucault’s argument leads to the conclusion that modern, 
proselytising religions such as Christianity and in particular its ‘seeker services’, offering the 
non-believer opportunity to hear its message, pose a more dangerously coercive ideological 
model than the Spanish Inquisition’s auto-da-fé.49 The thin ideological line dividing these 
two means of ‘persuasion’ is particularly apparent in a religious context, with its complicated 
set of agendas, methods and expectations. Not least amongst these agendas is the desire to 
convert and thereby change those currently outside its scope and parameters.
50
  
This desire is not seen as being negative, much less violent, by those seeking such change; 
instead, this agenda is by definition at the very centre of any proselytising religion’s mandate. 
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Conversely, Blumenthal notes that those proclaiming a message of love that necessitates 
conversion do not understand the nature of the love they profess. Instead, he asserts, love is 
the acceptance of the other, not the desire or attempt to change them and especially not 
through emotional and spiritual violence.
51
 This raises perplexing issues for those who 
disavow God of violence whilst concurrently upholding the importance of personal 
transformation of outlook in order to facilitate the embracing of a relational model of 
engagement between God and humanity.
52
 
This idea of the violent nature of mission and evangelism presents a further problem for any 
religion advocating expansion and conversion. After all, in regard to the auto-da-fé it sought 
to burn the body, whilst the stratagems of religious evangelism go further, seeking to capture 
the will.
53
 Foucault’s point initially seems like a reductio ad absurdum when the blatant 
differences between literal torture and death and an act of emotional or spiritual persuasion 
are compared. Conceptually, however, there is much in common between two methods that in 
their respective, but ultimately coercive and forceful ways, both seek the same goal of change 
and conversion. In other words, both are exerting a potentially irresistible force in order to 
achieve a desired end – or rather, they are both violent.  
The charge levelled against certain elements, historical and doctrinal, of the Christian Church 
and the God it claims to represent is that throughout history outright violence and violent 
coercion have been used against people in order to convert or restrain, physically, 
emotionally, theologically or praxiologically. Dawkins recounts instances, both modern and 
biblical, in which believers and their God have committed acts that can only reasonably be 
described as flagrantly violent.
54
 Such observations are not so much accusations but a simple 
recounting of biblical stories requiring honest engagement and response rather than denial or 
avoidance.
55
 The charges they represent are levelled at the Church and the One who instituted 
it and upon whom it is based.  
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The further accusation following from these charges is that a Christian reading about God’s 
passion towards the ‘lost’ might then engage in proselytization that violates the integrity and 
conscience of those being sought in much the same way as God and his ancient followers 
have done.
56
 This could either be in consciously or subliminally and unconsciously chosen 
efforts. The charge nonetheless remains that God and Christians are, to some degree, caught 
up de facto in an endeavour that will always, by its nature, be at least coercive and at worst 
cross the line into outright, explicit violence.   
1.3 Jesus as a Model.  
Another means of understanding the character and violence of God is to reflect on Jesus of 
Nazareth as the physical, historical and human manifestation of God; the plans and purposes 
of Jesus are given priority as a means to explicate the place and priority of violence within 
Christianity.
57
 Such engagement with Jesus facilitates understanding of his outlook, teaching, 
praxis and methodology in order to express God’s perspectives and goals. His actions, 
outlook and beliefs are analysed so that when Jesus is cited as a model for those presenting 
theologies of violence it is done within the context of his being God’s incarnate revelation to 
humanity.  
For example, Jesus was active within the Jewish tradition, in which it was decisive for all 
powers hostile to God to be overcome. Faith in the Jewish deity Yahweh knew two primary 
ways of achieving this: the destruction of enemies and/or their conversion.
58
 This model for 
Jesus’ mission presents him as a new paradigm through which God manifests and reveals His 
soteriological purposes.
59
 This would be accomplished with less emphasis on overt, tangible 
violence through literal, historical destruction and opposition to various human power- 
constructs and more by overcoming God’s enemies manifest in the spiritual sphere of the 
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Satan and the demonic realm. Wright highlights this change of focus in Jesus’ life and 
ministry arguing that it is a theme that looms large in the Gospels. Instead of Jesus helping 
Jews and others to fight Rome or the Gentiles, he rather encourages those wanting to inherit 
his coming Kingdom to battle against the Satan and evil powers. Wright notes that stories of 
the kingdom of Yahweh were essentially stories of conflict; summarising this conflict by 
claiming that,  
The true god was not at the moment ruling the world in the way that he intended to do. 
Evil powers had usurped his authority, and they would have to be defeated if he was to 
regain his rightful throne.
60
  
It was to the defeat of these evil powers that God, in Jesus, would now turn his attention. 
1.3.1 Jesus & Confrontation.  
This does not mean that human constructs are free from being a means of demonic influence. 
Macquarrie notes that it was the original sin of idolatry that caused humans to turn from 
worship of the Being to the beings, causing an ontological rift between God and humanity. 
The practice of humans putting something before someone in regard to their response to God 
has meant, he argues, that anything other than God which becomes of ultimate concern is 
‘demonic’ in the sense that it dominates humans, their lives and their relationship with their 
Maker.
61
 In perceiving the demonic and sin as individual and structural social forms, the way 
is open for ancient images of salvation as victory over hostile powers to take on fresh 
significance and meaning.
62
 
Whilst this cosmological context may be a primary way of understanding Jesus’ priorities in 
fulfilling God’s soteriological mission,63 it does not follow that there is a lack of evidence for 
him addressing injustice and unrighteousness when he encountered it in tangible form. For 
example, on the basis of his understanding of the biblical terminology surrounding ‘power’ 
and ‘structure’ Yoder argues that in modern social analysis these concepts can only 
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reasonably be understood in social and political terms and that, therefore, Jesus was engaging 
both cosmologically and politically throughout his ministry and mission.
64
 Further, those 
reading Jesus’ denunciation of hypocrisy and his concomitant physical disruption of the 
temple market
65
 may be forgiven for seeing some acts of violence as being advocated by 
Jesus himself and perhaps, therefore, as necessary acts of righteous indignation against a 
wayward religion and culture.
66
  
Such instances could allow the Christian to cite precedence from Jesus for their own acts of 
violence against whatever regime, structure or person they find unrighteous or counter to 
their perception of Christian purposes. In discussing this phenomenon Niebuhr illustrates 
such an outlook in Frank’s consideration of the Spanish conquistadors who invaded and 
subdued the indigenous population in South America in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries. 
After committing acts of the most grotesque and violent kind Frank alludes to the Christian 
faith that sustained and justified such outrages because for the conquistador, “Within his 
cruelties is the intuition of his destiny as an agent of the divine.”67 This idea of working on 
God’s behalf and within a modus operandi He is believed to have utilised and endorsed has 
continued to fuel, motivate and justify acts of violence by those aligning themselves with 
Christianity.
68
  
1.4 The Possibility of Divine Violence. 
The following chapters delineate methods of interpreting language and bringing meaning to 
concepts via symbol and metaphor; first is the question of whether violence is connected with 
a God biblically revealed as potentially being ontologically love. For biblical reference to this 
concept from the New Testament, see 1 John 4: 7-21; of particular note is the ontological 
nature of the verse, “Whoever does not love does not know God, because God is love.” (v8). 
Smalley observes that John does not merely say that “God loves”, but rather that God is love 
which means that God is not only the source of love, but is love itself. Thus the assertion 
“God is love” means not simply, asserts Smalley, that love is one of his activities, but that all 
his activity is loving.
69
 Further St. John states, “And so we know and rely on the love God 
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has for us. God is love. Whoever lives in love lives in God, and God in him.” (v16 NIV). 
Smalley concludes that the sentiments this verse portrays form the high point of the 
Johannine contemplation of God.
70
 Conversely, Tracy argues for a metaphorical 
understanding of the Johannine understanding of God’s nature in his letters. For him, John’s 
statement that “God is love” does not say literally what God is but instead produces a 
metaphorical meaning for what God is like and in this re-descriptive sense, the statement 
defines, for Tracy, who for the Christian, God is.
71
 
In the quest to understand the purpose and use of violence from such a God of love a 
conceptual duality, or antagonistic dichotomy, has developed in regard to violence and the 
created order. This is seen in chapter sub-headings such as ‘The Goodness of Creation Versus 
an Ontology of Violence’.72 Creation is presented as existing in a state in which original, 
implicit goodness came about because of the inherent love of the Creator; not because it had 
to exist and certainly not because of a battle that God engaged in with evil.
73
 
1.4.1 Ancient Near Eastern Context.  
Ancient creation stories, in particular the Babylonian myth, make it possible to consider the 
pre-eminence of violence in the chronological revelation of the created world. Delineating the 
full story of the Babylonian Creation Epic, Unger notes that in the primitive age when only 
living uncreated matter existed the mythical god-figures present gave birth to many offspring 
who were so annoying in their conduct that their father, Apsu, made up his mind to do away 
with them.
74
 This violent behaviour was only a pre-cursor to what would follow as another 
god, Ea, found out about this plan, foiled it and gave birth to Marduk – the great Babylonian 
hero-god of the Epic. The ensuing battles and destruction of enemies are presented as a 
violent suppression of anyone and anything that stood in the way of the gods who created this 
world. It is a bloody and violent story of war, intrigue, obsession and decimation; evil and 
violence are pre-eminent and remain central to understanding the Babylonian gods, how they 
created the world and the way they would rule and sustain it. 
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The question as to the chronological appearance of goodness or violence in the creation 
process is addressed in the Babylonian creation story Enuma Elish, a text that was likely to 
have been known by the ancient people of Israel.
75
 In this account, the god Marduk has to 
subdue the chaos monster Tiamat before going on to create the world out of Tiamet’s dead 
body.
76
 The key issue is that the world’s elements of evil emanate inevitably out of the evil 
from which it was originally made. Other Ancient Near Eastern (ANE) creation myths also 
observe that good is not always prior to evil in the chronology of creation, leading to the 
proposition that violence might be considered as an element in the godhead, or at least a 
means of divine revelation and the unfolding of a Deity’s purposes.77  
When these perspectives are contrasted with the Judaeo-Christian creation stories it has led to 
the observation that the two positions are diametrically opposed.
78
 Brueggemann 
acknowledges that the opening verses of the Genesis creation account suggest that God is at 
work on an already present chaotic reality and that the mood of this rhetoric shows God as 
serenely and supremely in charge without the presence of struggle, anxiety, or risk.
79
 In 
contrast to other ANE creation myths this suggests that the biblical God of creation is in 
providential control such that nothing outside of Him can impede or influence His being, 
creation or purposes.
80
  
Conversely, a broad approach to themes common within ANE creation stories detects many 
shared macro-ideas. The Gilgamesh epic and the biblical account, for instance, agree on the 
existence of an invisible, supernatural world and a God or gods that are personal and can 
think, speak and have a desire and ability to communicate with humans and seek to control 
human affairs.
81
 From the perspective of the biblical God with an ontology of love, creation 
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comes about by divine choice and power as an inherently perfect and good thing for the 
fulfilment of a good God’s purposes. This leads to the conclusion that a biblical worldview 
would not grant ontological pre-eminence to either evil or violence.
82
 In fact, God is seen to 
be both fully in control of creation and at the helm of an ongoing plan of love to redeem 
people from evil and the consequences of their choices and actions.
83
 A good God creates a 
good world and has a good plan for it and its inhabitants.
84
  
1.4.1.1 The Chronology of Evil.  
This being the case, whether in God or creation, it follows that evil, as ontological source, 
and violence, as functional manifestation, are not necessarily synonymous or even  
conceptually conjoined. The world is sharply separated in its nature from the God who made 
it since it did not emanate from Him but was called into being by a pronouncement of His 
will.
85
  Notwithstanding this ‘separation’, a world called into being at the behest of God and 
by His free will is by its nature His possession and He its creator, owner and Lord.
86
  
Conversely, God’s relationship to the world should not be seen in terms of His being a 
Creator who merely makes a Creation as just another act amongst many others. Such a view 
suggests the possibility of a gap and therefore the potential for an inherent difference between 
God and the world He has made. Rather than suggesting, therefore, that a creator God makes 
a creation as something distinct and separate from Himself it is more apposite to project a 
closer, integral link.
87
  
The link, whilst not necessarily ontological per se, is at least one of extreme proximity and 
identity, such that it would be difficult to argue for an evil world being made by a non-evil 
God. This scenario exacerbates the existence of a clear differential between evil and violence, 
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because whilst violence can be borne out of an ontology of evil, this need not always be the 
case. Additionally, the idea of God having evil as an ontological trait is strongly refuted, as is 
the notion that God could ever functionally express evil.
88
 Boersma observes that,  
When theologians express fear of “implicating” God in violence, such implication is 
clearly understood as a negative thing. It seems unthinkable – perhaps particularly in 
our late modern context – to associate God with violence. The problem of God and 
violence appears to us analogous to the problem of God and evil. We find it 
impossible to worship a God who is implicated in violence as to worship a God who is 
the author of evil. The underlying assumption in many discussions of divine violence 
appears to be that violence is inherently evil and immoral...
89
  
So, whilst God being perceived as ontologically evil is rigorously denied, equal vigour should 
be applied to the divine right for God to functionally choose to express Himself and His 
purposes via violent means; this proposition can be held without having to concede that He 
must have an ontological base of evil.
90
 This is not a semantic exercise but a foundational 
assertion in the setting of biblical and theological parameters for God’s possible relation to 
and use of violence.  
1.4.2 The Divine, Evil & Ontology.  
In microcosm this is one of the positions this research is exploring; namely that Christian 
understanding of God does not have to accede to ontological divine violence, let alone evil. It 
also does not follow de facto that the ‘charge’ against God of using violence has no grounds, 
or that God requires humans to justify His seemingly difficult-to-explain-actions.
91
   
Terminology that charges or accuses God can be seen, therefore, as unnecessarily perjurious, 
juridical and bound by cultural and historic forms and contexts. It is evident, for example, 
that how the cross “speaks” to a particular people at a particular time is partly dependent on 
how and what they are capable of hearing and understanding within their historical epoch. It 
follows that those communicating their understanding of the Christian gospel must be adept 
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at interpreting and translating its message via new conceptual forms in each generation and to 
each group of people they are addressing.
92
 This process might necessitate the Christian 
theologian and apologist repackaging, retranslating and re-presenting old forms to establish 
whether they retain meaning and relevance for a modern audience.
93
  
Within such reappraisal and reinterpretation positive terminology might be utilised in 
describing God’s willingness to utilise violence for purposeful and soteriological means; this 
in spite of the reality of ontological goodness and love that would ordinarily be understood to 
curtail such activity. God’s desire to draw errant humanity back into the fold of His plans is 
such that perhaps He is willing to act outside the expectations of One who is ontologically 
love. He is also willing to enter into the experience and suffering of humanity in a way far 
outside the reasonable expectations that humans have of Divine Beings. Moltmann speaks of 
this willingness and engagement when, in a chapter entitled Beyond Obedience and 
Rebellion, he notes that God is, if one is prepared to put it into inadequate imagery, 
transcendent as Father, immanent as Son and opens up the future of history as the Spirit.
94
  
This view of the triune God, revealing and dealing with humanity in the past, present and 
future, as transcendent, immanent and eschatological presents a God who is not only 
profoundly un-deistic but supremely involved with the world; going beyond what might be 
reasonably imagined, expected or hoped for in order to engage with and save a lost humanity. 
Such action and choice does not defame the Christian God or accredit Him with negative 
predicates. On the contrary, it presents a sacrificial theology of the highest order, not merely 
of a creature, which though belonging to God can nonetheless be sacrificed for divine 
purposes, but rather the ultimate sacrifice available – of a human being, Jesus Christ, 
provided by God for this reason and ontologically linked in his being to both humanity and 
deity. Jenson observes, for example, about animals and particularly their use for food and 
sacrifice that all meals, in fact, are intrinsically religious occasions, indeed sacrifices, and 
were so understood especially in Israel; for all life belongs intimately to God, so that the 
killing involved in eating – which is, he contends, not at all avoided by eating vegetables – is 
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an intrusion into God’s domain.95 This is an intrusion that God not only allows but actively 
encourages; it remains an intrusion nonetheless into the sphere of divinely-ordained animal 
sacrifice for human pleasure and benefit. 
This demonstration of the created order and its concomitant hierarchy of beings exhibits the 
inalienable realisation that whilst animals undoubtedly hold an essential place in God’s 
creation, humans are nonetheless not merely pivotal, but are primary and the very reason for 
the creation existing in its current form.
96
 Willingness on God’s part to make this ultimate 
sacrifice expresses His all-encompassing purpose to do all that it takes soteriologically, even 
when the costs infringe upon His own Being and sensibilities.
97
   
The paradox of divine violence linked to a God of love apparently leaves little room for 
theological manoeuvre and yet further investigation reveals a more textured and multi-
layered view of the personality, purposes and character of God. Theologians have long 
sought to understand and delineate what they consider to be appropriate divine attributes, 
traits deemed to be mutually exclusive can, however, too easily be baulked at or ignored. 
Concerning these supposed contradictions within Godself Pannenberg states that He is  
concurrently the God of covenant righteousness, but also the eternal, almighty and holy God 
before whose wrath the ungodly and sinners are destroyed.
98
 This wide-ranging affirmation 
of seemingly opposing elements is intrinsic to describing the spectrum of divine attributes 
and although Pannenberg does not explicitly use the word violence its inference is 
inescapable when reading of a ‘holy God before whose wrath the ungodly and sinners are 
destroyed’ (italics ours). Linking wrath and destruction in this way leads to the possibility of 
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God manifesting an attitude of powerful anger, potentially leading to the destruction of those 
standing counter to His purposes and plans.
99
  
Assertions and biblical depictions of God utilising blatant aggression imbue Him with at least 
the potential of having an extrinsic and perhaps even intrinsic attitude, acceptance or 
endorsement of violence. They suggest a Being who might choose to act in ways that can 
only be properly understood as being violent. Various biblical instances in which God exerts 
aggression, violence or destruction against humans can be presented; in Exodus 12:29, for 
example, it describes how God ‘strikes down’ (‘smote’ KJV,) the firstborn in the land of 
Egypt during the plagues. Whilst the root of this verb can be used in a variety of contexts, 
here it demonstrates God killing people to fulfil His purposes; the verb most ordinarily 
translated as meaning, “smite, strike, hit, beat, slay, kill.”100 
It has been seen as at least a possibility that violence could be considered within the praxis of 
this Judaeo-Christian God. Such a possibility is an appropriate starting point and it is now 
important to consider the various means by which violence and atonement is presented as a 
concept via metaphor, symbol, language and story.   
1.5 Knowing God. 
All the models and metaphors historically used to explain the atonement acknowledge, at 
least tacitly, violence
101
 raising the theological issue of interpretation and whether God’s 
connection with violence should be addressed directly or obliquely. The former explains the 
importance of violence whilst acknowledging the difficulty in correlating it to an 
ontologically loving God. The latter interprets divine violence in terms that distance violence 
both from God and its normative use as a word and concept. Either way, violence in the 
atonement and the character and attributes of God is a contentious issue.  
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The opening sentence of the Geneva Catechism states that the primary goal of human life is 
to know God.
102
 This proposition is not an archaic vision of human life, but an allusion to the 
theological mystery interwoven with Christian belief: living has something to do with 
knowing God.
103
 This core tenet of faith and theology expresses the human desire to know 
God in a manner which encompasses frank engagement with the biblical revelation,
104
 
including any unfavourable or unpalatable elements; a priori preclusion of anything perceived 
as negative cannot be countenanced.
105
 Amongst these unpalatable elements in theology is, 
according to McFague, uneasiness with the relational and passionate language inferred in 
creedal statements. She notes that from Augustine through Thomas and to the Westminster 
Confession the “end of man” was to “know” and “enjoy” God forever; beyond fear of 
judgment and punishment for sins, she observes, and beyond relief and gratitude for 
forgiveness, lies loving God for God’s own sake – because God is God, attractive, valuable, 
lovely beyond all knowing and all imagining.
106
 
Theology, of course, begins and ends within the human realm, so insofar as humans claim to 
know God they do so because God comes to be with humanity in their sphere - not because 
He lifts them out of it.
107
 The ‘problem’ of engagement with God is not a philosophical 
conundrum, it is a realisation that finite humans are acknowledging, responding to and 
speaking about a God who has made Himself known and wants to be known.
108
 For those 
seeking to express something of this knowable Being, the doctrine of God is a principal topic 
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of Christian theology.
109
 Its special concern is God’s nature and the character of His dealings 
with the world revealed in the history of Israel and articulated in the life and witness of the 
Church.
110
  
1.5.1 Relationship With God.  
In the description of God in Genesis and Exodus, for example, words like ‘omniscient’, or 
‘omnipresent’ are not found and Pannenberg argues that infinity is, in fact, not a biblical term 
for God. It is however implied, he concedes, in many biblical descriptions of God, and 
especially clearly in the attributes of eternity, omnipotence, and omnipresence that are 
ascribed to him.
111
 Further, Macquarrie considers the grouping of these concepts to be 
centred in the notion of overwhelmingness; discussion of them not primarily being in terms of 
their explicit biblical references, but rather of their philosophical cogence and how they 
enable the theologian to preserve, what he calls, the existential dimension in our 
interpretation, for this word [overwhelmingness] describes God as he relates to man, God 
being manifest as the tremendum.
112
 
The prevalent biblical concepts instead identify God in terms of His relationship to 
individuals and His deeds on their behalf.
113
 Fiddes highlights the relationality of God in 
describing those who stood against Arius and Arianism in their desire to reduce Jesus to a 
semi-divine and perfectly created being. Instead, he argues, the Church re-asserted its 
position that the story of salvation tells us that God always goes out from God’s self in love, 
sharing the divine being in a communion of life; concluding that the God of salvation lives 
eternally in relationship.
114
 Fiddes places God’s actions in the context of the doctrine of a 
God whose life and reality consists in relationships; moreover, he argues that these, 
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…relationships are not static links between individuals, but are love in movement, 
making an interweaving dance of ‘perichoresis’ in which we are summoned to be 
involved. God happens, moves and comes.
115 
God is therefore not concerned with either convincing people of His reality or of providing a 
theological lexicon
116
 and instead extends relationship towards humanity providing a basis of 
knowing One who is knowable, loving and loveable.
117
  Biblical theology must, therefore, 
acknowledge the Old Testament’s troubling images and these must be reconciled with the 
revelation of God in the New Testament, particularly in Jesus Christ. This will enable a 
theology which does not deny or ignore polarities, but rather incorporates them into an intra-
testamental schema to better explicate, understand and facilitate relationship with God as a 
multi-layered Being, replete with nuance, difficulty and complication.
118
 
1.6 Divine Attributes.  
This ‘chasm’ is keenly felt in regard to establishing God’s attributes, with an emphasis upon 
where, if at all, violence might be situated. Barth warns against the arrogance and 
anthropocentrism that can be at the heart of such endeavours; in delineating the Old 
Testament meaning of truth he notes that it indicates the propriety of a process or state, and 
therefore its solidity, force and permanence, and therefore its authenticity, validity, necessity 
and impregnability.
119
 For Barth God-talk is possible because it is sourced not in humans, but 
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in God; he argues that ontological truth can only be seen as the predicate and prerogative of 
God as the Lord who speaks and acts in Israel.
120
  
1.6.1 Aposiopesis…  
When speaking of this God of Israel all statements must be held lightly; conclusions and 
propositions being made with the incorporation of appropriate humility and provisionality. 
Rorty posits the contingency of language and truth, claiming that the one cannot properly be 
understood, or even exist, without the other; asserting that,  
Truth cannot be out there – cannot exist independently of the human mind – because 
sentences cannot so exist, or be out there. The world is out there, but descriptions of the 
world are not. Only descriptions of the world can be true or false. The world on its own – 
unaided by the describing activities of human beings – cannot.
121
  
God can only live in the grammar of religious talk when that talk expresses God’s freedom 
from it. We have something to say to human religiousness, our own included, Williams 
argues, but we are not in the business of winning arguments for good and all. He concludes 
that what the world, religious and secular, does with the news of Jesus crucified and risen is 
beyond our control, and if it were otherwise we should have lost what our own ‘news’ is 
news of.
122
 
Another example of aposiopetic theology came in the Middle Ages when thinkers were 
debating whether God has qualities that are crucial to human understanding of Him; that are a 
part of His ontology. Maimonides taught that God is so unlike anything that can be thought 
about God that He cannot be said to have any attributes at all; at its most coherent it can only 
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be said that God is not a member of the class of beings that possess any given trait or its 
contrary – this is “negative theology”.123 
1.6.1.1 The Deeper Essence.  
 
Conversely, Otto claims that it is essential to the Christian conception of God that it 
designates and precisely characterizes deity by the attributes spirit, reason, purpose, good 
will, supreme power, unity and selfhood.
124
 These attributes, he argues, are definite concepts 
that can be grasped by the intellect and analysed by thought and are to be deemed rational; so 
that belief in such a God is possible as opposed to having mere feelings.
125
  
 
Otto warns against the danger of believing that any supposedly exhaustive list of ‘rational’ 
attributions can represent the full nature of God.
126
 He acknowledges that such attempts are 
worthy and necessary and yet that they can also inadvertently shroud a fuller and more 
holistic understanding of God by means of highlighting ‘synthetic essential attributes’ to the 
detriment of the ‘deeper essence’ of deity and the ‘profounder religion’ that the inclusion of 
mysticism can facilitate.
127
 Otto, therefore, introduces an element of alterity into his theology, 
a theme that will be returned to shortly.
128
  
 
Without ascertaining divine attributes it would be difficult to engage in affirmative God-talk, 
hence the proposition of qualities perceived to be of God’s essence, “essential attributes”, or 
words used to relate to God, or “accidental attributes”.129 On whether divine violence might 
be integrated into God’s attributes, reflection upon both elements will be undertaken to 
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ascertain whether, if to be included at all, it might be an ontological or functional divine 
attribute.  
1.6.2 God’s Personhood.  
The question arises as to what God-talk is appropriate in terms of divine character, 
personality and relationality, whilst acknowledging that the ascription of personhood to God 
is fraught with difficulties.
130
 The God of the Bible is never called “person” or “personal”, the 
term is exclusive to Greek theatre of the time referring to the actor’s mask.131 This ‘mask’ as 
‘persona’ nevertheless presents a potential predicate of God in that whatever can be ‘seen’ of 
God is only that which He chooses to show, in terms which humans can engage with and 
understand.
132
 It is another example of God performing or revealing to accommodate human 
limitations – again similar to the mother talking baby-language to her children.  
In the history of theology this is how concepts of God have been framed. Macquarrie notes 
that even though ideas of God have undergone huge change in the interests of transcendence 
since the earlier mythological level of understanding in which God was conceived 
anthropomorphically, there nonetheless remains the idea in traditional theism that, “…God 
was still thought of as a person, but a strange metaphysical kind of person without a body.”133 
A via media has also been observed, that,  
…it is part of the completely incommensurable nature of God that he is neither personal 
nor nonpersonal, since he is both at once and therefore transpersonal. The decisive thing 
is that God is not below our level. Which means that, even though we can speak of God 
only in analogical terms, metaphors, images, ciphers and symbols, we can nevertheless 
speak to him meaningfully with human words. This much should be clear to us from the 
Bible. We need not try to think out in precise terms the reality of God, but we should 
squarely face that reality. Man should not lose his power of speech at this point, but 
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should stand up and speak out in a genuinely human way. From the first to the last page 
of the Bible, the talk is not only of and about God but continually also to and with God, 
praising and lamenting, praying and protesting. From the first page to the last – here 
Feuerbach was undoubtedly right – God in the Bible is subject and not predicate: it is not 
that love is God, but that God is love.
134
  
There are two offences to Modernity
135
 in the Old Testament here: firstly, God is presented as 
a person to whom humans can only relate personally; secondly, He is transcendent, 
extending beyond the deepest penetration of human religious understanding - moreover, he is 
both of these together.
136
 Using the language of medieval thinkers, God has, according to 
Blumenthal, at least two essential attributes : holiness and personality; God is incarnate in 
personality and holiness; so is humanity, God becomes through personality and holiness; so 
does humanity, holiness and personality are attributes (Hebrew yehasim); they are relation 
and relatedness (Hebrew yahas).
137
   
Elsewhere, Blumenthal exegetes seeming contradictions in the attributes and character of 
God; considering the Zohar, a medieval theosophical work, he notes that it is sometimes 
presented in the classical midrashic style of showing a contradiction between two verses 
which would otherwise seem to eradicate each other. According to the Zohar, he argues, God 
is made up of ten dimensions, called sefirot (singular, sefira) and these sefirot are not 
extradeical hypostases, nor are they intramental attributes; rather, he contends, they are 
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extramental, intradeical dimensions of God’s very being; that is, they are real, external to our 
minds, but also they are inside God’s very being.138 
Feuerbach argues that this understanding of God is prone to error and that such theology is 
simply anthropology as there is no distinction between the predicates of the divine and the 
human nature in the mind of the theologian and thus no distinction between the divine and the 
human subject.
139
 The classic expression of Feuerbach’s concept does not believe that 
theologians are dragging divine predicates into the realm of humanity but that they are 
projecting the very best of human accomplishments and attributes onto an ultimate, 
aspirational being who is the greatest thing they can conceive of and more.
140
 Theology, in 
this sense, can only exist as the human-bound reflection of religion upon itself in its use and 
endorsement of both anthropopathy and anthropomorphism.  
Schleiermacher likewise notes that religion is finite and therefore subject to imperfections
141
 
whilst Macquarrie observes, in his attempt to encapsulate the essence of theology, that it, 
“…may be defined as the study which, through participation in and reflection upon a 
religious faith, seeks to express the content of this faith in the clearest and most coherent 
language available.”142 The adjunct to his definition is that anthropopathy and 
anthropomorphism are therefore, by definition, the very clearest, most accessible and 
coherent concepts available for finite humans seeking to explicate and engage with an 
infinite, ethereal being in a manner which they can relate to.  
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1.6.2.1 Thinking & Speaking.  
Contrary to anthropocentric theology Hilary of Poitiers claimed, whilst speaking about God 
as Father
143
, that it is more prudent to think of these things than speak of them, admitting the 
inherent limitations of language as expressions of what might be said about God. Moreover, 
Hilary observed, that in regard to what He is in Himself He is incomprehensible, invisible 
and immortal and that in these words there is already an encomium of His majesty and an 
intimation of human thoughts and thereby a sort of definition of human meaning.
144
 As noted, 
speech as a result will necessarily surrender to the nature and words do not and cannot 
portray the subject as it actually is.
145
 
A modern proponent of this outlook, Riddell, challenges the ‘propositional nature’ of much 
modern Christianity which has, he argues, embraced the post-Reformation creedal nature of 
Christianity to the detriment of an open-ended and relational understanding of God. On 
speaking authoritatively about God and His nature he warns that God will not be contained 
and that the attempt to construct boxes for the divine presence is doomed to tragedy; 
concluding that, “It is no denial of the centrality of Christ to say that we are still finding out 
who God will be. Christian faith is not a deposit of information, but a relationship with a 
partner who is constantly luring and dancing in the direction of the horizon.”146 
This nevertheless does not defer the conclusion that attributes can and should be ascribed to 
God; because, indeed, without such ascriptions it is difficult to engage in any God-talk at all. 
The difficulty arises in the category differences that exist between finite, tangible creatures 
and an infinite, intangible God. Macquarrie argues that there is,  
…justification for talking of God in personal language, and for regarding him as personal. 
But this adjective “personal” is predicated of God symbolically, not literally. This fact 
seems to distress some people, but it need not. We can certainly assert that God is not less 
than personal, and that the dynamic diversity-in-unity of personal life affords our best 
symbol of the mystery of God. But it cannot exhaustively comprehend this mystery. In 
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general, the discussion of the attributes in relation to the mystery of God points us to the 
paradoxical, or dialectical, character that belongs to every adjective applied to the 
incomparable, which nonetheless draws near in revelation and presence. God is both 
hidden and manifest, our highest attributes fall short, yet in so far as they make God 
unhidden, they are true.
147
 
With these provisos in mind the exploration and explanation of the nature of God, and 
whether this nature incorporates violence at some level, continues.  
1.7 Disturbing Divine Behaviour.  
A critical juncture has been reached with the issue as to what degree of violence, if any, 
should be ascribed to God, either ontologically or functionally. Seibert presents an analysis of 
‘disturbing divine behavior’ (sic)148 addressing how such manifestations of God’s character 
might prove, “...particularly troubling to some people” and of the kind of questions which 
might be raised by, “...thoughtful readers of Scripture” and of, “...the potentially problematic 
dimensions of these portrayals of God.”149 In an a priori manner he decides what reactions 
and responses would be made by post-modern readers approaching scriptural descriptions of 
God that might be interpreted as unpalatable.  
In this regard Barth asserts that,  
 
Our undertaking to view and conceive God will not, then, involve self-deception, and our 
attempt to speak of God will not involve the deception of others. We shall not want to 
speak of more than an undertaking and attempt, and therefore not of an undertaking that 
has “succeeded”. Our viewing and conceiving of God and our speaking of Him will never 
be a completed work showing definitive results: and therefore we can never view what 
we do as something which has already “succeeded”. In this respect the hiddenness of God 
as the point of departure of this activity of ours defines at the outset the limit which will 
not be infringed even at its finishing point. The perfect work of truth will always be 
God’s own work and not ours.150  
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1.7.1 A Priori Agendas.  
 
Barth’s emphasis is upon God and His purposes, regardless of theological agenda, 
consequences and pre-set parameters.
151
 It would therefore be anachronistic to preclude 
certain traits and characteristics that, whilst difficult to understand in a contemporary context, 
might have been both explicable and necessary in another cultural and historical context. 
 
The same charge might be brought against those in a contemporary context who are 
condemning religion and God in similar fashion; Dawkins, for instance, is scathing of the 
Deity represented in the Old Testament without once acknowledging that the biblical 
narratives occurred in a culture and at a time entirely alien to our own.
152
 In like manner he 
might also criticise the scientists of that era for being ignorant of quantum mechanics. Römer 
too asserts that it is inappropriate to obfuscate ancient texts without acknowledging their 
original context. He notes that those editing an anthology of theological discources across a 
wide historical period, “…would attempt to understand these various writings as products of 
specific periods and circumstances in which writers spoke about God in certain ways.”153 
 
The need to let the text speak on its own terms is nowhere more urgently required, in fact, 
than in a situation where a bloodless present might de facto inaccurately understand and 
thereby misinterpret a bloody past. The task of interpretation always operates out of a 
personal framework and both the interpreter’s presuppositions and their personal or 
professional interests specify that framework. These issues inevitably determine the questions 
and methods that the individual interpreter deems appropriate for the text as well as the 
explanations they will accept or allow.
154
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An example of a ‘personal framework’ of interpretation comes in the a priori agenda and 
associated theological parameters exhibited by Macquarrie in his search for God’s character. 
When considering potential interpretative models for atonement he starts by ‘clearing the 
ground’; setting aside theologies of atonement he acknowledges as influential but nonetheless 
presuppose ideas of God which, from his perspective, are questionable.
155
 He is no different 
to any other scholar in terms of working from within a particular position and outlook; what 
is different is his admittance of the fact. He decides the parameters of divine possibility in 
terms of character and purpose and then sets these as the borders to his understanding and 
theological construction.  
This method de facto inhibits and limits any conclusions reached thereby hampering the 
broader search for metaphors and analogies to explicate deity and divine purposes. The 
purpose of analogy, metaphor or theology is to make meaningful that which would otherwise 
remain beyond understanding. If divine reality were already explicable there would be no 
need of expressive, interpretative tools and methods; the caveat being that all such attempts 
retain the limitation of human language and conceptual understanding. It is therefore unwise 
to exacerbate further these limitations with a new set of self-imposed parameters before the 
theological quest has begun.  
1.7.1.1 Feuerbach’s Projections.  
To do this is to fall, once again, into the scenario delineated by Feuerbach, who suggests that 
the human quest for the divine is no more than humans projecting their ideals for the perfect 
Super-Human onto the canvas of an aspirational, ‘deity’.156 In fact, Feuerbach goes further, 
charging Christianity of being afraid of its own theological pronouncements, choosing to 
limit itself to self-imposed parameters of perception and description. He argues that the one 
who earnestly believes in the divine existence would not be shocked at attributing even the 
most grossly sensuous qualities to God.
157
 It is ironic that an atheist engaged in a polemic 
against philosophical Christianity is nonetheless forthright in defending an open-ended view 
of divine predicates.
158
 Feuerbach contends that believers ascribe attributes to God on the 
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basis of their own subjective experience of the very best human traits, amplified and 
projected onto the divine.
159
 Wisdom, for example, is thus presented as a divine attribute 
because humans seek wisdom as an aspirational and positive trait.  
Likewise benevolence and goodness are projected, culminating in the ultimate human goal of 
love being predicated onto this divine being.
160
 All that is best and most positive in humans is 
projected onto God in whom these traits find their absolute completion.
161
 It follows that the 
opposite is also true and that humans, or indeed theology, is keen to distance God from any 
attribute that would be unpalatable or undesirable in itself; this, of course, causes distinct 
problems in even potentially ascribing violence to God.  
Commenting on Feuerbach’s model Pannenberg notes that the critical description of this 
procedure as projection gained force once the resultant concept of God was seen as a unified 
but contradictory model, since the qualities ascribed to God still bear traces of finitude (in 
opposition to God’s infinity) along with anthropomorphic features.162 Psychological 
motivation was all that was needed, he adds, for the human imagination to project ideas of 
God which would ascribe to the divine essence qualities analogous to those of human and 
finite things.
163
 This is all that humans can hope for in their desire to describe God and His 
supposed attributes; the difficulty being that given human limitations and an inherent inability 
to acknowledge and accept negative ascriptions coupled with the transcendent nature of God, 
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language is at best limiting and at worst ineffectual in its attempt to describe the indescribable 
and to ascribe the unpalatable.
164
  
1.7.1.2 Wisdom’s Parable.  
In regard to linguistic terms, the choice between the utilisation of equivocal or univocal 
language means that the theologian is caught between the proverbial rock and a hard place, a 
point examined by Flew in his adaptation of Wisdom’s Parable of the Gardener.165 In the 
parable two explorers, on finding a clearing in a jungle, speculate how it may have got there; 
they decide to test the hypothesis that a gardener must have created the plot. They await the 
gardener’s arrival to no avail and then wonder whether he is being consciously illusive and so 
construct a barbed wire perimeter around the garden, set up trip wires and post guard dogs. 
After another fruitless wait one of the explorers becomes cynical as to whether there is, in 
fact, no gardener at all. The other explorer maintains his faith that a gardener exists and 
provides provisos and caveats to explain the gardener’s inability to meet their ‘existence 
criteria’. "But what remains of your original assertion?” the cynical explorer questions, “Just 
how does what you call an invisible, intangible, eternally elusive gardener differ from an 
imaginary gardener or even from no gardener at all?"
166
 The ‘believer’ remains staunch in his 
assertion that the gardener remains real, despite seemingly compelling evidence to the 
contrary.  
Flew uses this parable to illustrate the point that once an assertion is challenged and defended 
in such a manner it loses its credibility and thereby, what is otherwise a fine brash hypothesis 
may thus be killed by inches, what Flew describes as death by a thousand qualifications.
167
 
This parable is useful in two ways. On the one hand, it can be used to verify the belief that 
God should in no way be associated in any manner with violence. If He were to be linked in 
this way then the problem is raised as to what would be meant by God’s ‘love’ if when such a 
love is qualified it comes to represent a love that can punish, commit violence, seek revenge, 
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that is wrathful and exhibits favouritism.
168
 It would have come to mean a love that is 
difficult for anyone to understand in normative usage and, therefore, be a love ‘killed’ by a 
thousand qualifications.
169
  
Conversely, all of these qualifications are human qualifications projecting human finite and 
limited, sensibilities and understandings onto a transcendent being. The issue becomes, once 
again, the difference between a theo-centric and anthropo-centric theology of God’s 
attributes. We choose to use the parable as a means of confirming the limitations of human 
endeavour to understand that which is outside its comprehension, thus opening the way for a 
theology that is predominantly biblical rather than cultural and theological rather than merely 
anthropological. 
Hart acknowledges that, indeed, all human communities have a story told to themselves and 
others expressing their distinctive origins and raison d’être; the Christian community 
likewise uses the Bible as ‘scripture’ formalising its role as primary text and basis of meaning 
and identity to fulfil a similar aim and to accomplish a similar task. This story, which the 
Church is based upon and which it offers to the wider community, “…is founded decisively 
upon the text of the Bible and the ‘story’ which it in turn tells with its classic themes of 
creation, sin, covenant, redemption and hope…”170 
1.7.2 Responding to Violent Accusations.  
Hanson provides an example of this perspective when he considers the epistemological 
paucity of his perceived three most-used responses to the Old Testament God represented as a 
warmongering, warrior Deity. Response one is to emit an ominous silence; response two is to 
accept Yahweh as warrior; whilst response three is to conclude that the God of the Old 
Testament is in some manner a lesser deity than the God portrayed in the New Testament.
171
 
If these three ways of interpreting God’s biblical activity as One who at least endorses war 
fall short Hanson proposes a further option of a biblical theology in which Old and New 
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Testaments bear witness to one universal redemptive drama.
172
 In the confessions of Israel 
and the early church this theology discerns the efforts of God to gather an obedient 
community around acknowledgement of its sole origin in divine grace and its sole vocation in 
worshipping God and becoming an instrument in His creative, redemptive plan for the 
world.
173
  
Marshall, too, acknowledges the necessity to move away from endorsing any one response to 
presenting God’s soteriological plan; he appeals to the various metaphors and analogies that 
together represent Christ’s accomplishments in his incarnation, obedient life, death and 
resurrection and heavenly reign which are all, he argues, to be treated seriously.
174
 
Unfortunately, Marshall does not elucidate what ‘treated seriously’ means; he is comfortable 
to engage concurrently with metaphors that express palatable aspects of God’s character 
whilst questioning those which represent perspectives out of line with his own outlook and 
sensibilities.  
For example, he considers the metaphors of ‘destruction and death’, noting various New 
Testament references where God incontrovertibly promises the dispensing of physical, 
ultimate death and destruction for those found in sin and for the Devil and his agents.
175
 
Having assessed this imagery he then baulks at the theological ramifications in regard to 
God’s character, attributes and purpose.176 He therefore inadvertently debunks his own 
translation of the metaphors, concluding that he believes it would be wrong to take the 
imagery to imply that God behaves in a way that would arouse the criticism of a cosmic 
equivalent of Amnesty International or similar agencies.
177
  
What Marshall means by ‘wrong’ is the apparent potentially negative ethical implications for 
God in dispensing death and destruction, thereby admitting that what had previously seemed 
to be a straightforward hermeneutic and application of the metaphors is, in fact, not accurate. 
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What transpires is that many divergent and difficult aspersions are aimed towards God when 
considering His biblical responses to sin, the Satan and His dealing therewith.  
The danger theologically is, once again, the avoidance of a position which then facilitates 
subjective ‘cherry-picking’ of favourite metaphors or biblical passages thus enabling the 
theologian to acknowledge and engage with some issues whilst explaining others away.
178
 
Our position is that it is more consistent and honest and thereby yielding of more accurate 
results, albeit potentially unpalatable ones, to decide on an interpretative methodology and 
then apply it in an objective manner, regardless of potential pit-falls for a particular view of 
God, His attributes and His purposes.  
1.7.2.1 Unacceptable Ascriptions.  
Such an anachronistic attitude does not have to apply only to biblical perspectives, however, 
as Macquarrie demonstrates when he decides in advance, having considered Anselm and 
Calvin in regard to their views of God’s character, that such harsh, even tyrannical, pictures 
of God are unacceptable.
179
 Such ascriptions say more, however, about Macquarrie, his own 
character and outlook than they do about the attributes of God; such will be the case for all 
anthropocentric theology.  
A priori dispositions against presenting God in an ‘unfavourable light’ lead to the pre-
exclusion of attributes construed as malicious or capricious on God’s part.180 This pre-
ordained desire to be entirely ‘positive’ to God, His attributes and purposes de facto causes 
theologians to eradicate factors they find negative or ‘unhelpful’. The theological fear of 
“implicating” God in violence understands such a process as negative and unthinkable, 
analogous to the perception that it is just as impossible to worship a God implicated in 
violence as it is to worship One who is the author of evil.
181
  
                                                             
178
 On biblical hermeneutics Stott concedes on behalf of the evangelical church that, “We must therefore 
acknowledge with deep shame that our treatment of Scripture seldom coincides with our view of it. We are 
much better at asserting its authority than at wrestling with its interpretation. We are sometimes slovenly, 
sometimes simplistic, sometimes highly selective and sometimes downright dishonest.” J. Stott, Obeying Christ 
in a Changing World, Volume 1 – The Lord Christ, J. Stott (ed.), London: Fountain Books, 1977, 21.  
179
 Macquarrie, Jesus, 401.  
180
 G.L. Borchert, ‘Wrath, Destruction’, G.F. Hawthorne, R.P. Martin and D.G. Reid (eds.), Dictionary of Paul 
and His Letters, Downers Grove: Intervarsity Press, 1993, 991.  
181
 Boersma, Violence, 43. Milbank notes that, “Traditionally, in Greek, Christian and Jewish thought evil has 
been denied any positive foothold in being. It has not been seen as a real force or quality, but as the absence of 
force and quality, and as the privation of being itself. It has not been regarded as glamorous, but as sterile; never 
as more, always as less.” J. Milbank, Being Reconciled – Ontology and Pardon, London: Routledge, 2003, 1. 
41 
 
That said, the distinction, demarcation and status between these elements is essential to a 
theology of God and His relationship with violence. Anger, for instance, is normally 
understood as a sinister, malignant passion, an evil force, which must under all circumstances 
be suppressed; its association with God, however, is altogether more difficult to pin down in 
a definitive manner.
182
 According to Heschel such features are accretions and exuberances – 
functions, rather than ontological; he admits that anger comes dangerously close to evil and 
yet concludes that it is ultimately wrong to identify the two together; it may be evil by 
association, but not in essence.
183
  
1.7.3 God’s Wrath.  
Another ontology and function issue comes in the Old Testament where God’s wrath is 
viewed not as an essential attribute but an expression of His will in His engagement with 
rebellious humankind.
184
 This understanding is based within various philosophical 
presuppositions originating in classical Greek thought which have left Jewish and Christian 
theologians wrestling with frequent biblical references to God ‘becoming angry’.185 Amongst 
these presuppositions is the idea that every emotion, especially anger, is aroused by “evil 
spirits” dwelling in the soul so that every act undertaken because of emotion or anger is a 
sign of weakness or sickness. Other presuppositions are based upon the Platonic distinction 
between reason and emotion whilst subsequent Hellenistic notions about God emphasised 
divine mind and thought, transcending joy and sorrow.
186
 
Countering the potential unpredictability of God and the emotional or dangerous exercise of 
His anger or wrath, these elements have been framed in a more palatable context. Schroeder, 
for example, argues that God’s wrath is not expressed as divine arbitrariness but is manifest 
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when social cohesion and solidarity break apart.
187
 It is thereby presented as being both 
purposeful and positive. Likewise, Heschel provides a positive context and genesis for divine 
wrath arguing that God’s concern is the prerequisite and source of His anger and it is because 
He cares for man that His anger may be kindled against man.
188
 
Paul takes up similar use and understanding of wrath to describe the effect of human 
unrighteousness on the world, though God’s wrath is not something for which He is merely 
responsible, neither is it merely an attitude of God, far less a vengeful or negative attitude, 
but instead simply something He does.
189
 The Pauline conception of God’s wrath is framed in 
the debate of whether he understands it as emotional in nature (affective) or the necessary 
consequence of a holy God encountering sin (effective).
190
  Borchert notes that any ultimate 
solution to this problem must factor in both the judgement and the love of God in His 
dealings with Israel and humanity in general and must exclude either malicious or capricious 
anger on God’s part.191 Either way, in the Old and New Testaments the idea of violence and 
its subsidiary elements and manifestations as they relate to God are exhibited and yet it seems 
that in both the motif is primarily interpreted and perceived to be one of expression or 
function.
192
  
The attempt to distance God from violence is real and if downgrading it to a function is 
considered to be falling short of acceptable detachment then the causes for God’s exercise of 
wrath, for example, can be removed from Him entirely. Fiddes equates God’s wrath with 
human sin and its consequences, taking the onus away from God and placing it with humans 
in regard to any potential violence God might be exhibiting. In the context of Israel, he states 
that God’s wrath is His active consent to the working out of Israel’s sin into its inevitable 
results.
193
 This linking of God’s ‘wrath’ with human actions is, for Fiddes, an interpretation 
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that saves Christianity from the need to identify supposed divine punishments that have been 
inflicted upon them, including earthquakes, famine, sickness or bankruptcy.
194
 
McCabe takes a similar stance explicating how evil might be associated with and founded in 
God; his threefold defence of God in relation to evil and His potential guilt in initiating it 
firstly suggests that everything good in the world is brought about by God. He suggests that 
some kinds of evil – such as suffering – are necessary concomitants of certain types of good, 
thus God can only have brought them about in the sense that He had initially brought about 
good. He acquits God of the final kind of evil – sin – as this is brought about by humans 
exercising their choice in God’s neutral material world. He concludes that, “… since there is 
no good at all, except incidentally, in a morally evil act, in evil done, there is nothing created 
there, hence no action of God.”195 
In such instances the ramifications of an outlook are being considered in a pre-determinative 
manner to their original biblical context; or rather, given the possible negative outcomes and 
difficult associations that such opinions incur, current sensibilities are read back into the text 
to find answers consistent with extant perspectives and ideologies. If this is not done, 
according to Fiddes, there would have to be admission that the views held promote an 
unhealthy sense of human guilt and the image of a tyrant God;
196
 neither of which, 
apparently, are acceptable options.  
1.7.3.1 Anthropocentric Outlooks.  
A similarly anthropocentric and consequential view of sin, God’s wrath and violence is 
presented by Green who argues that it is wrong to hold God responsible for His exertion of 
wrath against wayward humans. He posits that humanity’s sinful acts do not invite God’s 
wrath but rather that they prove that God’s wrath is already active.197 What is required for 
Green is not a transformation of God’s disposition toward the unrighteous and ungodly but a 
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transformation on the human side.
198
 The onus is again taken away from seeing God as one 
storing up and unleashing His wrathful judgement on a recalcitrant humanity or on God in 
some way needing to be appeased because of the wanton, chosen sinfulness of disobedient 
humans. This is a similar defence to those who might claim that they did not want to steal but 
the prohibitive price of the item made their illegal acquisition of it both necessary and 
inevitable.  
Again, divine judgement, for Green, is not something to fear eschatologically but is an 
anthropocentric fulfilling and outworking of human choice and consequence; it is not God 
requiring justification or defence but humans - culpable for their own misdemeanours. If 
God’s ‘wrath’ is exhibited, therefore, it is no more than they deserve as a consequence of 
voluntarily-chosen actions; if God unequivocally demonstrates violence by means of His 
wrath it is not His fault – humans have driven Him to it, contrary to His best intentions and 
purposes.
199
 
An alternative to these anthropocentric models is that the text should be freed from a 
modernist agenda and allowed to present its own perspective and theology regardless of 
postmodern sensibilities and cultural mores. Goldingay, for instance, uses an interpretation of 
Psalm 94 which calls upon the ‘God of vengeance’ to give the arrogant and the wicked their 
‘just desserts’ as a model to pursue the more natural translation of the Hebrew text (italics 
ours).
200
 He avoids taking a biblical passage’s supposed ‘natural’ meaning, however, instead 
choosing to understand it as having a diametrically opposite explanation. Such a method does 
not resolve the subjectivist issue as to who would be ultimately responsible for defining what 
a ‘more natural’ translation is. 
1.7.4 Necessary Violence.  
Conversely, Boersma seeks an agenda-free understanding of ‘God’s violence’ by seeking to 
define what violence is per se.
201
 He acknowledges that some violence might, at the least, be 
considered necessary and at most essential in a fallen world and yet baulks at equating 
violence with God in anything but the most minimalistic and perfunctory functional manner. 
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He presents a counter-balance argument in which God’s positive attributes can only be 
meaningful when placed in the context of their necessary corollaries; contending that,  
God’s hospitality requires violence, just as his love necessitates wrath.202 This is not to 
say, of course, that God’s violence and wrath are his essential attributes. God is love, not 
wrath; he is a God of hospitality, not a God of violence. There is an absolute primacy, 
therefore, of hospitality over violence. Hospitality bespeaks the very essence of God, 
while violence is merely one of the ways to safeguard or ensure the future of his 
hospitality when dealing with the humps and bumps of our lives. Divine violence, in 
other words, is a way in which God strives toward an eschatological situation of pure 
hospitality.
203
  
Boersma’s contention is that however bad the picture looks in terms of linking violence with 
God, there is no cause for concern because ultimately the end justifies the means. If he is 
correct the issue remains as to whether a functional and purposeful violence of this kind 
stems from or is separate to an ontology or essence of God that includes, incorporates and 
endorses violence.  
Linking ontology and function in this manner and in answer to those who argue that the one 
does not have to be conjoined to the other, Pannenberg states that it will be different if 
attributes are viewed as external to things themselves; as merely a means by which humans 
might grasp these things. The thing as the thing in itself is behind the attributes that we 
ascribe to it and yet we may not arbitrarily ascribe such and such attributes to this thing or 
that. The attributes are those of the thing itself and they belong to its essence.
204
 Only then are 
they its attributes, and only then can the essence manifest itself in them.
205
 We endorse 
Pannenberg’s observations whilst acknowledging that it would be extremely difficult to 
affirm God’s attribute of violence without concurrently predicating to God an ontological 
violence from whence this function might proceed and be made known.  
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1.7.5 Orthodox Perspectives.  
This perspective should be compared with Orthodox theology which differentiates between 
God’s essence and energies. The essence or inner-reality of God is that which is totally 
transcendent, unreachable, incommunicable, unknowable, whilst the energies of God are 
perceived as the reality of God which exists outside the essence (τα περί tἡv ούσίαν), in which 
God exists outside His inner-reality. In this sense the energies have no real value or meaning 
unless they are traced back and related to the essence from which they emanate; rather like 
the distinction and corollary between God’s ontology and function framed here. For the 
Orthodox, God is 'present' to Himself in His 'essence' whilst being present to His creation in 
His 'energies,' in which He really 'exists,' or rather in which he makes His reality present to 
the creation without communicating His 'essence.
206
 
In Orthodox theology, whilst God may not communicate His essence to humanity, the 
expression of His energies is nonetheless dependent upon His essence as its ontological 
source.
207
 Or rather, whilst humans cannot know God ontologically in Godself, they can still 
engage with and know God functionally through His actions, or energies, in creation and 
recreation.   
This ties in with the ideas expressed in our Prolegomena in which the difficulties of ‘knowing 
God’ in a definitive, ontological way were acknowledged, thus abrogating the claim to 
‘unconditional certainty’. Rather, an attitude of provisionality was commended which accepts 
that whilst all may not necessarily be known, at least something, enough, can be experienced 
to maintain knowledge, engagement and faith.  
This is a useful position to maintain whilst addressing claims of divine violence in the 
biblical canon; facilitating acceptance that whilst it may not be possible to ascribe ontological 
violence to God it need not mean that such violence does not exist, but is rather manifest 
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functionally through divine acts.
208
 In such manner God’s essences remain veiled and 
impenetrable to analysis and yet His energies give glimpse to their source thereby revealing, 
at the very least, a potential endorsement of violence.   
 Section 2 Biblical Violence.  
2.1 Old Testament Violence. 
To consider God’s attributes, reflection must be made on God’s character as revealed through 
both the Old and New Testaments of the Judaeo-Christian Scriptures; it has been noted that 
God’s violence is so much a part of this tradition that most Christians today barely even 
notice it.
209
 Schwager adds that many Old Testament texts, in fact, confirm that bloody and 
violent divine actions were particular signs by which Israel recognized the might and glory of 
its God.
210
 
Such ascriptions lead to the atheist Dawkins’ observation that,  
The God of the Old Testament is arguably the most unpleasant character in all fiction: 
jealous and proud of it; a petty, unjust, unforgiving control-freak; a vindictive, 
bloodthirsty ethnic cleanser; a misogynistic, homophobic, racist, infanticidal, genocidal, 
filicidal, pestilential, megalomaniacal, sado-masochistic, capriciously malevolent 
bully.
211
  
Whilst in a chapter entitled, ‘Distorting the Character of God’, the theist Seibert concedes 
that, indeed,  
Within the pages of the Old Testament, one meets a God who instantly annihilates 
individuals, massacres large numbers of people, and commands genocide. God frequently 
behaves violently in the Old Testament and many readers are troubled by it. The “God of 
the Old Testament” often seems to be an angry, vindictive deity determined to punish 
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sinners and evildoers severely. Many Old Testament portrayals of God are unflattering, to 
say the least, and do not inspire worship.
212
 
What is to be done, therefore, with all the violence and bloody war perpetrated in the Old 
Testament? Brueggemann suggests that this question acknowledges that such ‘texts of 
violence’ are at the very least an embarrassment, morally repulsive and cause theological 
problems in the Bible; not so much because they are violent per se, but because this is a 
violence perpetrated in the name of, or at the hand of Yahweh.
213
  
Römer observes that, indeed, after the end of the Second World War the image of the God of 
the Old Testament improves considerably amongst Christians, most notably in certain 
Protestant circles that feel close to Judaism. Here, he argues, the pendulum swings in an 
interpretative direction which erases or assimilates into apologetic and harmonious readings 
all that might appear forbidding or incomprehensible in the Old Testament texts.
214
  
In appraising the Old Testament as a whole, however, Schwager notes that the theme of 
God’s bloody vengeance occurs more frequently than the problem of human violence. He 
points to approximately one thousand passages speaking of Yahweh’s blazing anger, His 
punishments by death and destruction and how, like a consuming fire, he passes judgement, 
takes revenge, and threatens annihilation, concluding that there is no other topic as often 
mentioned as God’s bloody works.215 Or expressed another way, by any normative standard 
of measure, Old Testament narratives assign, as Seibert puts it, an enormous amount of 
killing to God.
216
 
In regard to these passages of Scripture that represent God in difficult ways, Israel’s counter-
testimony, Brueggemann posits that it has been made clear that Yahweh is a God capable of 
violence and that further, the texture of the Old Testament is deeply marked by violence.
217
 In 
the end, he concludes,  
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…a student of the Old Testament cannot answer for or justify the violence, but must 
concede that it belongs to the very fabric of this faith.
218
 
2.1.1 Types of Violence.  
In a broad overview of the various ways in which violent divine retribution is wrought, 
Schwager notes that there are four series of biblical texts in evidence. In the first, God 
appears as an irrational being, killing or wanting to kill without apparent reason.
219
 Secondly, 
there are those texts in which He reacts to evil deeds perpetrated by humans, and He himself 
takes revenge. Thirdly, are those where the wicked are punished by their deeds recoiling on 
themselves.
220
 Finally, there is the series in which God punishes evildoers by delivering them 
in His anger to other (cruel) human beings.
221
 These four types of divine violent retribution 
forcibly illustrate the point that there are not only a small sample of violent acts and activities 
associated with God in the Old Testament, but rather a whole schema of them.
222
  
Whilst reflecting upon biblical passages that apparently point to wrath being a trait of God, 
Hershel demonstrates the issue facing those seeking to acknowledge, understand and then 
potentially associate violence with the biblical God. He notes that some have remained open 
to the message of the anger of God, to which the Bible, and particularly the prophetic writing, 
refers again and again whilst acknowledging that some others have recoiled; others have 
treated it allegorically; while still others have been repelled by it.
223
 Hershel concludes, 
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however, that it is impossible to close one’s eyes concerning the words of the wrath of God in 
Scripture.
224
  
The extensive, far-reaching and overarching Old Testament evidence as to the centrality of 
the Divine Warrior theme, of God’s wrath and of holy, violent war and genocide against 
Israel’s enemies and of judgement and violent punishment upon Israel itself leads to other, 
difficult conclusions. Extensive and widespread violence has throughout history been 
perpetrated against people generally in indirect ways, covertly and explicitly, in what is 
called “institutional” or “structural violence”; war and other systematic corporate actions of 
killing and destruction are only the most overt examples of this institutionalized violence.
225
 
This being the case, we will demonstrate that God could be said, in some manner, either 
intrinsically or extrinsically, to be ‘institutionally violent’ in the context of His character, 
actions and purposes as revealed in His violence in the Old Testament.   
2.1.2 Abrahamic Violence.  
In terms of the Abrahamic religions Jacobs argues that they are, in fact, all intrinsically 
violent and violent from their origins; Abraham himself, after all, is most vividly associated 
with his willingness to perform the ultimate act of violence upon his own son, at God’s 
behest.
226
 Dawkins opines on this story that,  
A modern moralist cannot help but wonder how a child could ever recover from such 
psychological trauma. By the standards of modern morality, this disgraceful story is an 
example simultaneously of child abuse, bullying in two asymmetrical power 
relationships, and the first recorded use of the Nuremberg defence: ‘I was only obeying 
orders’. Yet the legend is one of the great foundational myths of all three monotheistic 
religions.
227 
As if this were not enough, there is cause to wonder at a God who not merely asks such a 
thing of Abraham – but to wonder even more at One who would but appear to ask such a 
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thing, but then further trick or mislead Abraham.
228
 Kierkegaard agonises over this story, 
using it as the basis for his Fear and Trembling
229
 in which he grapples with the ethical and 
religious conundrums faced by those who believe in a God requiring so much from a person 
such as Abraham.  
This one biblical story exists for Kierkegaard as the frame into which he centres his 
understanding of what faith in God is. He interprets and reinterprets the story of Abraham in 
Fear and Trembling concluding that religious faith is faith in the absurd, arrived at not 
through reasoning and thought but by a leap into absurdity, perhaps at the behest of God – 
just as in the Abraham story.
230
 He states in his exploration of the themes inherent in God’s 
request to sacrifice Isaac that he would extract from the story its dialectical element in the 
form of problemata, or various issues raised by a faith such as Abraham’s. He did this in 
order to see how monstrous a paradox faith is, a paradox capable of making a murder into a 
holy act well pleasing to God and a paradox which gives Isaac back to Abraham and which 
no thought can grasp because faith begins precisely where thinking leaves off.
231
   
As in the story of Abraham, God and Isaac, there are any number of foundational moments in 
the interaction and establishment of relations between God and humans in which there is at 
least the spectre, if not the full-blown actuality, of violence.
232
 The potential for divine 
violence is built into the Covenant through which God chose the Hebrews as His people.
233
 
According to its terms (Genesis 17; Exodus 24; Deuteronomy 29), He undertakes to be the 
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God of the Hebrews and, in return, they undertake to obey His Law. The various benefits of 
this transaction for the Hebrews include the gift of the Promised Land, whilst the means by 
which God brings it about is violence - through violence He rescues Israel from Egypt, 
overturning the forces of Pharaoh
234
, and through violence God enables the Hebrew tribes to 
conquer and annihilate the Canaanite peoples and to settle the Promised Land.
235
  
In this context early Jewish theology and understanding of God were wrought; by relating to 
Ancient Near Eastern cosmology the experiences as slaves delivered by the righteous, 
compassionate God Yahweh, the early Israelites developed a unique, dynamic notion of 
chaos and shalom.
236
 Shalom was a state of harmony given to the community acknowledging 
God's sovereignty and embodying His righteousness and compassion in its communal life, 
whilst chaos was the intrusion into the community of anything that might disrupt this 
covenant of peace.
237
  
2.1.3 The Divine Warrior.  
One of the primary means by which this disruption could occur was the outside influence of 
other nations, their cultures, their religions and their desire to expand; in such a manner, the 
theme of God as Divine Warrior was established.
238
 This theme has long evoked problems in 
biblical interpretation, for example in the move from biblical exegesis to theology and 
preaching and thereby to the proclamation of God and Jesus Christ.
239
 This picture of God as 
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warrior therefore forms the skandalon of the Old Testament for modern people, including 
Christians.
240
  
It would have been difficult enough if such a motif had occurred only occasionally in the Old 
Testament. The real problem is that this image of God, one which portrays Him as being, at 
the very least, responsible for the killing of large groups of people through His role as Divine 
Warrior, is one of the most pervasive and unsettling in the Old Testament.
241
 It has, therefore, 
to be addressed and considered and for this thesis it provides a lens through which to view the 
character and activities of God during the whole Old Testament period.  
The theme of Divine Warrior does not stand alone as a discrete issue; instead, closely allied 
with this imagery, is the ancient institution of Holy War in Israel.
242 
War was regarded as a 
highly sacral affair in which the people assembled, made sacrifices, purified themselves, and 
sought God's aid and counsel, generally by some oracle device.
243
 Numbers and weapons 
were relatively unimportant, as far as Israel was concerned; what mattered was that they were 
not to fear, but to trust God to deliver them.
244
 A strong correlation and understanding was 
thus built between the people of Israel and their God in terms of salvation - inherent in the 
promise and expectation of divine deliverance by whatever methods were required.
245
  
The history of the Israelites throughout the Old Testament regularly demonstrates in various 
eras and contexts that the primary means of such deliverance involved the explicit and often 
brutal exercise of God’s violent intervention. Indeed, according to Brueggemann, Israel’s 
counter-testimony to God makes it clear not only that Yahweh is a God capable of violence 
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but that, in fact, the Old Testament itself is deeply marked by violence.
246
 Lind challenges 
this, arguing that Yahweh, as Israel’s God of war, fought for them by miracle and not by 
sword and spear. His position is an exercise in semantics, however, as whilst upholding that 
Yahweh’s miracles are His primary means of defeating Israel’s enemies, he nonetheless 
concedes (as he must) that,  
Israel’s fighting, while at times a sequel to the act of Yahweh, was regarded as 
ineffective; faith meant that Israel should rely upon Yahweh’s miracle for her defense 
(sic), rather than upon soldiers and weapons.
 247
   
The primary point is that fighting still happened and was sanctioned by Yahweh, or at the 
least was not condemned by Him. In other words, if it were true that Yahweh wanted Israel to 
be entirely dependent on their faith in Him for deliverance then there would never have been 
any need for them to take up arms at times of threat – whether as a prequel or a sequel to 
God’s miraculous intervention. Indeed, in terms of God expressing His frustration and 
punishment of Israel, this was in fact sometimes manifest by those outside the national 
borders.
248
 
On this perception of God as warrior and the manifestation of His hostility, Juergensmeyer 
notes that,  
Behind this arresting image is an interesting idea – that God is intimately tied to human 
relationships, including hostile encounters. God is someone, or something, that can 
become engaged in human affairs and take sides, favoring (sic) one group or another. The 
divine warrior image suggests a certain theology, but it also implies a theory of religious 
violence, for this theological image indicates that real acts of violence can have sacred 
significance. Violence is undertaken by no less a figure than God.
249
 
The idea of Yahweh as Divine Warrior was not limited, however, to His dealings with those 
outside Israel. After citing Leviticus 26:14-17 with its lists of promised curses and 
punishments for those who violate God’s commandments Young notes that in confirmation 
of God’s domineering attitude towards Israel, the Hebrew Scriptures also contain numerous 
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examples of a wrathful God punishing His chosen people, as well as other nations and 
specific individuals, for their transgressions.
250
 
Further, in verse 18 of this passage in Leviticus it is promised that, “I shall discipline you 
seven times more...” causing Wenham to observe that throughout the Bible divine discipline 
is referred to and that God punishes His people not merely because they deserve it, but 
because He loves them and He wants to correct their foolish ways.
251
 Wenham makes no 
attempt to explain or describe God’s apparently violent ways, but neither does he deny them 
as a means of God achieving His purposes; in this instance, to demonstrate His love and to 
facilitate correction. 
In acknowledging the double-edged nature of the Divine Warrior theme
252
 it is essential to 
reiterate that the motif is ultimately soteriological; the most compelling example being the 
destruction of the Egyptian army which existed and still exists for Israel as a primary 
salvation story, central to which is the portrait of God in combat.
253
 So essential, in fact, is 
this image of divine power that the complete annihilation of the enemy by Yahweh marks the 
moment of salvation for Israel and prompts its victory hymn of celebration in Exodus 15:3, 
“Yahweh is a warrior!” This war cry underscores how, for the Jewish nation, salvation is an 
event of divine warfare in which the destruction of the enemy is victory for God and 
liberation for Israel.
254
  
This theme of liberation and soteriological violence, sometimes seemingly gratuitous, is one 
that will be returned to both in consideration of the New Testament and also of atonement in 
the final section. In terms of the Divine Warrior theme, let it suffice in terms of the Old 
Testament to conclude that one of the principal epithets for God found there is “Yahweh of 
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Hosts” which can hardly mean anything other than “Yahweh of the armies” whether 
heavenly, earthly, or both.
255
 
2.1.4 Divine Genocide.  
Having reflected upon various manifestations of God’s violent character and acts we will 
now consider another way in which divine violence is particularly explicit as a representation 
of His being, actions and purposes - biblical instances of divinely sanctioned mass destruction 
and genocide.  
In his reflection upon the nature of various Old Testament texts in which God’s ‘repentance’ 
is extant, or rather, where God turns away from promised good in response to human 
wrongdoing, Moberly cites Gen 6:5-8. The fundament presupposition, he argues, is that 
God’s relationship with people is a genuine, because responsive, relationship. The nature of 
this relationship between God and people, he asserts, is that it is characterized by a dynamic 
analogous to that of relationships between people: they are necessarily mutual, and they 
either develop or wither away. How people respond to God matters to God, and affects how 
God responds to people.
256
  
As will be demonstrated, this mutuality of relationship is positive when human beings 
respond in a manner proscribed by God. The problem comes, of course, when they disobey 
His orders and operate beyond His moral, religious and relational parameters. The people of 
Israel fully understood the nature of this relationship, its requirements and its potential 
ramifications should they be unfaithful to God or otherwise go astray. In fact, they seemed 
aware of and comfortable with their God of strong and far-reaching providence. Helm notes,  
For the idea of God’s rule over them was a consciously operating principle in the lives of 
many Old Testament men and women. One of the distinctive features of Old Testament 
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piety is the recognition, on the part of certain people, that the Lord has the right to do 
with their lives what he has done.
257
 
More than Old Testament believers merely accepting God’s expectations and the potential 
consequences of disobedience, however, it was clear that they also understood the 
characteristics and character behind these divine covenantal and relational demands. 
Therefore, having presented various biblical terms for God’s anger and the proliferation of its 
expression Lorberbaum concludes that many sections of the Bible, and particularly of the 
Pentateuch, may thus be read as the history of the Divine fury and the means of restraining 
it.
258
  
Even more explicitly, Schwager notes of God’s occasional genocidal intent that,  
Aside from the approximately one thousand verses in which Yahweh himself appears as 
the direct executioner of violent punishments, and the many texts in which the Lord 
delivers the criminal to the punisher’s sword, on over one hundred other passages 
Yahweh expressly gives the command to kill people. These passages do not have God 
himself do the killing; he keeps somewhat aloof. Yet it is he who gives the order to 
destroy human life, who delivers his people like sheep to the slaughter, and who incites 
human beings against one another.
259
 
In order to explore and explicate these claims we will take two classic representative 
instances of divine genocide: the Flood and Sodom and Gomorrah. We will then conclude 
our reflection upon biblical violence in the Old Testament by looking at an overarching 
theme that runs through both accounts and is also explicitly manifest in various other violent 
biblical events, occurrences and stories – מֶרֵה (ḥērem), the ban.   
2.1.4.1 The Flood.  
Firstly, we will examine perhaps the most striking and certainly most far-reaching illustration 
of divine violence in the form of mass-genocide in the Old Testament - the Flood narrative in 
Genesis (chapters 6-9). Each new element of the Creation is initially deemed by God to be 
“good” and therefore presumably pleasing to Him, manifesting both His presence and 
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creativity.
260
 It did not take long, however, for this most hopeful and wondrous of biblical 
narratives to become abrogated into something more foreboding. As Jantzen notes,  
Whatever we say about the creation story itself, divine violence quickly asserts itself in 
the Genesis text. Even though God is portrayed at the outset as transforming chaos into 
paradise without struggle, before six chapters are complete, God is so frustrated with 
what he has made that he plans and carries out genocide.
261
 
In terms of the general bias and focus of this salvation-history, as delineated in Genesis 1-11, 
it is shown that God’s punishment and forgiveness is not restricted to Israel alone, but rather 
that it extends beyond these limits to the broader horizon of sin and revolt as part of the 
overall human condition.
262
 It is this condition that provokes divine violence, making it 
always an immediate consequence of evil human deeds; Yahweh’s anger, therefore, does not 
erupt because He takes pleasure in killing or is totally irrational - rather, humans are the cause 
of His anger.
263
 Such pronouncements do not, of course, mitigate expressions of divine 
violence; rather, they provide insight into their manifestation and purpose.  
In his overview of the Creation narrative as a whole Lorberbaum points to the profound 
divine disappointment,  
…due to humanity’s corruption, causing God “sadness of heart” that rapidly turns into 
fierce, disproportionate anger; that wishes to destroy everything and to return the world to 
chaos; and that concludes with God accepting and bearing His violent and impaired 
images.
264
 
The Flood text therefore has special biblical and therefore theological significance because it 
describes the sin of all humanity and the kind of divine response that this elicits. Schwager 
observes that the decisive statement in the narrative is: “Now the earth was corrupt in God’s 
sight, and the earth was filled with violence” (Gen 6:11); noting that this sin of the earth is 
characterized with one single word: violence (ḥamas), referring both to the ruthless violation 
of fellow humans and ultimately to their murder and that it is a word which under the priestly 
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codex sums up all human misdeeds.
265
 Brueggemann concurs, stating that there is no doubt 
that Yahweh has caused the floodwaters, and likewise no doubt that it was disobedience in 
the form of corruption and violence that evoked Him to act.
266
 Schwager opining that,  
Every sinful act against one’s fellow human tends towards violence, for which 
God punishes the earth by leaving human beings to their own devices.
267
  
The notable oversight here, of course, is that in the instance of the Flood Yahweh did not, in 
fact, leave human beings to their own devices. Instead, He pro-actively intervenes thus 
overcoming and overrunning ‘human devices’ to the degree that He enacts the most far-
reaching genocide against humanity ever recorded.  
In fact, God’s pronouncement upon humanity of a flood in Genesis 6:7 could hardly have 
been any more explicit or all-encompassing. “So the LORD said, “I will wipe mankind, 
whom I have created, from the face of the earth – men and animals, and creatures that move 
along the ground, and birds of the air – for I am grieved that I have made them.”” (NIV) 
Westermann notes that the verb החמ, “to wipe out, obliterate” is also used in Judges 21:17 in 
regard to obliterating a tribe from Israel; it is a severe way of describing the destruction and 
anticipates what he calls the, “…utter horror of the decision.”268 
So, when these ‘evil human deeds’ reach endemic proportions, as is suggested in the biblical 
text before the Flood narrative (Gen 6:5-6), then it is expected that God would take measures 
commensurate with the scale of the problem. Indeed, Wenham notes of verse 5 that few texts 
in the Old Testament are so explicit and all-embracing in specifying the extent of human 
sinfulness and depravity.
269
  It is in the face of such definitive divine judgement that 
Brueggemann acknowledges the nature of this kind of trade-off when discussing the covenant 
curses of Yahweh; arguing that it is commonly accepted that if Yahweh is disobeyed, 
affronted, or mocked, He enacts penalties. He concludes that this much is reasonable and the 
severity of the affront will match the severity of the sanction.
270
 Ergo, in the instance of the 
Flood, if the whole earth is evil, then the whole earth will have to be dealt with.  
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Facing up to this stark assertion is rather difficult, however, leading Seibert to observe that,  
Understandably, most modern depictions of the story focus primarily on the survivors: 
Noah’s family and the fortunate animals in the ark.271 Yet, despite cute songs, child-
friendly play sets, and colorful (sic) artistic renderings of the story, “Noah’s Ark” is not a 
happy tale of giraffes and panda bears clambering aboard a floating zoo. It is a story of 
catastrophic death and destruction that, incidentally, results from a divine decree. Nearly 
the entire population perishes because God drowns them. It is a disaster of such epic 
proportions that even some of Hollywood’s doomsday scenarios pale in comparison.
272
 
Sheriffs prefers not to linger over the destruction that the flood heralded, but rather focuses 
on the righteousness of Noah, noting that the sacrifice he made after the Flood is not 
specifically commanded but is rather as example of his piety which is well received by God. 
He further observes that the ‘soothing aroma’ is so called because it appeases and pacifies 
God’s anger, leading to the divine decision to never again repeat such a universal judgement 
and punishment; concluding, in fact, that ‘soothing’ plays on Noah’s name, niyḥoaḥ 
‘soothing’ which puns with nōaḥ Noah.273  
Likewise Murdoch focuses on the biblical notion of Noah as a good man, as found in the 
New Testament, for instance in II Peter 3, 5, where it states that, “…he voiced righteousness” 
and the Greek refers to him as κηρυκα, ‘a herald’, the Authorised Version presenting him as a 
‘preacher of righteousness’. In narrative terms, Murdoch argues, the introduction of these 
descriptors can have several functions such as stressing Noah’s relationship to God whilst 
highlighting that his comments otherwise fall upon deaf ears, underlining further the moral 
failure of the wicked generations and hence justifying God’s solution.274 
Even when violence is inextricably linked with God, such as in this story of the flooding of 
the world and the salvation of a few via the ark,
275
 Christendom still tends to interpret it in 
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such a way that it becomes a story of salvation for the lucky few rather than a violent, global 
devastation of the many.
276
 Commenting on God ‘wiping out’ humankind (Gen 6:7a) 
Wenham, for instance, upholds the interpretative juxtaposition that whilst, “…a more 
catastrophic sentence is hard to imagine”… it is nonetheless, “…tinged with a glimmer of 
hope.”277 So yes, humankind will be destroyed in a universal genocide, but there is still 
reason for optimism because one man and his family will be ‘spared’.  
Likewise in her consideration of how the Flood story is represented, particularly in children’s 
literature, Fish notes that their accounts are not true to life whereas the biblical tale is. She 
observes, that in contrast to the myriad interpretations, the story of Noah is actually not about 
how bad men are killed and good ones saved, or of animals or miracles. Instead, she 
concludes, it is a story about a man who learns to give and who finds out the ‘hard way’ 
about the consequences of selfishness.
278
 The hard way indeed.  
According to Jantzen it is quite simply astonishing that universal acknowledgement of God’s 
blatant violence is not made by Christendom in its interpretation of the Flood narrative. How, 
she speculates, can an account of divine mercy to the few in the ark be coaxed out of a text 
which is rather the story of horrific, divine brutality and genocide to the many who perished? 
She conjectures that such a reading is comparable to a situation in which,  
…someone today planned and carried out nuclear holocaust which exterminated all life 
on earth except for one family and their livestock: should the perpetrator of this deed be 
venerated for his great mercy?
279
 
Rather than highlighting God’s supposed ‘great mercy’ Turner, in his commentary on 
Genesis 6:6 (“The LORD regretted that he had made man in the earth. He felt bitterly 
indignant about it”), does not elucidate beyond prosaic necessity when encountering God’s 
announcement of His regret at having created humanity, and His resolve to blot out His entire 
creation. The pleasure God had previously taken in His creation, he observes, contrasts with 
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His present grief and sorrow.
280
 It would be difficult to countenance a greater expression of 
understatement.  
On this same verse Goldingay remarks that,  
God’s feeling emotion suggests that possessing emotions is one of the respects in which 
God and humanity are fundamentally alike. God is not without passions, as Christian 
doctrine has sometimes reckoned. As the First Testament will go on to show, God has all 
the emotions human beings have, and has them in spades.
281
 
It is unlikely that Goldingay would uphold this assertion without adding the caveat - God has 
all the positive emotions human beings have. Otherwise, his anthropomorphic and 
anthropopathic representation of God would confer on Him, for instance, sloth, lust, avarice 
and any number of other human vices and sins that are readily and regularly manifested, 
perhaps especially, however, those of wrath, vengeance, violence and even evil. In regard to 
such theological assertions which seek to conjoin God’s character and emotions to those of 
humans Castelo notes that differentiation is not initially emphasized between the divine and 
the created until a conceptual demarcation is later deemed necessary when the similarity is no 
longer helpful.
282
 
The issue remains, however, that whether such a similarity is helpful or not, in the specific 
issue of divine violence the Flood narrative presents a God who is capable of exerting the 
most all-encompassing violence, nay genocide, in the pursuit of His goals and the 
implementation of His purposes.  
As Wenham puts it,  
In other words, he felt the bitter rage of someone whose closest friend had been terribly 
wronged. This is the anger of someone who loves deeply. It spurs on to drastic action, in 
this case nothing less than God’s destruction of his creatures “man, animals, creeping 
creatures and birds.”
283
  
                                                             
280
 L.A. Turner, Genesis, Sheffield: Sheffield Academic Press, 2000, 45. 
281
 J. Goldingay, Old Testament Theology, Volume 1, Downers Grove: InterVarsity Press, 2003, 168.   
282
 Castelo, Apathetic, 25.   
283
 Wenham, Genesis, 147. 
63 
 
Or rather, in the story of the Flood, God demonstrated a genocidal violence born of love, for 
the ultimate redemption of humankind; the divine love not lessening the divine violence, nor 
the divine violence undermining the divine love.
284
  
2.1.4.2 Sodom & Gomorrah.  
Amongst the plethora of incidents of divine violence, including those of genocide in the Old 
Testament, the account in Genesis 19 nonetheless makes for bizarre reading. Not least in 
terms of the baying mob and their desire for gang-homosexual rape, the tone then lowered 
even further by Lot’s bewildering offer of his innocent, virgin daughters by way of placating 
the potential rapists. In a moment of exquisite understatement Turner describes this latter act 
as, “…quite shocking”285, although perhaps not quite as shocking as the fact that in his 
commentary Turner is entirely silent about verses 24-26 of Genesis chapter 19 where God is 
said to rain down sulphur from heaven. This action kills every inhabitant of Sodom, 
destroying even the vegetation, the whole plain and its adjoining cities; it is difficult, 
therefore, in the face of such blatantly aggressive divine acts to countenance the scale of 
Turner’s theological obfuscation of divine violence in this pericope.  
Additionally, after recounting the sorry tale, following the destruction of Sodom and 
Gomorrah, of Lot’s two daughters first inebriating and then copulating with their father, 
Dawkins notes that if a dysfunctional family of this kind was the best Sodom had to offer by 
way of morals, it might be possible to feel a certain sympathy with God and his judicial 
brimstone.
286
 Of this ‘judicial brimstone’, Seibert notes that Sodom and Gomorrah is one of 
many Old Testament stories which portray God as a mass murderer.
287
  
The text itself also speaks of smoke ascending like the smoke in a furnace, using words for 
smoke and ascent usually connected with the making of burnt offerings.
288
 This mixture of 
divine wrath and liturgical offering suggests an example of God’s attributes and actions 
which, Lorberbaum notes, there are repeated biblical incidents of  that culminate in God’s 
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furious anger, followed by ‘futile attempts’ to appease Him; he offers this episode at Sodom 
as a particular case in point.
289
    
To balance this interpretation of divine anger and implacability Seibert considers examples of 
“virtuous” violence, again citing Sodom and Gomorrah, noting that the narrative itself 
suggests that God’s actions were fully justified because its inhabitants were terribly 
wicked.
290
 Barth too, in his reflection on the heavenly dimension, its scope and the 
manifestation of God thereof, acknowledges, but does not dwell on, any events which might 
be perceived as negative. So, whilst acceding that ‘fire and brimstone are rained on Sodom 
and Gomorrah’ (Gen 19:24) by God from heaven, he incorporates this occurrence into other 
moments of divine activity and concludes,  
But all these divine benefits and judgments are only the epiphenomena of what comes 
primarily and centrally from heaven to earth, namely, the Word which the God who is 
gracious in His holiness and holy in His grace addresses to man as the Lord of the 
covenant; the Son in whose person He Himself becomes man and therefore earthly for 
our salvation.
291
 
The decimation of entire cities and their environs constitutes for Barth ‘epiphenomena’ which 
should be put in the much later context of Jesus’ incarnation. This interpretation of events 
constitutes an extreme form of delayed gratification for those observing what would 
otherwise be blatant acts of divine retribution and violence.  
Conversely, these acts in which God annihilates “the entire Plain” including “the vegetation 
of the ground” (Gen 19:25), whether or not they would later be explicable in the light of 
Jesus’ incarnation, nonetheless cause what Ludwig calls, “That fatal fertility” in a manner so 
like Eden, in which Sodom and Gomorrah are withered in the flames whilst the earth that 
bore it is scorched. In its place, he argues, is left the sterility of the salt of the Dead Sea and of 
the pillar into which Lot’s wife is turned, leading him to conclude that the punishment fits the 
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crime, since in the midst of such fecundity, Sodom had enjoyed only her sterile attachments, 
generating nothing.
292
   
2.1.4.2.1 The Spectre of Infanticide.  
The implementation of genocide or other mass destruction leaving an area sterile will, of 
course, necessitate the death of all humans present. The often un-spoken element of these 
death-tolls is the inevitable corollary that all children, of whatever age, will also be lost. 
Seibert notes that in addition to the obvious examples of such child-death, like the flood 
narrative, other stories of mass destruction, including Sodom and Gomorrah, display,  
…a similar lack of interest in the fate of the children – or virtually any other victim, for 
that matter. Even though each of these stories assumes the utter annihilation of every 
single child, these children remain virtually invisible.
293
  
According to one count, there are almost 200 texts about violence against children in the 
Hebrew Old Testament.
294
 A search for theological perspective and insight into these texts 
meets a resounding silence, or perhaps rather a massive denial or conscious obfuscation of an 
otherwise unbearable truth. The truth that God is, whether primarily or secondarily, involved 
in far-reaching acts of infanticide in the implementation of His purposes and will. Phillips 
suggests that the only way that texts of this kind must be read is non-violently, or rather,  
Readers of the Bible must read differently, deferentially, deliberately for the children, lest 
they contribute to the formation of a culture that makes the murder of the innocents 
natural, inevitable, biblical.
295
  
The voices of these voiceless victims, Phillips argues, must be allowed to interrupt our 
reading of the story. Such ‘interruption’ occurs when particular innocent children disrupt the 
power biblical texts exercise in shaping our perceptions and informing our world. By 
attending to these children’s faces and other innocents whose deaths rupture our critical 
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strategies and our memory, he contends, we open ourselves to the possibility of saying “No” 
to all texts, biblical or otherwise, that kill children.
296
 
Again Seibert agrees, arguing that,  
Violence against children is never appropriate, never justifiable, and never virtuous. If we 
condone textual violence against children, we have been seduced by Scripture. We must 
resist all readings as inherently violent and as a violation of our obligation to read 
critically and ethically. For the sake of the children, we must read these texts 
nonviolently, in ways that neither legitimate the violence in the text nor justify it in our 
present context.
297
  
Whilst Seibert advocates reading postmodern sensibilities into the scriptural text he falls short 
of delineating whether he agrees that the text, in its original form and context, actually 
contains violence, indeed divine violence, or whether postmodern readers should merely 
reinterpret it non-violently. If such a hermeneutic were to be utilised then, in the case of 
Sodom and Gomorrah for instance, the issue ceases to be one of what the text describes and 
means. Instead, the postmodern reader places their own limitations and expectations upon the 
text to dilute its explicit meaning and thereby in the case of explicating the event and 
meaning of Sodom and Gomorrah, offering an a-priori, non-violent appropriation of their 
own theological sensibilities and parameters. Or, more simply, the postmodern reader will set 
up moral parameters within which it is acceptable for God to operate.  
2.1.4.2.2 God’s Appropriate Response? 
Conversely, rather than projecting postmodern mores onto ancient biblical texts it might be 
more apposite to let the texts speak for themselves, even if their message is difficult to digest 
for the modern reader. Under the subtitle, ‘Expecting a Severe God’ Moser, for example, 
observes that, as God is a being perfectly active in gracious righteousness He would be duty-
bound to oppose whatever obstructs perfect righteousness amongst agents. This opposition, 
however, would be wisely intentional rather than impulsive or irrational; it could also, 
nonetheless, be severe in human life.
298
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With this attitudinal imperative in place, Schwager argues that in the Old Testament God is 
never seen to appear as a cool judge who, with utter detachment, guides the people in the 
strict observance of laws. Rather, Yahweh turns out to be a God who is directly affected by 
the deeds of men and women and correspondingly reacts to them. If the people’s conduct is 
good, Schwager states, he becomes their friend and benefactor; if they disappoint him, he 
repays them in kind.
299
 
Kass argues that Sodom’s true crime was manifest in its inherent disregard of outsiders and 
its insistence on its own self-sufficiency.
300
 He concludes that,  
The city thus blinds its inhabitants to the truth silently carried by all strangers and beggars 
(and explicitly taught by many ancient peoples): any stranger or beggar may be “a god in 
disguise” – which is a poetic way of saying that he, and by implication we, continue to 
survive only by some power of grace. For all these reasons, men in every city will 
commit injustice towards strangers – eventually also toward neighbors (sic) – unless the 
city is informed by teachings of hospitality, teachings that are in turn informed by fear-
awe-reverence for God and the ability to discern the divine image equally present in all 
human beings.
301
 
In other words, God was punishing Sodom and its environs because it had set itself up in 
opposition to Himself as the One upon whom its inhabitants should have been dependent, 
with the inevitable manifestation of many attendant social, cultural and behavioural 
iniquities. The City had become a ‘god’ and the true God would demonstrate His own 
judgement and ascendancy in the most definitive manner – the total and irrevocable 
destruction and genocide of every living being, even vegetation; to humble this city-pretender 
and thus re-instate both divine status and authority in the most violent manner imaginable.  
In conclusion to his assessment of various biblical descriptions of Yahweh, His character and 
activity, including the events at Sodom and Gomorrah, Brueggemann therefore notes that,  
In all of these noun-metaphors we can notice, alongside a tender inclination on the part of 
Yahweh, a dimension of fierceness that tilts towards potential violence. Thus I propose 
that in the full utterance of Yahweh, the thematization (sic) of Yahweh is as the powerful 
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governor and orderer (sic) of life who is capable of generous and gracious concern, but 
this same Yahweh has a potential for extraordinary destructiveness.
302
 
The lesson of Sodom and Gomorrah could hardly be more explicit in this regard: whatever 
stands against or sets itself up as an alternative to God will risk falling victim to His 
implacable wrath and its violent and far-reaching consequences and ramifications. The size of 
the disobedience will inevitably be matched by the size of Yahweh’s, almost invariably, 
violent judgement and response as demonstrated in Sodom and Gomorrah - nearly all the 
people had rebelled and so nearly all the people had to be punished and punished in the most 
violent and definitive manner imaginable.    
2.1.5 מֶרֵה - The Ban. 
Finally, in our consideration of Old Testament violence we come to what Niditch observes to 
be the most chilling of biblical texts which, in the context of war, refer to ḥērem, the ban; a 
divine imposition under which all human beings among the defeated are “devoted to 
destruction.”303 She notes that this ban is frequently issued with a reason for annihilation 
provided and that sometimes it includes not just enemy combatants but also women, children 
and infants along with all creatures associated with those being destroyed. It could hardly be 
any more shocking, appalling and difficult to understand, not least in the context of it being 
commanded by an otherwise loving and relational God. In summing up God’s conditions and 
parameters of the ban Niditch concludes,  
Let no one escape the imposition of total destruction and spare or be spared, a 
sympathetic mother, a piteous baby. The very language forbids the emotions of mercy.
304
 
2.1.5.1 Etymology of the Ban. 
The root of the Hebrew noun referring specifically to the ban, מַרָה (ḥāram), means both to 
devote and to destroy utterly; its basic meaning further denotes the exclusion of an object 
from the use or abuse of man and its irrevocable surrender to God.
305
 A derivative of ḥāram 
is מֶרֵה (ḥērem) which likewise relates to a devoted thing or the ban itself.306  
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In the Old Testament the rendering of something or someone as ḥērem marks that thing or 
person as unalterably off-limits and with respect to Yahweh, signifies a permanent 
transference into His possession and removal from common use or contact.
307
  This 
seemingly innocuous connotation nonetheless invokes its definitive and non-negotiable 
nature – what belongs to Yahweh is to be His in its entirety with no exceptions whatsoever. 
In the most extreme and violent interpretations this has led Steffen to observe that from a 
moral point of view ḥērem is a demonic religious notion whereby God directs a total 
obliteration of the enemy, sometimes with rationalisation, sometimes without.
308
 The ban, 
therefore, is both at Yahweh’s behest and indeed His whim and contains something 
threatening, dark, or worse.  
On this theme Frederiksson notes that,  
The regulations for all war legislation, which are calculated also to underscore the 
significance of cultic purity, are all rooted in the idea that Yahweh the war god was a 
sacred and dangerous god. Here holiness has in it something of the demonic.
309
 
As Niditch and Steffen acknowledge there are two sets of ban texts, one in which reasons and 
rationales are given for the impending total destruction and those where such matters are not 
discussed. The understanding prevails in these latter texts, however, that God has demanded 
that all that breathes be devoted to him in destruction.
310
 That which is under the ban is 
indeed Yahweh’s, but the means of His ‘receiving’ the item or person first precipitates their 
ceasing to be in an earthly sense.  
Such a definitive and brutally violent divine injunction has, of course, caused scholars to seek 
means of lessening its apparent severity. Gopin, for example, questions if ḥērem laws were 
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actually carried out
311
 and whether they were, in fact, merely a means of frightening 
syncretistic Jews into monotheism. His further assertion that ḥērem laws were later 
discontinued by Rabbis nonetheless comes with the concession that they are nevertheless part 
of a sacred tradition, the text of which has never disappeared, thus evoking the possibility of a 
new hermeneutic existing as well.
312
 
2.1.5.2 Applications of the Ban.  
There is patently a daunting element to the ban which causes problematic questions about 
Yahweh’s purposes, modus operandi and character, especially in regard to divine violence. 
As Gopin notes, however, application of the ban is open to the possibility of a new 
hermeneutic such that Deuteronomic writers, supporters of the Josianic reform, for instance, 
consider the ban primarily as a means of rooting out what they believe to be impure in regard 
to sinful forces damaging the solid and pure relationship between Israel and God.
313
 Whilst 
this might be a reasonable assertion, the ban nonetheless represents an inordinately violent 
way of Yahweh accomplishing this goal.  
An alternative non-violent description of the ban is offered by Boling who presents it as a 
liturgical device, comparable to the practices of other extant cultures. Thus, he argues that it 
is the biblical equivalent of an old Amorite expression, “to eat the asakkum” of a god or king 
and consequently had to do with certain spoils of war marked for the treasury of the royal 
house or for sacrificial offering to the deity.
314
 As such, by prioritising extant cultic activity 
and the positive purposes of the ban, the focus is turned from violence and its shocking 
implications for Yahweh in terms of His character, attributes and purposes.    
Similarly Niditch concedes that,  
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One group of biblical writers, like many modern scholars, tries to make sense of the ban 
in terms of justice in a way that discloses their own discomfort with the sacrifice 
tradition.
315 
Another who interprets the ban in nonviolent terms is Yoder who, whilst acknowledging that 
the conquest of Canaan is, “…full of bloodshed” explains, nonetheless, that this must, once 
again, be understood in its original cultural context, i.e., cultically. In other words, before the 
battle the enemy army or city would be under the ban and therefore ‘devoted to the Lord’ and 
consequently comparable to an animal on the altar. He grants that no booty, slaves or cattle 
were to be taken but concludes that such killing was not instrumental, contributing practically 
to a political goal, but was rather sacrificial and thereby, in his opinion, acceptable.
316
 In this 
manner he presents a sacred and holy context to ḥērem rather than one containing merely the 
banality of violence, albeit divine violence.   
Conversely, Niditch considers the ramifications of the ban, asking for whom it might be 
meaningful in terms of such sacrifice, whether sacred or not. She concludes that rather than 
being focused upon the destruction of the enemy the ban in fact validates them as human and 
valuable, not turning them into a monster worthy of destruction or a cancer to be rooted out. 
Rather, the enemy is not the unclean “other”, but a mirror of the self, that which God desires 
for himself.
317
 Such an explanation might yet prove ‘thin gruel’ for those exterminated and 
those mourning this extermination by and for Yahweh in His apparent desire to uphold and 
validate their value and humanity in the ban.  
2.1.5.3 Holy War & the Ban.  
As demonstrated, there are a number of biblical uses of the ban in the overall context of 
ḥērem, principally in regard to it being seen as a ‘devoted (thing)’ and something set apart as 
belonging to Yahweh and thereby forbidden for profane use.
318
 Whilst acknowledging this 
range of usage and the various means of interpretation, understanding and application we are 
primarily focusing on the complementary use of ḥērem as it pertains to divine violence in the 
context of war.   
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Conrad affirms this complementary nature of the ban, noting that it is used both in accounts 
of early Israelite conflicts to refer to war booty whilst being concurrently linked to that which 
is devoted to Israel; concluding that in a victorious militaristic milieu nothing is to be spared 
and that Israel must therefore “utterly destroy” everything.319 All those interpreting ḥērem 
agree that destruction is complete, the arena of controversy exists only in regard to who 
initiates the ban and for what purpose.  
The idea of total destruction is taken forward by Mayes who defines ḥērem as that which is 
used for the extermination of the enemy in a holy war as well as for the exclusive reservation 
of certain things to Yahweh. The common factor is that the things so designated are not 
available for common use.
320
 
Where the word ḥērem is used with its full religious force, however, and always in its 
nominal form, it means uncompromising consecration without the possibility of recall or 
redemption. It was not, therefore, applied merely to idolatrous objects, but to all things which 
could have been taken as plunder or people who could have been enslaved. It was never 
presented, according to Lilley, as the normal procedure of war, although the verb could be 
used in this definitive secondary sense to denote overwhelming destruction of the enemy.
321
 
It is this notion of ‘overwhelming destruction’ with all its moral and theological ramifications 
which commends the ban to our study and understanding of not just Old Testament violence 
but divine violence per se. In the biblical accounts it does not appear as an arbitrary 
expression of force but rather as part of Yahweh’s overall modus operandi and, more 
crucially, as part of His character, especially in regard to His covenantal relationship with 
Israel.  
As Hawk observes,  
The verb occurs frequently in connection with the conquest of cities and peoples, often with a 
qualifying phrase or note that reports the annihilation of a population… -These campaigns of 
extermination are usually presented as a response to a divine decree and place the conduct of 
war within the context of the nation’s relationship with YHWH. The massacres of populations 
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are cast as acts of careful obedience to the divine decrees and enhance the sense of Israel’s 
covenantal loyalty.
322
 
2.1.5.4 The Ban at Jericho.  
There are a great many Old Testament texts in which the ban is proscribed; Niditch, for 
instance, cites numerous examples in this war-category, including Deut 2:34-35, the defeat of 
Sihon; Deut 3: 6-7, the defeat of Og; Josh 6: 17-21, the destruction of Jericho and Josh 8:2, 
24-28, the destruction of Ai.
323
 The common factor amongst them all is that on Yahweh’s 
behest all humans, regardless of age, gender or military status, are destroyed, in some 
instances livestock is also included in the slaughter.    
To take one example - Joshua chapter 6 delineates how Yahweh gives over Jericho to 
‘irrevocable destruction’. In the story Yahweh is seen to instruct Joshua in His requirements 
for the inevitable fall of this great, walled city including stark and startling commands for 
every living person and animal to forfeit their lives upon pain of the ban coming back upon 
Israel.
324
  
These plans of Yahweh included specific and detailed instructions for the exact means of this 
conquest to be successful, including what should be carried, by whom and the number of 
circumnavigations of the city walls and the manner and timing of the final denouement. The 
fall of Jericho therefore stands as a case study of von Rad’s theory of holy war which he 
asserts was an eminently cultic undertaking, in that it was prescribed and sanctioned by fixed, 
traditional, sacred rites and observances.
325
   
Jericho is thereby interpreted and understood as an instance of Yahweh’s holy war and also 
representative of a model of divine violence. As Steffen notes, in the realm of action, ḥērem 
refers to a divinely sanctioned use of force and violence for ends willed by God, so that 
ḥērem satisfies the formal criteria for invoking generic holy war. It is clear from the text, he 
argues, that ḥērem is here divinely directed, and the Hebrew Scriptures also clearly set forth 
the details of Yahweh’s expectations.326 
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The text of Joshua is explicit and the goals and benefits for the Israelites are minutely 
delineated; in their obliteration of the town, divine wrath would be turned aside and the 
Hebrew nation would once again be able to enjoy Yahweh’s compassionate attention.327 Even 
the most non-violent reading and interpretation of this text would struggle to explain the 
blatant violent over and under-tones inherent in Yahweh’s means of re-establishing the 
otherwise broken harmony between Himself and Israel.  
Steffen notes that ḥērem presents one version of a divinely commanded “holy war” in ancient 
Israel and is manifest in obliteration bordering on omnicide and when this command is given 
by God the expectation is that the faithful were always to respond with absolute fealty. He 
concludes that God’s involvement in the actual destruction and the divine desire for the 
annihilation of enemies is unambiguous.
328
 The unavoidable reality of the story of Joshua at 
Jericho is therefore that the irrevocable and absolute destruction of an entire city puts Him 
back on strong relational terms with His chosen people; a more violent manner of 
reconciliation could however hardly be imagined.
329
 This is further coupled and extrapolated 
by His threat of the ban being transferred upon the Israelites should they ever demure in the 
execution of His commands. This constitutes, to say the very least, an entirely violent milieu.   
This story of Joshua’s enactment of the ban remains emblematic for Jews, both in terms of 
their understanding of Yahweh’s character as well as their relationship and commitment to 
Him. It is also serves as a reminder of their ongoing responsibilities and the consequences 
thereof should they fail to adhere strictly to Yahweh’s vision of their mutual relationship, 
given sometimes through ferocious commands and forged in the crucible of divine violence 
and manifest in violent human conflict.  
As Butler notes, 
The story of Jericho entertained and instructed Israel for long generations. Each new 
historical situation added another dimension of meaning to the narrative. Throughout the 
long history of telling and interpretation, one message continued to ring out loud and 
clear: God fights for his people. The people of God testified repeatedly that what they 
possessed came from the hand of god, not the strength of men. Israelite audiences never 
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lost the captivating awe and mystery of the lesson. The most ancient city of the land with 
its seemingly impregnable fortifications fell easily before Joshua and his God.
330
  
2.1.6 Conclusion. 
Not all however have understood the ban in violent terms; Yoder, for example, suggests that 
ḥērem was unique in relation to the morality of the time not in its violence, but in ensuring 
that war would never become a source of immediate enrichment through plunder.
331
 He does 
not deny the ban or that it was exercised, he instead plays down the otherwise explicit 
violence with an appeal to the ethics of war and extant morality.  
Another who accepts the reality of the ban and its historical application is Soggin who takes a 
wider view of its practice, arguing that it represents the total destruction of the enemy and his 
goods at the conclusion of a campaign with the implication that looting was never allowed in 
any circumstances.
332
 
Both Yoder and Soggin engage with and express their respective understandings of ḥērem, 
illustrating the broad spectrum of scholarly agreement on its historical veracity and 
application. Where agreement ceases is in a shared consensus on the otherwise blatant 
violence of the instruction and its implications for God’s character and divine violence in 
particular.  
Admittedly, such a consensus raises thorny theological issues, both for Godself and for 
human praxiology. In regard to the ongoing relevance and potential applicability of ḥērem, 
for example, Gopin notes that as long as such biblical words were and are considered to be 
expressive of something that God wills, or willed at one time, it will always be more difficult 
theologically to categorically reject the morality of a war that systematically slaughters the 
innocent, if they are non-monotheists or not of one’s faith.333 
In their desire to explicate ḥērem less violently and thereby to absolve God of divine 
violence, either in the past or the present, scholars continue to interpret and re-interpret its 
meaning, substance and potential ramifications. Niditch attempts a non-violent volte-face in 
her observation that the ban as sacrifice has a terrifying completeness and fairness about it 
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and, because all has been promised to God, there is no individual decision that need be made 
about sparing this person or that, no guilt about tactical or surgical strikes that go awry. 
Rather, in the ban, all people are condemned and the matter is out of one’s hands.334  
Whilst this might appear to be rather a neat apology for the ban, the fact remains that in 
taking the matter out of human hands responsibility necessarily transfers into the hands of 
God. This being so, consideration must be given as to what implications the ban has on the 
one authorising it. It is certainly terrifying and complete, as Niditch suggests, but the 
arguments provided to suggest that ḥērem is also non-violent, kind or loving are far from 
straightforward and certainly not compelling. Indeed, it is very difficult to imagine or 
construct a context in which the ban, as biblically presented in the context of war, is anything 
less than an entirely violent divine action.  
More than this, ḥērem, taken on its face-value as expressed in the Old Testament Scriptures 
in the war-texts, provides compelling insight into the character of Yahweh and also His 
relationship with Israel; it is represented as a covenantal relationship and one steeped in 
violence, both divine and human.  
Or, as Wellhausen summarises,  
The armed camp, the cradle of the nation, was also its most ancient holy of holies. There 
was Israel and there was Yahweh.
335
  
Or rather, ḥērem indisputably demonstrates that divine violence is at the heart of Yahweh’s 
purposes and modus operandi, especially in regard to His covenantal engagement with His 
chosen people, Israel.   
2.2 New Testament Violence.   
The Old Testament has provided a number of motifs, models and narratives that associate 
God with violence, to varying degrees. The New Testament might usually be seen as a less 
fertile ground for such evidence and yet it too provides numerous examples of violence, 
whether sanctioned, tolerated, promised, accommodated or perpetrated by God. Indeed, 
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despite what Young calls the common Christian claim that the ‘loving’ God of the New 
Testament is different from the ‘angry’ God of the Old, violence, he argues, is also central to 
the New Testament: through violence God inaugurates the Christian dispensation and the 
primary Christian symbol, the crucifixion, which is the ineradicable centrepiece of the 
Christian message of redemption is, he concludes, indubitably an act of extreme violence.
336
 
Further, as a foundational New Testament concept, even the clear, over-arching delineation 
between believers and unbelievers, between those considered good and bad, creates a mind-
set predisposed to conflict and violence. Avalos suggests that violence emerges when there is 
a scarcity of resources and the deliberate restricting of access.
337
 This is coupled with the 
eschatological promise given to Christians that the final consummation of history will take 
place through a great outbreak of divine violence, where evil will be destroyed, before the 
revealing of a new heaven and a new earth and that God has the power to destroy both body 
and soul in hell.
338
 It is therefore apparent that there is at least an undercurrent and at most a 
distinct theme of violence running throughout the entire New Testament.
339
 
2.2.1 The Violent Cross.  
In his preamble to a consideration of the cross, atonement, and nonviolence, Belousek states 
that the cross of Christ is more than nonviolence and that, in fact, it reveals the way that God 
does justice and makes peace through acts of costly faithfulness for the salvation of 
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humanity.
340
 He later acknowledges the danger of an a priori agenda and admits that no 
method of interpretation and understanding is completely bias-free
341
 whilst remaining 
seemingly oblivious to his own pre-agenda in terms of a cross which, whether it comes before 
nonviolence in his reckoning or not, is in its most basic form nonetheless a patently violent 
medium by which humanity’s salvation might be won. Even if that which the cross 
accomplishes is inherently non-violent, the means to this end could hardly have been any 
more violent. Moser notes the crucifixion of Jesus as a particularly memorable case of God’s 
severity, concluding that aside from its theological significance the human treatment of Jesus 
before his death was remarkably severe.
342
 
To ‘soften the blow’ of this perceived New Testament violence Boersma posits that although 
God steps into a violent world, on the cross he performs an act of amazing hospitality, which 
he accepts is attended by violence, and yet in so doing God reaches the eschatological goal of 
pure, unconditional hospitality.
343
 Whether the act is ‘justified’ or not by its 
accomplishments, it is hard to sanction an interpretative method that, in such an overtly 
violent scenario, nonetheless seeks to convolute an explanation that is entirely violence-
free.
344
  
 
Denials of this kind raise the question of how any process of interpretation might be 
approached if the interpreter has embraced such an a priori position in regard to an attitude 
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and outlook of nonviolence.
345
 Flew’s analogy of the Invisible Gardener346 is once again 
instructive, as by the time an explanation is given as to how non-negative ‘violence’ is by 
means of a thousand qualifications, its use has been illegitimatized from normative usage and 
understanding. Further, an interpretation of the cross shaped by a presumption of nonviolence 
might also miss or dismiss, whether consciously, or unconsciously, the “violence” of God’s 
own action through the cross.
347
 
 
2.2.1.2 God’s Hospitality.  
 
When seeking to accommodate violence in a doctrine of God and the atonement it is, 
therefore, possible to focus attention on His desire to deliver humanity back into ‘hospitality’ 
with Himself. With this primary focus the means by which it might be achieved can, 
however, be forgotten, underplayed or ignored. Those advocating a doctrine of non-violence 
find it difficult to conceptualise this endeavour in terms of an actual deliverance of human 
beings by the overcoming of an actual Satan and real demonic hordes, the defeat of sin and 
the resultant setting free of people from death. This war-like scenario, if it be the case, 
necessitates a victory being won in a far from non-violent manner.
348
  
 
Alternatively, this power-encounter can be framed as a battle to be won in order to pre-empt 
the end of an eternal war and it would, like any war, necessarily be bloody, messy and 
involve conflict, courage, sacrifice and, inevitably, violence. This does not necessitate the 
advocacy of violence per se but rather opens up awareness of its potential presence and the 
affiliated admission and realisation that only God has the capacity and capability of waging 
and winning such a war – whatever His chosen means of doing so.349 If God’s 
accomplishment is viewed this way it is fitting to state that a non-violent God would not be 
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capable of securing victory on behalf of a lost humanity and certainly not against such 
formidable foes. 
 
2.2.2 The Temple Incident.  
 
Having acknowledged some of the expansive and over-arching violence prevalent in the New 
Testament, our chosen means of addressing the topic of New Testament violence will be to 
focus on one particular event as paradigmatic of the overall theme. Given the subject of this 
thesis it is particularly resonant that the issue chosen features the incarnated Jesus Christ in an 
historical activity. The event is one that has come to be known as The Cleansing of the 
Temple although Matson prefers Temple Incident to “cleansing” since the latter implies prior 
judgement of the meaning and interpretation of the event.
350
 Ellens argues that to demystify 
the event further it should be ascribed by what he calls its right name: Jesus’ violence in the 
temple;
351
 because whatever Jesus’ ulterior motives for acting this way in the temple, Ellens 
asserts that they were nonetheless essentially violent, abusive and sacrilegious.
352
 It is, 
therefore, a compelling and important event in Jesus’ life, offering unique theological insight 
into the character, purpose and actions of God, as manifest in Jesus Christ, in the context of a 
divine soteriological plan.   
 
There are many similarities between the Johannine account of the Temple Incident and those 
portrayed in the Synoptic Gospels; Morris contests this, arguing that despite the assertions of 
some critics there are practically no resemblances between the two narratives, apart from the 
central act.
353
 Besides that stating there are ‘practically no resemblances’ far over-reaches  the 
point, our area of focus is on what Morris calls the ‘central act’ - the actions of Jesus in the 
Temple area during this incident; on this issue there is a great deal of convergence between 
the four gospel accounts.  
 
We, however, will highlight the Fourth Gospel account
354
 because of its greater attention to 
detail in regard to the historical occurrences of the event. Most notably, in the Fourth Gospel 
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Matson notes that Jesus drives out not only the sellers of animals but also the sheep and oxen 
themselves and that in particular, to highlight this act, the Fourth Evangelist has Jesus making 
a whip of cords to help drive out the animals, thus underscoring their presence in the Temple 
court and emphasizing the dramatic nature of the action. In similar fashion, Matson 
concludes, this account has Jesus actually pouring out the coins of the money changers – 
again a dramatic emphasis of an action only implied in the other accounts.
355
 
 
So, whilst almost no New Testament event receives unanimous affirmation as to its 
historicity, this one meets many of the main criteria. For instance, in regard to the 
multifarious difficulties in ascertaining historicity of a biblical story or incident Marshall 
asserts that it is clear that many factors enter into the historian’s reconstruction of the past, 
thereby hindering the arrival at certainty. In fact, the sources are fragmentary and opaque too 
often and the original events are too complex, he states, for any source to reproduce them 
fully, whilst several reconstructions of what happened are often possible. He concludes that 
the historian is therefore frequently reduced to reasoned conjectures and assessments of 
comparative probabilities.
356
 To clarify and counteract these issues Marshall suggests a list of 
seven historical criteria to be applied to biblical texts to ascertain historicity.
357
 
 
Certainly, the passage is multiply attested, fulfils both dissimilarity and embarrassment 
criteria, does not go against the grain of naturalism and it coheres with the sort of prophetic 
work Jesus is thought to have performed – and the fact that it is presented differently in John 
when compared with the other synoptic accounts bolsters its historical plausibility.
358
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Matson observes that it would be erroneous to present a demarcation between the incident 
and its theological implications and rather it should be viewed, “…as a prophetic symbolic 
act pointing to God’s eschatological intervention, which would involve the Temple in some 
way.”359 Given the magnitude of this symbolism as a warning and forerunner of God’s 
promised ‘destruction of the Temple’ and His emblematic ‘rebuilding’ of it in the person of 
Jesus
360
, it is appropriate that the human parameters of Jesus’ behaviour should have been 
pushed to such an extent. The wrath of Jesus is, of course, in the first instance a sign and 
demonstration that he was an actual man of flesh and blood.
361
 
 
The impact of this implication confirms that the ultimate significance of the Temple Incident 
is therefore christological and not primarily ecclesiological.
362
 Further, in his discussion of 
the Incident being placed by John at the beginning of his Gospel Morris concurs that this is 
due to the fact that he has a theological rather than a chronological approach.
363
 The question 
is then raised as to what these christological and theological implications are in terms of Jesus 
himself, his character, purpose and actions; with the additional repercussion of what might be 
added to an understanding of God’s nature.  
 
Jesus’ actions are described by Anderson as those of a ‘northern prophet’ who, when 
confronted with the mercantile character of the sacrificial system, saw it as a sacrilege and 
sought to expunge its flaws. His didactic conclusion is that in all four Gospels this incident 
pits Jesus against the central cultic and national institution of Judaism leading directly to his 
opposition and demise at the hands of religious leaders, though carried out by the Romans.
364
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Likewise, Casey observes that in throwing people out of the Temple Jesus stopped those 
trading in it; he also prevented those carrying vessels through it.
365
 He notes, therefore, that 
overturning the tables of the money changers was not a symbol of the Temple's destruction or 
of anything else but rather it was part of the practical action of stopping commercial activity 
in the house of God. For Casey, the reason that Jesus was not arrested immediately was 
because he had too much power, not too little and that he was crucified for exactly the same 
reason.
366
 
 
Lincoln, however, questions the ‘cleansing of the temple’ as a response to commercial abuse, 
arguing that this disruption of one of the most significant feasts of the year is understood and 
interpreted as a symbolic action that temporarily brings to a halt the sacrificial system 
understood to be ordained by God in the law.
367
 Sanders contends that the turning over of 
even one table points towards destruction, questioning whether Jesus’ choice to break 
something would have been a better symbol, before conceding that he will leave it to others 
whether the assessment of ‘overturning’ is a self-evident symbol of destruction, before 
concluding that to him it appears to be quite an obvious one.
368
 Not as obvious to those whose 
business was curtailed, however, who might understandably ‘interpret’ Jesus’ actions as a 
direct, personal and violent attack upon them and the precursor to his literally throwing them 
out of the Temple environs. A symbolic understanding of the Incident requires exploration, 
but not to the exclusion of the blatant and literal, historical action which Jesus enacted. 
 
In order to retain focus on violence in the New Testament, discussions pertaining to the 
pericope’s purpose and debates about  motivation and raison d’être in Jesus’ actions will not 
be undertaken.
369
 The centrally importance element of this event for Ellens and the one of 
which he contends that truth can be told is that it was a case of Jesus having, “…one of his 
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fits of violence.”370 Our focus will remain upon what the Temple Incident demonstrates about 
God’s character as manifest in the person and actions of Jesus in terms of wrath, judgement, 
and violent activity in achieving His purposes. 
 
The issue under consideration is therefore Jesus’ addressing, confronting and expelling 
people and animals from the temple area.
371
 Commenting on verses 14-17 of John chapter 2, 
Beasley-Murray notes of this ejection of the traders from the Temple with their beasts and 
birds for sacrifice, in addition to the scattering of their money, that it equates to an act of 
wrath which the traders were powerless to resist – thus fitting the previous definition of 
violence, especially in regard to irresistibility.
372
 
 
Controlling a large area such as the massive outer court or possibly the Royal Portico would, 
according to Borg,
373
 have required a para-military or mob action involving scores of 
followers, possibly even a larger group, and with the utilisation of force; he suggests that 
controlling the area without such force would have been virtually miraculous.
374
  
 
Casey counters that,  
 
As for the Romans, they were confronted with a minor disturbance at which a Jewish 
preacher persuaded most Jews to follow his view of what should and should not be done 
in the court of the Gentiles. This did not give them enough reason to risk life and limb or 
to cause carnage. They would surely need the chief priests and scribes to tell them 
whether or not Jesus' action should be regarded as seditious. When the Roman governor 
was told that it was, he had Jesus crucified. Borg's description of these proceedings as 
non-intervention is inaccurate. His objections should not be accepted.
375
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Again, rather than appealing to miracle, others have explained the Incident in terms of Jesus’ 
charisma and ‘holy gravitas’. Morris, for instance, insists that it is clear that it was not so 
much Jesus’ physical force as his moral power that was employed to empty the courts.376 He 
nonetheless implicitly infers acknowledgement of ‘physical force’, noting the prosaic nature 
of attempts to estimate the effectiveness of Jesus’ ‘whip’ as a weapon; it may have been 
considerable, but he contends that it was rather the blazing anger of the selfless Christ rather 
than the weapon He carried which cleared the Temple Courts of what he calls its noisy, 
motley throng.
377
  
 
Casey, however, counters Borg’s proposition of the need for para-military action to achieve a 
clearing of the temple, arguing that he underestimates the role of sacred texts and their 
interpreters in communities which adhere to them.
378
 If this were the case and Jesus were able 
to evict all those present, going about their legally and religiously sanctioned business, by 
means of an appeal to scriptural precedent then it is difficult to understand why he found need 
both for a whip, of whatever kind, and for the overthrowing of the moneylender’s tables.  
If it is decided a priori that Jesus could not exhibit an act associated with violence, the task 
for the theologian becomes one of interpretation and re-interpretation. The threat of physical 
violence, implicit in the carrying of a weapon, is in some way nullified when the ‘weapon’ is 
construed as a mere ‘stage prop’ rather than a blatant implement of violence. For example, 
Morris presents it is a ‘weapon’ which can only be called such in its most innocuous 
manifestation, so that the ‘whip’ (or rather, “…as it were a whip”) which Jesus brandishes is 
perceived as probably being “…a lash of twisted rushes”.379 Likewise, for Turner, it is 
understood as a, “…scourge of small cords (a clutch of rope ends)”.380 
 
It is only in John’s Gospel that the account of Jesus having ‘made a whip out of cords’ with 
which he ‘drove them all out of the temple’ (John 2:15)381 is mentioned. With such an 
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implement he ‘drove them all out of the temple’ (John 2:15), but who does this ‘all’ refer to? 
Lincoln contends that the more likely construal is a reference to the sheep, cattle and humans 
too particularly in the light of the Synoptic tradition which, he asserts, clearly has the human 
sellers and buyers being driven out.
382
 Commenting on the word ‘whip’ in the account, 
Lincoln adds that some manuscripts interpret ὼς φραγὲλλιον as being ‘like a whip’ or ‘a sort 
of whip’ and that despite the early date of two of the witnesses – p66 and p75 – this appears to 
be a clear scribal attempt to soften the portrayal of Jesus’ action.383 Beasley-Murray supports 
this, noting that both these sources and some other MSS prefix  ὼς  to φραγὲλλιον  to infer ‘a 
kind of whip’, concluding that despite the age of these witnesses the addition nonetheless 
looks like an attempt to tone down the action of Jesus.
384
 Michaels adds that Jesus was, 
“Quickly fashioning a whip out of cords…”385, again inferring that Jesus’ activity was 
rushed, spontaneous and unprepared; thereby lessening its potential power, threat, impact and 
violence.  
 
In regard to this ‘down-grading’ of the potentially violent nature of the passage, Croy notes 
that, 
 
The editors of the modern critical text have deemed the absence of ώς more likely 
original, but whether it was absent or present, it would mean that someone—either the 
evangelist or later scribes—felt the need to soften the image.
386
 
 
Further, in comparing the ‘whip’ used by Jesus with the more familiar flaggelum used by 
Roman soldiers, Croy also notes that it was an instrument fashioned (ποιήσας) on the spot 
from available materials; the latter did not likely include, he argues, leather thongs, bone 
fragments, or bits of metal.
387
 He concludes that such an implement would have been made 
from items such as rushes or reeds which, for him, are akin to rattan or wicker material which 
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theme is the forcible and irrisistable nature of the respective activities.  
382
 Lincoln, John, 137. 
383
 Lincoln, John, 136.  
384
 Beasley-Murray, John, 38.  
385
 J.R. Michaels, The Gospel of John, Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2010, 158-59.  
386
 N.C. Croy, ‘The Messianic Whippersnapper: Did Jesus Use a Whip on People in the Temple (John 2:15)?’, 
Journal of Biblical Literature, 128, No. 3, Fall 2009, 555-568, 557. 
387
 Croy, ‘Messianic’, 557. 
87 
 
might have been available as the animals' bedding or perhaps were already fashioned into 
ropes or traces.
388
 In other words, hardly a weapon to be used for violent purposes. 
 
Such toned-down versions of events mean Jesus’ actions become more passive, moral and 
righteous and merely the acting-out of a dramatic illustration; this presents a more palatable 
option excusing Jesus from charges of using excessive force, let alone violence.
389 
The 
process of explicating Christ’s actions in the Temple Incident has become an object lesson in 
mitigation as to why that which would normally be construed at face value as one thing, a 
confrontational and violent act, is actually something else, a piece of drama or a moment of 
charisma and strength of personality, when it is ‘perpetrated’ by Jesus Christ.  
 
Others, such as Stibbe, explicitly ignore this Incident
390
 whilst Lincoln debates the reasons 
for Jesus’ actions to the exclusion of the action itself.391 Alternatively, Morris acknowledges 
the Incident, detailing how Jesus overturned the tables used by the money changers, pouring 
their coins upon the floor; he then makes no comment whatsoever on these actions, choosing 
to ignore the seemingly blatant connotations that such avert and antagonistic deeds would 
normally elicit.
392
  
 
Whatever reason Jesus had for his actions in the Temple in which he patently provokes a 
confrontation with the religious authorities
393
, the fact remains that the Incident, at the very 
least, raises the spectre of the possibility of ‘divine violence’ in the person of Jesus and at 
most that Jesus may have perpetrated a violent act, whether it is construed as parabolic or 
not.
394
 Whether Jesus’ actions were symbolic, political, metaphorical or parabolic there is, 
however, very little suggestion that they did not happen at all.  
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Adding these various adjectives to Jesus’ activities in the Temple is a means, consciously or 
not, of mitigating their obviously forceful and perhaps violent content. An example is seen in 
Yoder who, having briefly considered the Temple Incident, concludes that if one sought to 
reach behind the canonical Gospels to what he calls “the real historical Jesus,” such an effort 
would increase rather than decrease the socio-political dimensions of our picture of his 
work.
395
 He gives little evidence for this conjecture, although it should be noted that his own 
writing and work was produced in the context of his being a professor of theology at the 
University of Notre Dame where he was a fellow of the school’s Joan B. Kroc Institute for 
International Peace Studies.   
 
Whatever the sub-text for Jesus’ disruption in the Temple area, he blatantly manifests actions 
that in any other context would be construed as confrontational, antagonistic, irresistible, 
adversarial and therefore violent.
396
 The argument that the event was symbolic in some way 
does not lessen the incident’s historicity, power, impact or potential to be interpreted as an 
incident of New Testament violence perpetrated by no less a person than the incarnate God in 
Christ. Herzog agrees. Having assessed the divergent claims for respective interpretations of 
Jesus’ actions in the Temple Incident he concludes that it is more than a symbolic action and 
that it involved violence against the exploiters of the people.
397
 
 
In the Temple Incident the theological conjunction of the two Testaments is demonstrated in 
terms of message and method. Jesus’ audience was predominantly Jewish, representative of a 
Judaism directly linked, historically and theologically, with what Christians later came to call 
the Old Testament. Jesus was acting in a manner familiar to Jews in terms of his stark, 
antagonistic and violent engagement with that which stood in the way of his and God’s 
soteriological purposes. Jesus was not trying to destroy and surpass Judaism, on the contrary, 
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he wanted to bring it to its destined goal in the eschatological order of worship in the new 
creation; this event being initiated both through and in his own deed and presence, as the one 
who would be crucified and resurrected.
398
 Jesus undertook this undeniably dramatic action 
in order to open up a way for true worship of God and this motif is central to the narrative 
and dialogue of the pericope.
399
 It can be seen that when the intention of an action is 
soteriological God is willing, in either Testament, to exercise whatever means are necessary 
to accomplish His purposes – even if these means are occasionally confrontational and 
violent.  
 
Concluding his thoughts on the Temple Incident Morris observes that one of John’s great 
themes is that in Jesus God is working His purposes out; every critical moment, he argues, 
sees the fulfilment of Scripture in which those purposes are set forth.
400
 Another 
interpretation of these events is possible - the purposes of God are manifest in Christ and the 
fulfilment of Scripture is demonstrated in God’s violent activity, mediated through Jesus, in 
an act and moment of epoch-making soteriological significance.   
 
Jesus was confronting Judaism and heralding both its fulfilment and its passing as the means 
of human engagement with deity – a paradigm shift of this magnitude required a dramatic, 
demonstrable, irresistible, emphatic and violent, action – just as the heralding of a ‘new 
covenant in his blood’ heralds another Violent Incident at the crucifixion.401 Divine violence, 
therefore, is constant throughout the New Testament, in its most explicit forms only manifest 
at moments of profound and essential soteriological significance; at the fulfilment and end of 
Judaism and its sacrificial system and then at the inauguration of the era of the cross and the 
subsequent genesis of Christianity.
402
 The Temple Incident, therefore, provides an essential 
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interpretative key to the New Testament as well as a lens through which to regard God’s 
nature, purposes and, in this instance, His violence.  
 
We conclude and assert that it is, therefore, impossible to imagine a historical scene in which 
moneylenders were plying their perfectly legal, state and religiously-sanctioned trade with a 
full entourage of staff, including a retinue of various animals, and in which an unknown and 
unauthorised interloper arrives, overturns their tables, spills their money and drives them and 
their animals out of their area of business and for it not to be considered an act of violence. 
To arrive at an alternative explanation requires not only a strong a priori agenda, disallowing 
and disavowing violence, but rather a denial that violence could ever, in any context, be 
associated with Jesus, with God and with His character, purposes, being or function. 
 
2.2.3 Eschatological Violence.  
An important element of New Testament violence is found in the eschatological writings 
which Stott refers to as pertaining to the ‘last things’, which include death, the parousia, the 
resurrection, the last judgement and the final destinies of heaven or hell, and which together 
form the focus of eschatology; he asserts that these issues have always fascinated Christian 
minds.
403
 
Certainly it is the case that much has been written on the interpretation of the Christian 
eschaton and thereby universal agreement on a definitive set of events is little short of 
impossible. Instead, as Stott has already noted, some concepts emerge on a regular, historical 
basis in order to provide at least a thematic framework if not a full-blown, definitive 
theological structure. Moltmann, for example, notes that in Catholic dogmatics up to about 
1960 the treatise on eschatology treats first ‘the eschatology of the individual’, with death, 
judgment, purgatory and hell, and then ‘the eschatology of the human race’, with the Last 
Day, the resurrection of the dead, and final Judgment.
404
  
Each of these themes, in their own way, is linked to and constitutive of an overall framework 
which would potentially not be alien to the notions of violence and, in particular, divine 
violence. Or rather, when considering, for instance, death, judgment and hell it would be 
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difficult to imagine them without at least the possibility of the shadow of violence falling 
across them.  
To further explicate this ‘shadow’, in the contention that in the Second Coming and 
Judgement Jesus confronts the world in the present, and will do so personally and visibly in 
the future, Wright reaffirms Jesus as the one to whom every knee shall bow (Phil 2:10-11) as 
well as being the one who took the form of a servant and was obedient to the death of the 
cross (Phil 2:6-8). Indeed, he concludes that, as Paul stresses, Jesus is the first because he did 
the second; God will therefore, Wright asserts, put the world and everyone in it ‘to rights’ so 
that death and decay will be overcome, and God will be all in all.
405
  
Wright does not dwell, however, upon exactly how God might both cause every knee, 
whether willingly or not, to bow to Jesus or, indeed, how a recalcitrant humanity might be put 
‘to rights’ without the exertion of a potentially irresistible force. Instead, whilst 
acknowledging traditional understanding of eschatology in terms of death, judgment, heaven 
and hell, Wright chooses to push divine violence entirely aside and focus rather on the over-
arching and violence-free theme that history is going somewhere under the guidance of 
God.
406
   
2.2.3.1 Revelation Chapter 14.  
In order to be more specific in our consideration of eschatological violence we will focus 
upon just the book of Revelation and, in particular, chapter 14. Kreitzer argues that 
Revelation contains perhaps the most detailed treatment of the judgment theme in the New 
Testament, interweaving complex images of judgment (past, present and future) within the 
apocalyptic vision related by the Seer. He concludes that the use of the Divine Warrior motif 
might be seen as an extension of this judgment theme which is so central to the book as a 
whole.
407
 In terms of Jewish eschatological expectation Bauckham further notes that the 
theme of holy war plays a prominent role in which the future will bring the final victory of 
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this Divine Warrior over his people’s and his own enemies.408 There could hardly be a more 
explicitly violent conceptual and linguistic framework for this apocalyptic vision.  
In the overall eschatological themes presented in Revelation chapters 12-14 they provide, 
according to Beasley-Murray, the longest interruption in the judgment visions and are 
chapters which set the opposition between the emperor worship and the church in the context 
of the age-long conflict between the powers of darkness and the God of heaven.
409
 Likewise, 
Bauckham posits a violent, cosmological macro-narrative in his observation that in these 
chapters the church’s role is portrayed primarily by means of the image of warfare with the 
forces of evil; the church being the army of the Lamb, the messianic conqueror of evil (Rev 
14:1-5).
410
 For this to be the case, of course, there would need to be an acceptance of at least 
an extrinsically violent God who proposes to fight, when necessary, via human means 
utilising the medium of his chosen vessel, the church. 
2.2.3.1.1 The Grapes of Wrath.  
Throughout Revelation 14 there are explicit and detailed references to the nature of this 
expression of divine violence; in equal measure it is shown who is commanding the violence, 
by what means and against whom and for what reason. In Revelation 14:10b, for example, it 
states that the one who worships the beast and receives his mark will drink the wine of God’s 
fury, “…which has been poured full strength into the cup of his wrath.” This metaphor of the 
“cup of wrath” is found with some frequency in the Old Testament, Aune cites numerous 
occasions,
411
 concluding that their common element is that Yahweh is presented as one 
compelling his enemies to drink a cup resulting in their drunkenness, which is considered a 
judgment.
412
 It should also be noted that the term ποτηριον, “cup”, can be used as a metaphor 
for destiny
413
 and, rather more stridently, for violent death
414
, either the fact of violent death 
or violent death as the consequence of divine punishment.
415
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In terms of the ‘wrath’ of Yahweh’s ‘cup’, in classical Greek θυμος is used of the inner 
emotion of passion and anger while οργη is used for its external expression, though these 
terms are used interchangeably in the LXX as they are in Revelation.
416
 The emphasis on the 
wrath of God, provoked and deserved by the wicked behaviour of humans, which results in 
the judgment of offenders, is a biblical motif found frequently in Revelation.
417
 One would 
have to take an almost obtuse a priori non-violent hermeneutic in order to interpret these 
concepts as anything less than suggestive of very aggressive divine activity, let alone explicit 
divine violence.  
In Revelation 14:19b it is further stated that the ‘grapes’ will be cast, “…into the great 
winepress of the wrath of God” – a clause which, according to Aude, is an allusion to Isaiah 
63:1-6, which depicts the Lord as the divine warrior coming with garments stained with the 
blood of His enemies in comparison with the garments of one who treads grapes in the 
winepress.
418
 This represents yet another explicit reference to divine violence and its being 
unleashed upon those who have incurred God’s wrath.  
In a reference to the cultural and biblical context of these fabled ‘Grapes of Wrath’, Barker 
notes that when the prophet Joel foresaw the Great Judgement in the valley of Jehoshaphat he 
spoke of harvesting grain and of trampling grapes. The nations would assemble there on the 
Day of the LORD, the sun and moon would be darkened and the stars cease to shine, and then 
the LORD would give his command:  
Put in the sickle, for the harvest is ripe. 
Go in, tread, for the wine press is full.  
The vats overflow, for their wickedness is great. (Joel 3:13).
419
 
In his summation of Revelation chapter 14 Beale therefore asserts that the divine violence 
delineated there of God wreaking destruction upon the irreligious is as thoroughgoing as one 
mowing down the ripe harvest and crushing grapes in the winepress. He concludes that the 
building up of sin throughout history reaches its zenith in the final generation of history and 
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has made the impious ripe for wrath.
420
 Those destroyed thereby earned and deserved their 
destruction and God was therefore justified in this expression of His nature in the furtherance 
of His overall purposes.  
2.2.3.1.2 The Shedding of Blood.  
The stark language and metaphor of violence continues on into Rev 14:20b where it states 
that the, “…blood flowed from the winepress to the height of the bridles of horses for one 
thousand six hundred stadia.” Bauckham argues that this is an instance of hyperbole which 
consists of an extraordinary amount of blood to indicate a slaughter of exceptional 
proportions and is, he argues, a topos, frequently found in ancient literature.
421
 Whether a 
topos or not, the reference is, at the very least, one of excessive bloodshed and violence and 
refers, according to Aune, to God’s climactic victory in the final eschatological battle.422  
This being the case, then however these metaphors and descriptions might be translated and 
interpreted it is difficult to get away from both their original and overt militaristic and thereby 
violent connotations and of their association with God. This linkage to divine victory, of 
course, raises the violence above that of mere human militaristic endeavour and instead 
equates it to the accomplishment and fulfilment of God’s purposes. It becomes, therefore, not 
merely violence, but rather divine violence manifest through human means. Beale observes 
that as in the Old Testament, so in Revelation 14 these two metaphors of harvest and vintage 
connote the thoroughgoing and definitive judgment of sinners by God. He concludes that 
blood rising up to “the bridles of horses” is figurative battle language and functions 
hyperbolically to emphasize the severe and unqualified nature of the judgment.
423
 Figurative 
or not, the language chosen could hardly have been any more explicit in its manifestation of 
violent imagery.  
2.2.3.1.3 Two Sides of the Same Coin? 
Within the same pericope, Rev 14:17-20, it is stated that the fire ‘spread out across the world’ 
which Prigent interprets as the fire on which has been poured the incense of worship, that is, 
the prayers of the saints. Here, he contends, the angel of fire comes out from before the altar, 
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showing once again that worship is not without relation to judgment; the wrath of God is 
therefore, for him, not the unleashing of a hateful vengeance but is rather the other side of the 
Gospel.
424
 
In equating these two elements of wrath and love as being two sides of the same conceptual 
coin Prigent exhibits and expresses his fear of biblical ideology that might be construed as 
violent. Likewise, Collins, too, concedes that one criticism of the Apocalypse is its perceived 
focus on violent language. She asserts, however, that such language by no means advocates 
violence of humans against others and yet she cannot avoid the fact that violent imagery is 
prominent in the text, concluding that the attitude towards violence in the book of Revelation 
thus seems ambivalent.
425
 
Having also seemingly accepted the notion of violence, both human and divine, and 
particularly of violent confrontation in Revelation, Bauckham, too, sets up an interpretative 
schema in which language that is otherwise apparently violent indeed only seems to be so. 
Rather, he argues that the lavish use of violent and militaristic language is invariably used in 
a non-militaristic sense; in the eschatological destruction of evil in Revelation, he concludes, 
there is no place for real armed violence – instead, he asserts, that there is ample space for the 
imagery of armed violence.
426
  
Again, Collins’ interpretation of the indisputable violence, both human and divine, in the 
book of Revelation is based on what she sees as the subjective benefit that it can facilitate for 
the individual engaging with it. She posits that,  
Meditation on the violent images, symbols, and narratives in the Apocalypse can have a 
variety of effects. Instead of ignoring or rejecting these portions as distasteful, one can 
use them as an occasion to discover one’s own hostile, aggressive feelings. Critical 
reflection is then needed to determine the most constructive way of dealing with these 
feelings. It may be that they should be released in the imagination in a way analogous to 
Revelation’s resolution of tension.
427
 
Attempts of this kind to downplay, reinterpret or ignore violence, and especially divine 
violence, can lead to a degree of confusion and contradiction in those advocating such an 
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approach. Even after having previously down-played the use of violence and violent 
language, for example, Bauckham nonetheless concedes that in the book of Revelation the 
call to readers or hearers to ‘conquer’ is fundamental to the structure and theme of the book. 
In fact, he argues that such a call demands the readers’ active participation in the divine war 
against evil.
428
 
Quite how one would ‘fight’ such a ‘divine war’ without the use of divine violence is an issue 
that Bauckham leaves unanswered.  
2.3 The Satan & The Demonic Realm.  
We have established that God, at least extrinsically, accommodates violence and now it is 
time to consider the identity, being and function of that or whom He had to overcome at the 
atonement, whether primarily or secondarily, metaphorically or in actuality – the Satan, the 
Devil, the Evil One.
429
 Or one, who Perry concedes, when presented as an explanatory 
hypothesis, is now mythological and pre-scientific.
430
 
Whilst acknowledging what he perceives as the imprudence and naivety of seeing demonic 
forces along the lines of ‘them’ and ‘us’, however, Wright is willing to grant that there is, 
nonetheless, an enemy at work, but one who is subtle and cunning and much too clever to 
allow itself to be identified simply with one person, group or nation. He concludes that the 
line between good and evil is clear at the level of God, on the one hand, and the Satan, on the 
other and yet asserts that it is much less clear as it passes through human beings, individually 
and collectively.
431
 
Conversely, according to Macquarrie, what was previously attributable to ‘demons’ is now 
explicable through reason, leading to the province of the demons being shrunk away; 
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Occam’s razor, he concludes, demands the excision of the concept of the demonic from the 
categories of modern thought.
432
 
This is an issue which polarises religious opinion, producing a tendentious area of theological 
penumbra, engendering controversy and debate, but little congruence.
433
  
That the ‘devil’, shorthand for evil at its most potent, truly exists is unquestionable. ‘He’ 
was present throughout the witch-craze but in the hearts not of its victims but its 
inquisitors. He was present at Auschwitz. His face appears only too often in the daily 
papers. The danger in demonology is not that it has over-emphasized the need to struggle 
with the ‘powers of darkness’ but that, too often, it has misplaced and perhaps even 
belittled the extent of their true identity.
434
  
Hastings’ quote is a microcosm of current theological debate and understanding of the Devil 
adding to the overriding malaise around his/its identity. He starts with a depersonalised view 
giving way to dropping the inverted commas with the later acknowledgement that His ‘face’ 
appears only too often in the media. He is conflicted about evil and the Devil, the linking of 
the two and the personhood of the latter; he is not alone.   
2.3.1 Biblical Background. 
A robust theological foundation for understanding the Devil must, of course, be built upon 
testamental evidence and it is therefore important to initially note that every writer of the 
New Testament makes mention of either the devil, the Satan, the evil one or the deceiver of 
this world.
435
 Macquarrie acknowledges that belief in demonic powers does appear in the 
pages of the New Testament but argues that, “…it could hardly be said to be prominent.”436 
Certainly the relative prominence or priority of the Satan and demonic powers is open to 
interpretation and debate. Perry again challenges the notion that Paul is more concerned with 
sin than the Satan in his theology and asserts that, in fact, Paul not only has a great deal to say 
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about the Satan but further, this element of his theology could only be removed from his 
presentation of the Gospel with serious loss.
437 
 Conversely, in comparing the Gospels and St. 
Paul, Macquarrie asserts that whilst removing demons from the former can be done without 
much difficulty, it would prove rather less easy to eliminate them from Paul because they 
enter into the very texture of his theology.
438
 
Likewise, in terms of the Gospel as Jesus himself preached and understood it, Hastings 
acknowledges that the Satan and the demonic was central for Jesus; he adds the caveat, 
however, that it is less clear that this is true of Jesus’ own thought and that perhaps it owes 
rather more to his interpreters.
439
 Perry counters such assertions with his view on Jesus’ self-
understanding of the Satan and the demonic realm and whether he represents a reliable 
theological source. He contests that,  
What we cannot do is to say that Jesus really knew there was no such entity as a personal 
devil but that he spoke and acted as though there were, in order to accommodate his 
teachings to what would be credible and accessible to the people in whose culture he had 
become incarnate. That is to reduce the incarnation to play-acting, and cannot be 
seriously entertained.
440
  
Any attempt to look at the historical and cultural context of Jesus’ life, teaching , death and 
self-understanding must facilitate a broader theological vista that, whilst incorporating God’s 
overall soteriological purposes, does not stop short of putting them into their ultimate, 
framing context of the eternal and everlasting purposes of a Sovereign God. Noble, for 
example, warns against what Hanson called a, “…washing line theology”441 in which an 
attempt is made to delineate each and every topic with its own theology – such as a ‘theology 
of gender’ or a ‘theology of science’ – rather than acknowledging Christian theology as an 
organic whole, incorporating each of these separate and yet related theological elements into 
one overarching, inclusive and inter-dependent model. Noble argues that such an outlook is 
dangerous in its perception of a ‘theology of the spirit world’ which might be presented as 
separate to an overall and otherwise consistent all-in-one, holistic Christian theology.
442
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Further, it is also essential to be aware of First Century cultural context which necessarily 
affects perceived meaning, understanding and interpretation.
443
 Indeed, acknowledgement 
must be made of the spiritual and over-arching biblical milieu in which these teachings and 
theology find their original and thereby potentially ultimate soteriological purpose, meaning 
and resonance; failing to do so will mean producing a theology which will necessarily fall 
short of recounting a truly authentic theological picture, for those either in the First or the 
Twenty First Century. It is therefore not without irony, given his perspective on 
demythology, that Bultmann nonetheless contests that to understand the theology of parables 
it is first essential to recapture the culture that informs the text; in the context of the synoptic 
parables, that of first-century Palestine.
444
 
This testamental background is, however, not limited to the New Testament. Rather, in the 
Old Testament the Satan was originally presented as being one of the angels whose role was 
to tempt people and to test their faith; he challenged the LORD to let him test the faith of Job 
(Job 1:1-12) and tempted David to take a census of Israel (I Chron. 21:1). He even stood 
before the LORD in the holy of holies to challenge Joshua’s right to be the high priest (Zech. 
3:1). In his origin, however, the Satan, according to Barker, appears to have been an aspect of 
the LORD himself, insofar as later texts attribute to him what had formerly been described as 
actions of the LORD.
445
  
Barker’s assertion raises a problem in diabolic provenance, especially in regard to the issues 
of the Devil’s origin and character, his fall and his future. On these matters Hastings argues 
that there is remarkably little in Scripture outside the book of Revelation resulting in what he 
calls a ‘scriptural paucity’ leading to the church being extremely parsimonious in 
dogmatizing in these areas.
446
  
Notwithstanding this dogmatic caveat, there is still a great deal that the Scriptures either 
explicitly state or at least allude to in regard to the Satan and his activity. In his commentary 
on the three angels that fly in mid-heaven in Revelation 14:6-11, for example, Bauckham 
observes that this means that they fly between heaven, which since the Devil’s fall is now the 
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uncontested sphere of God’s kingdom, and the earth and the sea, where the devil and the 
beasts rule.
447
  
A cosmological duality of this kind is therefore not alien to the biblical text and has in fact 
been evident from the very first occurrences of scriptural Satanic references. There are 
multifarious scriptural occurrences which include a large number of names for the 
principalities and particularly for the Satan; showing, according to Schlier, how much early 
Christians were preoccupied with these phenomena. He observes that their names are derived 
only in a few cases from the Old Testament, which describes the Satan as accuser and 
tempter,
448
 but mentions him only three times.
449
 
In an Old Testament incident in Genesis 6:1-4, however, the spirits of the deceased offspring 
of the sexual liaison between the angels and human women continue to roam the earth as evil 
spirits and, because of their corrupt nature, continually seek to destroy humanity. Wright 
posits that their former physical nature is most likely responsible for the implied desire to 
reoccupy a human body as identified in the Gospels.
450
 In the DSS (Dead Sea Scrolls), he 
claims, the evil spirits develop as a group that operate under the leadership of a chief spirit 
who is known by the names of Belial, Beliar, and Mastema, and who is probably, he 
concludes, the “Satan” figure in later Christianity.451  
Certainly, the term Mastema originates from the Hebrew root  םטש (satam) which is a 
derivative of  ןטש (satan). The origins of this personification are found in the Hebrew Bible 
whilst the LXX uses the term διαβολος to translate the Hebrew   ןטשה thirteen times as a 
proper name (in Job, Zechariah and 1 Chronicles). In these instances, Wright argues, it could 
be implied that    ןטשה  is a member of the bene elohim; however, it could be understood that 
he has been singled out, thus leaving room to recognize him as some other type of being.
452
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Mastema also appears in Hosea 9:7-8 as a noun that is translated “hostility” and has likely 
evolved from the concept of hostility or adversarial conduct to the personification of this 
concept in postbiblical Judaism in the figure of Satan, Mastema (Jubilees), Belial (DSS), and 
other designations in the New Testament.
453
 
So, whilst there are many references to a Satan figure in the Old Testament there nonetheless 
remains a lack of specific and detailed description and ascription of the Satan’s 
characteristics. Hastings, in fact, states that the devil has rather a complicated history before 
acknowledging that the Old Testament has remarkably little to say on the subject concluding 
that only in the later books are there hints about him and his function.
454
 In response, Langton 
nevertheless posits the first small beginnings of a stream of Hebrew thought concerning a 
supernatural enemy of God and humanity; detailing one which/whom was later destined to 
exercise a predominating influence upon the whole body of Jewish and Christian teaching 
concerning God and humanity in all succeeding centuries.
455
  
By the first century, however, the Satan had developed, Barker asserts, into the antitype of 
Melchizedek and according to the Qumran fragments 4Q280 and 4Q544 the Satan had three 
names: the first is Melchiresa, meaning ‘My king is evil’, whereas Melchizedek means ‘My 
king is justice’; the second can also be read Satan, meaning ‘the tempter, the accuser’, the 
antitype of the Paraclete, meaning ‘the advocate, the intercessor’. The third name in the 
fragment has not survived but Barker conjectures whether it was perhaps the Prince of 
Darkness, as his followers are called the ‘Sons of Darkness’ and the followers of 
Melchizedek are called the ‘Sons of Light’.456 Again, the Satan is seen as the ‘anti-divine’ 
and an apophatic theological realisation as God’s nemesis, adversary and enemy.  
The initial association of the devil with the introduction of evil into the world is made, 
according to Murdoch, in Wisdom 2:24 and the link between devil, Satan and serpent is in 
Revelation 20:2. That the devil fell from Heaven, so was presumably originally an angel, he 
notes, is supported by Luke 10:18, and a plurality of angels-become-devils is implied in 
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Matthew 25:41, II Peter 2:4 and Jude verse 6, just as the Heavenly hosts are attested in 
Genesis 32: 2 and Daniel 7:10. That a third of the stars of Heaven fall in Revelation 12:4-9, 
and the reference to the war with Michael, provide additional circumstantial details, he states, 
as does the most significant addition to this complex, Isaiah 14:12-14, the death-song to the 
arrogant King of Babylon, referred to as Lucifer, the day-star, who wanted to set up his 
throne above that of God.
457
  
Later scholars built upon this diabolic foundation and some, according to Murdoch, went 
further in their ascriptions and descriptions than the Scriptures themselves. He notes that,  
In medieval thought we encounter what might be termed a process of logical 
extrapolation of the Bible, which is then presented as if it were actually biblical itself. 
Thus although the devil does not appear in Genesis, assuming his presence means that he 
has to originate somewhere, and indeed to have a motivation. Medieval treatments of 
Genesis almost invariably begin with the fall of an angel, usually (but not always) named 
Lucifer, and of other angels, driven out by Michael. Lucifer is transformed into the head 
of a council of devils, and various explanations are given for the integration with the 
serpent for the purpose of causing the downfall of man.
458 
Overall however there is, according to Girard, a biblical and theological centrality of the 
Devil in the Scriptures which he notes that, especially in spite of his considerable role in the 
Gospels,
459
 modern Christian theology nonetheless scarcely takes into account. If these 
references to the Satan are examined, he claims, they do not deserve the oblivion into which 
they have fallen.
460
  
2.3.2  Diabolic Definition.  
Considerable influence has been exerted by Wink and his understanding of the Satan and the 
demonic realm in the Twentieth Century and on into the Twenty First.
461
 He asserts that 
nothing commends the Satan to the modern mind, acknowledging the difficulty of perceiving 
and representing him as a spirit, when the modern worldview has banned spirit from 
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discourse and belief. The Devil is evil in a culture which resolutely refuses to believe in the 
real existence of evil, preferring to regard it as a kind of systems breakdown, fixable with 
enough tinkering. Worst of all, he claims, the Satan is simply not a very good intellectual 
idea, arguing that once theology lost its character as reflection on the experience of knowing 
God and became a second-level exercise in knowing about, its experiential ground began to 
erode and with it a clear dialogue and understanding of the Satan, his being and function.
462
   
Throughout history the concept of the Devil has moved with the times. Perceived as a great 
Christian myth in an age when Western people could not chose their religion, when heretics 
were persecuted and witches burned, the notion of the Satan infiltrated the romantic 
symbolisms of an age of revolt and rebellion. More recently, the notion of the Devil has 
metamorphosed endlessly in societies increasingly drawn to individualism.
463
 In terms of 
perceiving Satanic personhood and to paraphrase the biblical ascription to Paul: the Devil has 
become all things to all people in order to confuse, confound and delude many.  
Against this backdrop a unanimous theological understanding and definition of the Devil is 
both illusive and elusive; a fitting context and an appropriate metaphor for a ‘being’ who has, 
throughout the history of theology, been a continual cause of contention, denial and 
controversy.  
2.3.2.1 Diabolic Theology.  
From the earliest days of Christianity attempts have been made to dogmatise diabolic 
theology, with each era seemingly apt to disregard the findings of former times. In terms of 
addressing and potentially rejecting out of hand Patristic teaching on the Devil and Christ, 
however, Aulén notes that,  
It should be evident that the historical study of dogma is wasting its time in pure 
superficiality if it does not endeavour to penetrate to that which lies below the outward 
dress, and look for the religious values which lie concealed underneath.
464 
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So, whilst Macquarrie argues that the concept of the demonic is, at best, not what he calls ‘of 
first-class importance’ he yet acknowledges that this is not the case with the Fathers. The 
reason for this, he postulates, is that in the Fathers the idea of the demonic has become 
closely connected with the central Christian doctrine of the Atonement. With variations of 
emphasis, he notes, the teaching of the Fathers is that the meaning of the death of Christ for 
faith lies in the victory which He won at the Cross over the powers of darkness. Macquarrie 
concludes that, for the Fathers, Jesus put to flight the demons, destroyed their dominion over 
man, and so rescued man from sin and death.
465
 
These biblical ideas and ontogeny germinated and eventually found expression in the 
theology of Calvin who describes the Satan as one who opposes the truth of God with 
falsehoods, who obscures light with darkness, who entangles men’s minds in errors, stirs up 
hatred and kindles contentions and combats; all to the end of eventually overturning God’s 
Kingdom and plunging humans, with himself, into eternal death. Calvin concludes that the 
Devil is in nature a depraved, evil, and malicious being.
466
 Such dogmatic certainty and 
detailed personification has had a bearing on certain elements of theological and 
ecclesiastical history ever since.
467
  
Conversely, in speaking of the expectation of an imminent arrival of God’s Kingdom on 
earth, Bultmann concludes that the hope of Jesus and the early Christian community was not 
fulfilled, demonstrated by the fact that the same world still exists and history continues. The 
reason for this, Bultmann argues, is that the conception “Kingdom of God” is mythological, 
as is the conception of the eschatological drama and the presuppositions of the expectation of 
the Kingdom of God, namely, the theory that the world, although created by God, is ruled by 
the devil, the Satan, and that his army, the demons, is the cause of all evil, sin and disease. 
The corollary of his position is that the idea of the intervention of supernatural powers in the 
inner life of the soul, the conception that men can be tempted and corrupted by the devil and 
possessed by evil spirits, is likewise mythological.
468
 
Certainly, overly literalistic images of a personified and ontologically evil being have long 
provided a ‘wicker man’ for liberals to rail against and fundamentalists to use the acceptance 
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of as a mark of theological orthodoxy.
469
 Such polarities do little to further understanding of 
such an elusive and controversial figure who, in whatever manifestation is presented and 
accepted, nonetheless occupies, as demonstrated, a place of central importance in both 
theology and the biblical narrative whether literally or metaphorically.  
Acknowledging this figure in an overarching assessment of the various enemies ranged 
against God and Israel throughout history, Wright concludes that the pagan hordes 
surrounding Israel were not the actual foe of Yahweh’s people. Instead, standing behind the 
problem of Israel’s exile was the dark power known in some Old Testament traditions as the 
Satan, or the accuser.
470
 Even with acknowledgement of this accuser, conclusive adjudication 
of identity and function has been difficult to ascertain. The parameters of theological 
speculation on the Devil are wide and few conclusions are deemed universally heterodox, 
stimulating a wide spectrum of conjecture within diabolical theology.  
Assessing the role of the Satan in the book of Job, for example, Wink concludes that whilst 
God alone is supreme; the Satan is thoroughly integrated into the Godhead in a wholly non-
dualistic fashion. The Satan is not evil, or demonic, or even fallen, let alone God’s enemy; 
this adversary is merely a faithful, if somewhat overzealous, servant of God, entrusted with 
quality control and testing.
471
 It is, after all, the Satan who prompts God and humanity, in the 
person of Job, to explore the problem of evil and righteousness at a depth never before 
plumbed – and seldom since.472 Whilst this is a somewhat unorthodox representation of the 
Satan, it is nonetheless one in which he is personified and given identity. Wright notes the 
difficulty such a view raises for Satanic ontology and God-talk, arguing that a position such 
as Wink’s confers legitimacy upon the devil if he is thought to have an existence of the same 
order as that of God.
473
 He asserts that,  
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God is the Living God who possesses fullness of being and is Being Itself. God and the 
devil stand in mutual contradiction. To make God’s existence even notionally dependent 
on or akin to that of the devil is close to blasphemy.
474
  
Further, Moser notes that for God to be considered divine He needs to go beyond mere 
kindness or even mercy to seek what is morally best, not just for God’s allies but for all 
concerned – without which such a goal would be a divine purpose in which one would not be 
divine; God, Moser concludes, is not to be confused with the kind of evil being called 
“Satan”.475 
In the post-exilic, inter-testamental period the Satan, his person, identity and function, entered 
Jewish religious consciousness and the traditional idea of an evil spirit, warring against God, 
mysterious in origin and fearful in power, takes shape.
476
 Acknowledging the evolution of 
understanding and representation between the Hebrew ‘Satan’ of the Jewish Bible and the 
New Testament ‘Devil’ Walker accedes that there is considerable evidence that the view of 
the New Testament Evil One is influenced by apocryphal literature, which in turn was 
influenced by Persian Zoroastrianism.
477
 There have always been outside cultural influences 
on theology but in this instance there is a thread running through the entire biblical narrative 
affirming the existence and purposes of this evil being.  
This thread ineluctably culminates in the clash of evil with God incarnate, Jesus Christ, at the 
crucial crucifixion.
478
 For Green, any model of the atonement with a ‘solid claim’ to being 
biblical cannot represent the death of Jesus in terms that do not integrate seriously the reality 
of his crucifixion as the consequence of a life in the service of God’s purpose and in 
opposition to all manner of competing social, political, and religious agenda.
479
 In addition to 
these earthly opponents are the cosmological and spiritual elements of the Satan and his 
demonic hordes; in making a link across the testaments with his previous comments on 
conflict for the people of Yahweh against such ‘evil hordes’, Wright concludes this later 
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meant for Jesus Christ that the struggle coming to a head was cosmic and not merely martial 
in nature.
480
 
2.3.3 Modern Understanding: Satanic Personhood.  
At the end of the Twentieth Century Wink addressed the concept and possible identity of the 
Satan and the demonic realm and, whilst thoroughgoing in his comments on demons and 
principalities, he demurred at explicitly addressing the Satan’s personhood;481 referring to 
“Satan” (speech marks his) as the, “…world-encompassing spirit of the Domination 
System.”482 Wink’s problem is the impasse reached if personal identity or being is given to 
what he views as an impersonal spiritual reality at the centre of institutional life. 
Wink’s main objection to personification is that demons would be regarded as having a body 
or form separate from the physical and historical institutions of which he believes them to be 
the interiority.
483
 Wink has no hesitation in speaking of Satan, demons, powers or angels;
484
 
neither does he baulk at acknowledging their reality. In fact, after criticising those possessing 
a simplistic ‘Pentecostal political naïveté’ in regard to their ascriptions of a too-active 
demonic realm he counters that it is equally naïve to blindly refuse to recognize the reality of 
the demonic in this most demonic of centuries.
485
 Where he demurs is in describing 
adequately what ‘the Satan’ is and whether it/he has an ontological being apart from his/its 
manifestation in the systems and structures in which its/his activity is made known. 
Such a perspective calls to mind Harnack’s quip in regard to Marcion’s deference to Paul - 
that only one Christian in the second century—Marcion—took the trouble to understand Paul, 
but he had actually misunderstood him.
486
 It might likewise be said of Wink that he was one 
Christian in the twentieth century who took the trouble to understand the Satan and the 
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powers and yet he misunderstood them! At the very least he failed to explicate their 
identities, even though they formed the foundation of his whole thesis.
487
 
Wink’s position seemingly answers both those accepting the Satan’s importance and those 
baulking at ascribing the Satan being; on the contrary, Wink’s position furthers the need to 
continue searching for the Satan’s personhood within the ontological context which he has 
ignored. Girard likewise observes that the Devil’s “quintessential being,” the source from 
which he draws his lies, is the violent contagion that has no substance to it; concluding that 
the Devil does not have a stable foundation, having no being at all.
488
 To himself in the mere 
semblance of being, he must act as a parasite on God’s creatures. He is, for Girard, totally 
mimetic, which amounts to saying non-existent as an individual self and therefore not to be 
regarded as an ontological reality.
489
  
Girard and Wink express reticence at conferring personality, identity and ontology upon the 
Satan but fall short of denouncing attributes and prescriptions entirely. Wink notes that he 
reluctantly refers to the Satan as “he”, after trying “it” without satisfaction. I have done so, he 
concedes, because every archetype must find some image by which to present itself to 
consciousness and the satanic seems above all to be personal in its assaults on us; and 
because the form of action we call satanic is most often “agentic”, a type of behaviour 
culturally associated with crass masculinity unleavened by any feminine qualities.
490
 He 
presents an amorphous outline of Satanic personhood whilst simultaneously ascribing a 
negative descriptor of masculinity, thereby necessarily conferring a degree of personal 
identity. 
In this regard and whilst admitting that because of ‘silly and unhelpful caricatures of evil’ he 
cannot blame non-Christians for dismissing the possibility of a personification of evil, 
Walker states why he nonetheless still accepts this position. Contrary to Wink he adds the 
caveat that the Devil is an ‘it’ rather than a ‘him’ because of the connotation of attributes 
                                                             
487
 Noll notes that in failing to distinguish the holy angels from the powers Wink turns the Satan into God’s 
negative parent in which he becomes the, “…negative possibility that resides in God and he/it is incarnated by 
us when we sin.” Noll, ‘Thinking’, 25. 
488
 Barth agrees, “Evil as such does not and cannot receive any individuality or autonomy from God. From all 
eternity this gift is denied to evil.” Barth, Dogmatics, Vol II, 2, 178.  
489
 Girard, Satan, 42. The accusation can be made, however, that since humans are, according to him, also 
‘totally mimetic’ they are, therefore, also to be perceived as non-existent as an individual self.  
490
 Wink, Unmasking, 174-175.  
109 
 
normally associated with personhood that the Satan lost when he rebelled against God.
491
 
God, according to Walker, is therefore only truly personal and humans only persons in so far 
as they bear God’s image.492  Küng, too, in regard to the use of the term ‘person’ when 
attributed to God, observes that,  
God is not a person as man is a person. The all-embracing and all-penetrating is never an 
object that man can view from a distance in order to make statements about it. The primal 
ground, primal support and primal goal of all reality, which determines every individual 
existence, is not an individual person among other persons, is not a superman or 
superego. The term “person” also is merely a cipher for God. God is not the supreme 
person among other persons. God transcends also the concept of person. God is more than 
person.
493  
On the other hand the Devil, according to Walker, is instead all that God is not and is, 
therefore, not a person and subsequently remains an ‘it’. He has no objection in personifying 
evil per se but is loath to over-personalise by awarding the Satan predicates that ‘he’ has lost, 
or never had.
494
  
Further, Barth describes the Satan as,  
…the rebel angel who is the very sum and substance of the possibility which is not 
chosen by God (and which exists only in virtue of this negation); the very essence of the 
creature in its misunderstanding and misuse of its creation and destiny and in its desire to 
be as God, to be itself a god.
495
 Satan (and the whole kingdom of evil, i.e., the demonic, 
which has its basis in him) is the shadow which accompanies the light of the election of 
Jesus Christ (and in Him the good creation in which man is in the divine image).
496
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The ways of expressing the concept of the Satan may differ, but the belief in a personalized 
Prince of Evil, Perry notes, is common both to the Synoptists and to John.
497
 He further notes 
that even if Epistle and Gospel are not by the same hand, they come from the same 
community, thereby showing that it could not have been a community which ignored the 
existence of the Satan.
498
  
As has been demonstrated, there of course exists a broad spectrum of perspectives on the 
Satan - from impersonal force and metaphor for evil, to ontological being as source and 
personification of evil; two extremes which could hardly be further removed from one 
another. If atonement is, to whatever degree, a means of overcoming the Satan (or impersonal 
‘satanic evil’), it is imperative to establish what or whom has been overcome, by what means 
and whether violence was utilised by God.  
According to Hastings, regardless of the position held,  
Whether or not the devil is a ‘personal’ reality or a symbol appropriate within a society 
which believed in the existence of a multitude of invasive invisible beings, the power of 
evil is unchanged together with the Christian duty to resist it.
499
 
2.3.3.1 Seeking the Via Media.  
In Christian theology, Macquarrie contends that demonic powers have always been 
considered to be creatures, even if creatures of superior force and cunning; simultaneously 
affirming that they were never considered to constitute an independent reality equiprimordial 
with God.
500
 Conversely, attempts to demythologise the Bible come with a resultant effect on 
understanding demonology and the Satan; his part played as the lord of this world limited in a 
peculiar way, or else, if this is to be said, then “this world” standing in peculiar dialectical 
relation to the world as the creation of God.
501
 There is little room for manoeuvre between 
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these recalcitrant positions and even less attempt to find a via media between what otherwise 
remain diametric, contradictory and potentially mutually exclusive theological positions. 
Commenting on this dilemma, Walker concludes that if scholars are ‘modernist’ they reject 
the Devil and the fallen angels; not because of a lack of evidence or authentic bases for their 
existence in the New Testament canon, but rather because they do not believe in him. As 
heirs of the philosophical Enlightenment and the modern scientific world-view, he claims, 
they simply cannot grasp the possibility that Evil could be personified or exist as a spirit 
opposed to God and his creation.
502
 This means that there exists, in an a priori manner for 
modern theology and for the Church, the danger of rejecting the Satan as ontological reality.  
A modernist exemplifying this reluctance to personify the Satan whilst concurrently 
prioritising ‘him’ is Girard who, as noted by McDonald, identifies the foundational principle 
of culture as “Satan”, arguing that it mirrors perfectly Christ’s description of “the Prince of 
this world”, moved by envy and “a liar and a murderer from the first.” Girard, he observes, 
contends that by laying down his life to expose and overthrow this kingdom built on violence 
and untruth, Christ introduced the world to another kingdom, one “not of this world,” whose 
fundamental principles are repentance for sins instead of the catharsis of scapegoating and 
love of God and neighbour rather than the warfare of mimetic desire.
503
 
Girard explains his understanding of this ‘satan’ in terms requiring acknowledgement of the 
Satan’s importance but without conferring personhood. He claims that the interpretation that 
assimilates the Satan to rivalistic contagion and its consequences will for the first time enable 
acknowledgement of the importance of the prince of this world without also having to endow 
him with personal being.
504
 At best Girard appears confused about the Satan’s identity and at 
worst he simply does not care about it as a theological issue.   
Conversely, Bell has suggested that ‘person’ could be a tensive term in that the Satan is a 
person because the biblical witness suggests it
505
 and yet is still not a person, in the 
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commonly perceived sense, because he remains incapable of being redeemed.
506
 It is this 
redeemability, the ability to respond to love that, for Bell, is the essence of personhood and 
since this is lacking in the Satan, the claim for person-status is ultimately undermined.  
In terms of Girard’s views, however, whilst he remains ambiguous on Satanic identity he has  
nonetheless been persuasive, his influence perceived, for example, in Beck who contends that 
the construct of a strong ‘Satan figure’ exists as an attributional locus, fulfilling a psycho-
theological role in the lives of some Christian believers enabling them to explain misfortune 
and pain while simultaneously protecting their God-experience from negative affect.
507
 What 
he does not address, like Girard before him, is whether there is any ontological status for this 
‘Satan figure’. He is right to acknowledge the beneficial praxiological corollary of belief in 
such a ‘being’; he falls short in not exploring whether such a being might, in fact, actually 
exist.  
2.3.4 A Cosmic Power-Encounter: The Great Battle. 
It has been established that violence is certainly accommodated by God and sometimes 
actively endorsed and utilised by Him, primarily as an extrinsic, functional divine attribute; it 
has also been concurrently shown that a God devoid of violence is alien to the biblical 
evidence. Grimsrud argues, however, that this is only the case because understanding of God 
has been influenced by the idea that He is constrained in terms of providing salvation pending 
the offering of an appropriate sacrifice. The basis of this constraint, he argues, is in regard to 
a particular notion of God’s justice, holiness or honour carrying tremendous weight in His 
ability to relate to human beings.
508
 Further, we have demonstrated that the most biblically 
and theologically consistent representation of the Satan, both pragmatically and ideologically, 
is one in which he is personified as an ontological being; opposed to God and His creation 
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and the general of malevolent spiritual forces perennially at war with God and all He loves, 
most notably, Jesus Christ and human beings.
509
 
In terms of looking back to the theology of a bygone era in order to gain insight on this 
cosmic battle, or indeed to reject these earlier understandings, Macquarrie notes what he sees 
as the danger of jettisoning the teaching of the Fathers on demonology. This is because, for 
him, to throw out the demonic myths would necessitate, as we have already noted, the 
concurrent scrapping of the atonement which the Fathers closely conjoined with their 
demonology. Instead, Macquarrie proposes a reinterpretation of the Fathers’ theology in 
order to preserve the essential meaning of the death of Christ from their perspective. In order 
to do so, however, he adds the caveat that in this reinterpretation, “We reject the demonic 
mythology, assuredly.”510  
His justification for this rejection is that the critics who have taken these mythical statements 
as facts have, in his words, not surprisingly found them to be childish and even repellent.
511
 
Such an outlook pre-supposes that a modern hermeneutic is de facto more accurate and 
insightful, for no other reason than that it is more modern. It is, however, not a compelling 
argument to suggest that any biblical narrative or event that the interpreter might find 
‘childish’ or ‘repellent’ can a priori be disregarded. Indeed, Macquarrie sets up a theological 
impasse in his assertion that Aulén fails in the explication of his thesis because he represents 
his argument for the Christus Victor model in what Macquarrie contends are mythical terms. 
Or put another way, Aulén is caught in a theological vicious circle of presenting a spiritually-
focused doctrine in spiritual terms; which is, for Macquarrie, an endeavour doomed before it 
begins as Aulén will have to first remove all mythical references because only by so doing 
can he make it intelligible and convincing to people who no longer think, according to 
Macquarrie, along such mythical lines.
512
 
Following this theme, Walker contends that instead the New Testament should be understood 
not as a resource for abstract theological thinking, but rather as a divine drama: the story of 
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the Great Battle.
513
 He asserts that the early church, in particular during the great Patristic era 
of the first five centuries AD, despite many internal disagreements on matters of doctrine, 
saw redemption in thoroughly expansive and dramatic terms. He concludes that if – for 
whatever reason – the Devil is taken out of the redemption story, this divine drama is lost.514  
Certainly, the role of the Satan in the book of Revelation, according to Collins, is determined 
by what she calls the ‘combat myth’. In chapter 12, she argues, the Satan’s role as katēgōr in 
the heavenly court is subordinated to his role as warrior and his activity on earth after having 
been cast down is characterized as waging war on those who observe the commands of God 
and hold the witness of Jesus (12:17). Finally, she concludes, all of the subsequent activities 
of the Satan are dominated by battle language.
515
 
In the context of the overall prevalence of terminology describing the demonic world in the 
New Testament Wink concedes that the use of ‘demons’ and ‘evil spirits’ there is too 
extensive to review. He notes that daimonion is used 63 times in the New Testament; in the 
Gospels it refers to possession, in Acts, Paul and Revelation it refers to demons worshipped 
as gods, whilst daimōn is used but once, exactly like daimonion.516 He further states that it 
must suffice to note that Jesus regarded his healings and exorcisms as an assault on the 
kingdom of Satan and an indication that the kingdom of God was breaking in; concluding 
that the gospel is very much a cosmic battle in which Jesus rescues humanity from the 
dominion of evil powers.
517
 In terms of this New Testament battle language Twelftree argues 
that in what he calls ‘our sophisticated society’ and with theologies to some extent still 
dependent on nineteenth-century liberalism, it is often forgotten how important exorcism is in 
the Synoptic Gospels.
518
 
Perry goes further, asserting that at the centre of the New Testament is the conviction that, in 
Jesus, the kingdom of God is coming. Signs of its coming, he notes, are manifold, but they all 
boil down to the assertion that humans are in the last days, and that the Satan is meeting his 
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match. His conclusion is that Jesus is in the front line of this battle, provoking a head-on 
clash with the Satan.
519
  
Wright identifies evidence of Jesus’ interaction with the Satan early in his ministry as the 
point at which Jesus gained a demonstrable, but not final or definitive, victory. So, whilst this 
‘victory’ enabled Jesus to announce that God’s Kingdom was beginning to happen and 
thereby make inroads into the Satan’s realm, this same Kingdom, according to Wright, would 
only be firmly established through the Final Battle. At this time enemy troops will mass again 
and do their worst to repair the earlier damage, but it would be a war that should not be 
represented militaristically in terms of a battle, either against Rome or Herod. Instead, Wright 
contests, Jesus saw this Final Battle in terms of something much deeper, in fact, as the 
manifestation of a battle against the Satan himself who, whilst he no doubt uses Rome, Herod 
and Chief Priests, Jesus keeps his eye rather on the fact that the Satan is not identified with 
any of these entities per se and that actually to make such an identification would equate to 
already giving up, thereby losing the real battle.
520
 
The only way, Jesus believed, that this great anti-creation, this Satan, could be stopped and 
defeated, according to Wright, would in fact be for him,  
…anointed with God’s spirit to fight the real battle against the real enemy, to take the full 
power of evil and accusation upon himself, to let it do its worst to him, so that it would 
thereby be exhausted, its main force spent.
521 
Twelftree conjectures that there was a two-stage unfolding of Christ’s plan to ultimately and 
definitively destroy the Satan. From what we see reflected in the authentic Jesus tradition, he 
claims, this is how Jesus understood the destruction of the Satan: his exorcisms were the first 
stage of binding him but the final defeat would take place in the final judgment.
522
 This 
parallels the idea that violence itself was ‘mortally wounded’ at the cross of Christ and would 
be finally and irrevocably defeated at the parousia.
523
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In his conclusion to Jesus’ perception of his own mission and purpose Wright concludes that 
the battle Jesus was fighting was against the Satan and whatever we think of this theme he 
asserts that it was clearly centrally important for all the gospel writers, thus giving reason to 
suppose it was central for Jesus as well.
524
 
In the end however, Perry concludes, there is no proof that the evil in the world is to be 
explained by the activity of a supernatural creature who has rebelled against his Creator; 
additionally, there is no proof, in the sense of a logically irrefragable conclusion from neutral 
premises, that the good in the world comes from a personal God.
525
 Perry instead suggests a 
pragmatic approach in which believers in God should, whether they actually believe in 
Satan’s actual existence or not, act as if the Devil is real in order to better serve God and to 
live a more effectual Christian life. Such a life and choice, he argues, enables a hypothesis 
which facilitates the facts falling more smoothly into place and which are also consonant with 
the revelation offered in the Holy Scripture.  
2.3.5 Divine Violence against the Satan.  
The position of this thesis is that academic and chronological humility is once again required 
to facilitate a dynamic tension between ancient and modern perspectives. This acknowledges 
that original, historical doctrines might be capable of understanding and presenting a 
worldview that does not, de facto, have to be redundant to post-modern sensibilities and 
theology. To remove, or demythologise central biblical and theological themes could 
irreparably damage both ancient and modern understanding and engagement with the 
canonical Scriptures.
526
 Further, it is theologically pompous, short-sighted and academically 
disingenuous to reject a perspective on the grounds that it is outdated and erroneous solely 
because it is not of this time. Wink, for example, argues that it is as impossible for most 
people to believe in the real existence of demonic or angelic powers as it is for them to 
believe in dragons, or elves, or a flat world.
527
  
Conversely, Boyd argues that this represents a discredited and redundant Western 
rationalistic perspective which, when pushed to the point of the total relativism of Christian 
truth claims through their deconstruction, presents a perspective not merely philosophically 
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problematic for Christianity but rather disastrous since Christianity, he concludes, is 
inextricably rooted in a number of objective historical and metaphysical truth claims.
528
 
Indeed, this practice of assuming a ‘primitive human past’ to be contrasted with a more 
‘advanced’ ethical modern consciousness embodies, according to Blumenthal, the historical 
fallacy of the wholly unwarranted assumption of human moral progress.
529
  
Consequently, our conclusion is that it is necessary to present an inclusive, macro-vision of 
God and theological understanding of Him and His character. Also, we contend that His 
soteriological purposes are not seeking to accentuate divine violence at the expense or 
diminution of divine love but rather they are an attempt to demonstrate how the conjoining 
and co-existence of the two in the divine economy might be understood.
530
 Divine violence, 
coupled with the necessity of overcoming the Satan, the tyrant, is central to both the biblical 
message and the overall perception of God’s character and His soteriological intent.  
In fact, the denial of divine violence and its consequences and biblical centrality can lead to 
the desire of presenting God in entirely non-violent terms. This desire, as noted, leads to the 
inadvertent construction of a divine passivity which might itself become or be perceived as 
neglectful, or even ‘abusive’. God would then stand accused not just of the violence He has 
advocated, accommodated or sanctioned – He would also face the charge of choosing 
passivity in the face of human violence and chaos. On this point Volf concedes that his thesis 
on the practice of nonviolence, which requires a belief in divine vengeance, is one that will be 
unpopular amongst Christians, especially with ‘theologians in the West’.531  
Volf issues a pragmatic challenge to those apt to dismiss his contentions that they should 
imagine themselves delivering a lecture in a warzone on the topic of ‘A Christian attitude 
toward violence’, with the thesis that people should not retaliate since God is perfect non-
coercive love. He posits that the one doing so would soon discover that it takes the quiet of a 
suburban home for the birth of the thesis that human nonviolence corresponds to God’s 
refusal to judge. Instead he concludes that in a scorched land soaked in the blood of the 
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innocent, such a thesis invariably dies; and that as its demise is watched, one would do well 
to reflect about many other pleasant captivities of the liberal mind.
532
 
Conversely, the centrality of a violently overcome tyrant and the attendant forceful institution 
of God’s Kingdom, in dramatic rather than metaphorical or religious terms, is presented by 
Wright in his conclusion that Jesus’ death, as seen by Jesus himself, and manifest via the 
crucifixion,  
…was the ultimate Exodus event through which the tyrant was defeated, God’s people 
were set free and given their fresh vocation, and God’s presence was established in their 
midst in a completely new way for which the Temple itself was just an advance 
pointer.
533
   
Not a salvation won then by the actions of a non-coercive God, but rather a stark, 
violent, full-frontal attack on a deadly nemesis, heralding the release of previously 
subjugated captives.  
2.3.6 Decisions on the Devil.  
Before considering soteriological purpose and accomplishment and acknowledging the 
post-modern uncertainties of Girard and those he influences about the Satan’s identity, 
ontology and purpose; it is essential to conclude about what or whom is overcome in the 
atonement.   
It has been argued that right understanding of God’s freedom of will makes dualistic 
thought impossible; Barth noting that,  
We deceive ourselves if we think that we should take sin, death, and the devil 
seriously in the sense of ascribing to them a divine or semi-divine potentiality or 
the rôle of a real antagonist to the living God.
534
 It is when we see them as powers 
which are in their own peculiar way subordinate and subject to the will of God that 
we really take them seriously as powers of temptation, evil and eternal destruction. 
It is only then that we know conclusively that we ourselves do not have the power 
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to combat and conquer them. We cannot do this because it is not our business. 
They are powers combated and conquered by God, and our business is to 
acknowledge and accept the decision about them made by God’s will and to deal 
with them accordingly.
535
 
A theological via media between Barth and Walker is articulated by Gunton who argues 
that the language of possession by demonic forces expresses the helplessness of human 
agents in the face of psychological, social and cosmic forces in various combinations; 
theologically, he contends, it is important to see the origins of bondage in the idolatrous 
worship of that which is not God. When any part of the created world is given the value 
of God, humanity comes into the power of a reality which, because it is not divine, 
operates demonically.
536
 
Acceptance of a guarded personification of the Satan and powers and principalities is 
also forwarded by Schlier who argues that the manifold principalities which unfold the 
one satanic power are encountered as a kind of personal and powerful being. He 
simultaneously accepts that these principalities exercise their being by taking possession 
of the world as a whole, and of individual men, the elements, political and social 
institutions, historical conditions and circumstances, spiritual and religious trends.
537
 
Above all, Shlier concludes, their possession is exercised mainly through the 
“atmosphere”, which is the immediate site of their power.538  
It is apparent that whilst the personification of evil manifest in the Satan is currently out 
of theological and cultural favour it is likewise true that the concept of the Satan is not 
yet entirely redundant. The perception of the Satan as ruler over the world expresses the 
insight that evil is not only found here and there in the world, but that all particular evils 
make up one single power which in the last analysis grows from the very actions of men 
and which form, Schlier argues, an atmosphere and a spiritual tradition, which 
overwhelms every human. 
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This outlook represents the imperative that whilst the Satan might not be perceived how 
he has been traditionally and historically, demons nonetheless express, in at the very 
least a mythological way, truths about evil which will be lost if too superficial a view of 
the subject is taken. Amongst these truths, according to Macquarrie, are: the depth and 
mystery of evil; the superhuman dimensions of evil; its sometimes apparently 
systematic character; and the fact that a spiritual nature is no safeguard against evil and 
may indeed issue in the worst forms of evil.
539
  
The task of steering a via media between the opposite ends of theological perspectives 
on the Satan is highlighted, as we have seen, by Walker who warns that if the Devil has 
no reality or active role in the divine drama of salvation then the vision of the Great 
Battle is lost.
540
 Likewise, even though Gunton cautions of the dangers of taking talk of 
‘the powers’ and the devil too literally, leading to misunderstanding of the use of 
metaphor and myth,
541
 he is nonetheless cautious not to discount that the forces are in 
some sense ‘cosmic’, whilst simultaneously bearing an earthly manifestation through 
political, social, economic and religious structures of power.
542
  
Like Gunton we are keen to steer a middle course between a naively supernaturalist 
view of the demonic and a reductionist one, which is construed as a way of speaking of 
merely finite or psychological influences. Gunton endorses indirect description as the 
best means of expressing this cosmic realm; concluding that, “…an indirect description 
is still a description of what is really there.”543 We concur, therefore, with Barratt that 
this equates to there being a Devil who is defeated, but is not yet entirely destroyed.
544
  
Further, Newbigin argues that in the past 150 years scholarly readers of the New 
Testament have chosen, for all practical purposes, to ignore what was said about hostile 
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spiritual powers and the Satan. This outlook, he contends, feeds into the dominant 
reductionist materialism of the day, preventing the discernment of realities that Paul and 
other New Testament writers talk about, and which, according to Newbigin, are 
realities.
545
 
Those who have demurred at ascribing the Satan personhood, such as Wink and Girard, 
have nonetheless, at least grammatically, conferred being on the Devil by the addition 
of masculine pronouns as descriptors. So, this ‘force’ of evil, even if not a person per se 
should still be perceived as one, as this is the only route that ‘makes sense’. Whilst there 
will always be contention about the precise, ontological reality and personhood of the 
Satan we are in accord with the Fathers and Walker that belief in him as a being remains 
a central element of atonement doctrine and therefore of soteriology and it therefore 
remains incumbent upon modern believers to uphold the dogma that, “To be a Christian 
is to be at war with the Devil”.546  
In terms of ‘being a Christian’ and of a person thereby having secured salvation 
Harrison notes that human nature is, in fact, the foundation of what people are and what 
everyone shares, making them alike; he observes that,  
Being according to the divine image is intrinsic to our nature. It gives us the capacity to 
become like God or not, to choose between good and evil, to live a life of virtue, to love 
God and neighbours, to be rewarded by God in the age to come or not, and to enjoy 
communion with God in heaven. Their nature thus makes people capable of likeness to 
God, communion with him, and eternal life in the age to come – that is, salvation.547  
In regard to the one who is the enemy of this salvation, the Devil, we conclude that ‘it’ is a 
being, but not a person (in as far as a ‘person’ is determined as one with the potential to love, 
is redeemable
 
and on whom personhood has been conferred by a loving God)
548
, the 
personification of evil, its source and loci and the one who through Christ’s death and 
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resurrection would be mortally wounded to herald God’s eschaton and the ultimate salvation 
of humanity otherwise under his influence and sway.  
Section 3 - Metaphor & Models.  
3.1 Penal Substitution – Judicial Violence. 
Amongst many conservative Protestant and, in particular, evangelical scholars, preachers and 
apologists in the twenty-first century the Penal Substitutionary view of the atonement (PSA) 
holds predominant sway in much the same way that the Ransom Christus Victor model 
(RCVM) and then the later Christus Victor model (CVM) did amongst Greek theologians 
during the patristic era. One emblematic demonstration of this is the 20
th
 anniversary edition 
of Stott’s, The Cross of Christ,549 where he presents his adherence to the PSA view of 
atonement. Stott’s book has gone through nearly twenty reprints since it was first published 
in 1986 and prominent Protestant, evangelical scholars such as D.A. Carson, G. Goldsworthy, 
W. Grudem, J.I. Packer and D.F. Wells, amongst others, have written their endorsements for 
its contents and message. Another emblematic title which defends and presents the PSA 
model is the collection of articles written by key Reformed and evangelical scholars, The 
Glory of the Atonement.
550
 The Protestant evangelicals who contributed to this book include 
B.K. Waltke, H. Blocher, C.E. Hill, S.P. Rosenberg, B.L. McCormack and S.B. Ferguson. 
Other recent titles defending or promoting PSA include, The Wondrous Cross: Atonement 
and Penal Substitution in the Bible and History,
551
 Pierced for our Transgressions: 
Rediscovering the Glory of Penal Substitution
552
 and Aspects of the Atonement: Cross and 
Resurrection in the Reconciling of God and Humanity.
553
 
Among the available interpretative models of the atonement, not only is PSA the ‘controlling’ 
one but is, in fact, the sine qua non of evangelical soteriology.
554
 Hilborn charts a historical 
timeline of theologians who have held or been sympathetic to PSA, in much the same way 
that Aulén does in regard to the CVM in Christus Victor.
 
 He argues that this historical 
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pedigree has laid the foundation for the Protestant position of deeming PSA as the primary 
means of interpreting the soteriological role of the cross.
555
 Weaver observes that, on the 
other hand, Catholicism has not accorded the status of dogma to a specific theory of 
atonement, whilst acceding with Hilborn that nineteenth- and early twentieth-century 
conservative Protestants gave almost creedal status to satisfaction atonement.
556
 This 
assertion of Weaver reiterates that whilst PSA is not exclusively associated with conservative 
Protestants it is primarily so and, as we have seen, by evangelicals in particular. 
Anselm, of course, reflected on the significance and purpose of Jesus’ death in Cur Deus 
Homo
557
 and whilst the PSA theory which evolved out of his ideas is a thoroughly different 
means of understanding the atonement, it is nonetheless a hybrid of his position with many 
adherents. Weaver, in fact, notes that since Anselm some version of satisfaction atonement 
has been the majority view for both Catholics and the communions of Protestant 
Orthodoxy.
558
 Further, Rieger argues that Anselm wanted to prove the necessity of the 
atonement through reason alone, without relying on Scripture; in doing so, Reiger observes, 
he set a pattern that influenced thought about the atonement for the next millennium.
559
 The 
great influence of Anselm is such that whilst the majority of Protestants might not have read 
his text, its explanation retold countless times in hymnody and evangelistic illustrations, 
remains in their blood.
560
 Anselm’s ideas are, therefore, not explicitly extant within modern 
PSA and yet their teaching of a wronged and dishonoured God seeking appeasement by a 
sacrificial offering in a judicial context has remained constant. In regard to each of these key 
assertions Anselm entitled chapters to address their concerns in his seminal tome. In terms of 
a wronged God, book 1, chapter XV is ‘Whether God would suffer His honour to be profaned 
even in the very least; for appeasement by a sacrificial offering’. Book 2, chapter VI is ‘That 
the satisfaction whereby man can be saved can be effected only by one who is God and Man; 
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for judicial fairness’. Whilst book 1, chapter XX states, ‘That the satisfaction should be 
proportionate to the transgression, nor can man make it for himself’.561 
Modern proponents of PSA have objected to what they see as the over-simplification and 
concomitant vilification of this doctrine.
562
 Whilst restating support for PSA Tidball 
counterattacks those questioning it; concerned that critics are not attacking the model but 
rather a distorted caricature of it.
563
 Tidball does not distance himself from PSA, but a ‘crass 
version’ which highlights only its negative elements; advocates of PSA likewise seek to re-
present it in a positive manner. Rather than Jesus’ death being construed as the appeasement 
of a Father unable or unwilling to forgive, these apologists offer a constructive model in 
which those facing the judgement of a wrathful God can approach Him, claiming mercy with 
Jesus having borne their judgement in his death.
564
  
The irreducible claim of PSA is that Jesus Christ in his death offered himself on behalf of 
mankind and in its place. A wrathful God acts as Judge to fulfil His desire for justice and 
judgement and provides His Son as a payment otherwise required from a sinful, guilty 
humanity. Marshall considers key words related to God’s response to humans in terms of 
their sin and need of salvation; primary are judgement, wrath and vengeance. He admits, in 
regard to what he considers the most contentious issue of all, that,  
There have been numerous attempts to argue that this wrath is not the divine equivalent of 
what, in human terms, would be a feeling or emotion, still less an arbitrary outburst of 
rage. Some would understand it simply in terms of the inevitable self-inflicted wounds of 
sin that God allows to happen. However, I can see no legitimate way of avoiding the fact 
that these terms refer to the attitude of God himself that results in actions being taken 
against sinners.
565 
This kind of judicial metaphor represents, for Marshall, ultimate sacrifice by God for God, 
fulfilling the divine requirement for payment.  
PSA has been caricatured as a law-based ‘pay-off’ and although advocates claim that God 
cannot be persuaded through sacrificial offerings this is implied in doctrines of intercessory 
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atonement; even defenders of PSA fail to recognize their inherent violence.
566
 Additionally 
there is a trinitarian problem within certain atonement models in which it is said that the 
Father punishes, the Son expiates, the Spirit forgives and the Father demands satisfaction, 
whilst the Son pays it, and the Spirit interposes between.
567
  
This presents problems for perichoresis in the Trinity so that instead of eternal, divine unity 
there is internal conflict both ontologically and functionally. Augustine derives problems 
from terminology associated with PSA in which the Son ‘appeases’ the Father. He denies that 
God the Father can be ‘placated’ by the Son’s death. If this were so there would be inherent 
difference, even conflict, between Father and Son which, for Augustine, is unthinkable, 
because the Father and the Son eternally enjoy perichoretic union and harmony.
568
 So, whilst 
it is difficult to conceive of conflict in the soteriological plans of God, it is impossible to 
accept in terms of the ontological Godhead since the triune perichoretic unity of person and 
purpose precludes any possibility of division or conflict.
 
Gunton considers such Trinitarian ramifications of the atonement in regard to the three main 
interpretative models noting that the metaphors enable the expression of something of the 
work of the triune God through, in and with his creation.
569
 Gunton highlights the unity in the 
trinity regarding God’s response to the world and the atonement in particular, further 
commenting that the purpose of the Father achieved by the incarnation, cross and resurrection 
of the incarnate Son has its basis in the creation by which the world took shape, and which 
will find its completion in the work of the Spirit who brings the Son’s work to perfection.570 
If any doubt remains about the strength of Gunton’s claims of perichoresis in the triune 
Godhead he asserts that the human career of Jesus is also the decisive action of God in and 
towards his world and is, therefore, both the centre point of, and clue to, the way in which 
God is related to the world from beginning to end.
571
 For Gunton, there is no room for 
conflict in this ontolological, perichoretic schema.   
Away from these issues, those supporting PSA argue for a re-alignment of thought that 
presents the cross as not merely divine response to sin but as “condign penalty” for those 
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rejecting God and His will and purpose for creation as expressed in commandments of divine 
love. The disobedience of humanity thus causes a fatal break in personal relationship with 
God making it wholly appropriate for Him to respond by excluding them from His kingdom. 
Marshall states that final judgement is therefore the execution of a condign penalty after God, 
in His mercy, has provided a way of salvation that has been persistently refused and 
rejected.
572
  
‘Condign’ may be apposite in terms of God’s penalty, but regarding ‘severity’, not being 
‘well-deserved’; PSA thus seeks to defend God against charges of violence in the atonement.  
Following this feudal schema of a wronged God, rebellion and concomitant punishment it is 
reasonable to postulate whether any human law, judge or court would consider God’s eternal 
punishment a proportionate response to those who “persistently refused and rejected” God’s 
salvation during finite time.
573
 PSA makes an assumption about justice and retribution, 
closely linking the finite and the infinite, the human and the divine. It draws favourable 
comparisons between that ‘above’ and that ‘below’, confering continuity, union and parity 
between these realms. 
The charge of projecting anthropomorphic, human sensibilities onto divine purposes can be 
made against theologians and doctrines of every era and yet PSA may be particularly guilty 
of placing primary emphasis on the human realm before it has properly addressed and 
understood the divine realm.  
3.2 Moral Influence – Denied Violence.  
PSA has been presented as the predominant means of interpreting the atonement for 
Catholics and many Protestants denominations; equally it can be claimed that liberal 
Protestantism has broadly embraced MIT. So, while the MIT can be broadly characterised as 
being aligned with liberal Protestantism, it is not confined to this group; many modern 
Anabaptists, pacifists and Mennonite groups also hold this doctrine.
574
 To explain, ignore or 
                                                             
572
 Marshall, Aspects, 33.  
573
 Edwards, in his dialogue with Stott, comments on the prospect of ‘eternal separation’ from God which is 
restricted by the Lausanne Covenant to those who condemn themselves because they ‘reject Christ’. It is a 
concept, he argues, “That avoids the teaching that one ‘mortal’ sin earns the same punishment as a lifetime of 
total wickedness. By this teaching God was alleged to condemn the guilty to hell without adhering to the 
elementary principle of justice that the gravity of the punishment must fit the gravity of the crime.” Edwards 
with Stott, Essentials, 292.  
574
 Historically, key adherents who have held variations on the theme of Moral Influence have included F. 
Schleiermacher, The Christian Faith, T & T Clark: London, 1999; H. Bushnell, The Vicarious Sacrifice: 
Grounded in Principles Interpreted by Human Analogies, Wipf and Stock: Eugene, 2004; A. Ritschl, The 
127 
 
deny the charge of divine violence liberals have long turned to this doctrine to uphold the 
view of a non-violent God who would otherwise be associated with violence.
575
  
Abelard (1079-1142) is usually portrayed as the originator of MIT and is certainly its most 
influential purveyor; MIT’s ideals had, however, been extant before his version with the early 
Fathers highlighting issues that would later come to be associated with the model.
576
 As with 
other theories, key theologians and movements are associated, but each experiences a 
genesis, growth, evolution and adaptation to reach its modern manifestation.  
Given Abelard’s influence on MIT it is important to consider ideas that framed his thinking. 
He had thought it ‘cruel and wicked’, for instance, that the blood of an innocent person 
should be demanded as the price for anything. He also considered it abhorrent that an 
innocent man should be slain at all; much less that God would demand this to reconcile the 
world to Himself.
577
 These sentiments are foundational to Abelard’s view of God’s character 
and the means of accomplishing the divine will.  
Abelard concluded that,  
...our redemption through the suffering of Christ is that deeper love within us which not 
only frees us from slavery to sin, but also secures for us the true liberty of the children of 
God, in order that we might do all things out of love rather than out of fear – love for him 
who has shown us such grace that no greater can be found.
578
  
The means by which he interpreted and understood the centrality of God’s love served as a 
locus to which all other propositions were subsidiary.
579
  
This pervasive echo of love resonates throughout his doctrinal reflections and for Abelard the 
central atonement issue was not how to change an offended God’s mind toward the sinner, 
                                                                                                                                                                                             
Christian Doctrine of Justification and Reconciliation: The Positive Development of the Doctrine, Wipf and 
Stock: Eugene, 2004 and H. Rashdall, The Idea of the Atonement in Christian Theology, McMillan and Co: 
Basingstoke, 2010.   
575
 “Beginning with Schleiermacher… there was a renewed interest in an Abelardian-type approach that 
continued throughout the nineteenth and twentieth centuries among many.” Green & Baker, Recovering, 142.  
576
 Boersma, Violence, 116.  
577
 Ray, Deceiving, 13.  
578
 P. Abelard, ‘Peter Abelard on the Love of Christ in Redemption’, A. McGrath (ed.), The Christian Theology 
Reader, Oxford, Blackwell, 1996, 184.  
579
 Ray sums up Abelard’s position, noting that for him, “The event of atonement, then, is an event of creative 
love: God created the universe out of love; God becomes incarnate in Jesus out of love; and in and through the 
incarnation, God elicits from human beings a responsive love.” Ray, Deceiving, 14.  
128 
 
but how sinful humankind could be brought to see that the God they perceived as harsh and 
judgmental, was in fact loving.
580
 
One of the central themes of MIT is the atonement as living metaphor, demonstrating God’s 
intent and actions as an aspirational model for humans; there are, of course, multifarious 
biblical instances to support this. For instance, God exhorts Israel, the Church or individual 
believers to either imitate the divine or Jesus Christ. To illustrate this claim, in the Old 
Testament the people of Israel are addressed corporately on God’s instruction through Moses 
and encouraged to emulate God and his functions. Moses is told, “Speak to the entire 
assembly of Israel and say to them: “Be holy because I, the LORD your God, am holy””, 
Leviticus 19:2.  
In the New Testament Paul speculates on the role of the Church in God’s purposes and sees it 
as not merely an instrument of God, but an extension of God’s reality, not only to those on 
earth, but cosmologically. Paul also eulogises that, “His intent was that now, through the 
church, the manifold wisdom of God should be made known to the rulers and authorities in 
the heavenly realms”. Ephesians 3:10. Finally, Jesus exhorts individual believers to have the 
highest aspirations in terms of outlook, behaviour and purposes; he encourages individuals to, 
“Be perfect, therefore, as your heavenly Father is perfect.” Matthew 5:48. In all cases, 
corporate and individual, emulation and expression of God, His character and purposes is 
paramount. 
God thereby serves as ‘exemplar’ for imitation, to be copied and aspired to in terms of 
thoughts, outlook and behaviour. From an exemplarist perspective, whatever else the story of 
Jesus expresses it represents a supreme pattern to follow (Heb.12.2) and the one example of a 
genuine human life in the midst of a fallen world.
581
  
MIT places a new soteriological emphasis of responsibility with humans, making it possible 
to conclude that,  
...for Abelard, Jesus died as the demonstration of God’s love. And the change that 
results from that loving death is not in God but in the subjective consciousness of 
the sinners, who repent and cease their rebellion against God and turn towards 
God. It is this psychological or subjective influence worked on the mind of the 
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sinner by the death of Christ that gives this view its name of moral influence 
theory.
582
  
A theological paradigm shift in emphasis of this kind will, of course, elicit those who 
welcome it and those who oppose it. Some question the emphasis accorded to humans and 
consider its subjective and anthropo-centric pole to be a weakness.
583
 Others, like Boersma, 
believe it represents God taking human response seriously, not coercing believers, but using 
genuine persuasion to draw them to Himself.
584
 Certainly MIT presents new-found 
soteriological responsibility for humans in that whilst the divine expression of love is utterly 
God-initiated, nonetheless huge onus is put upon humans who will be held accountable for 
whether they rightly respond to Christ-as-exemplar.  
Rather than worshipping a distant, judgemental and potentially violent God humans find 
themselves, according to MIT, at the heart of divine soteriological purposes, deciding 
whether to emulate God or not. They either bear the consequences or reap the rewards of 
their actions and choices rather than remaining dependent upon a potentially wrathful and 
unpredictable God. This soteriology has been seen as both admirably simple and ethically 
appealing, replacing the disconcerting notion of divine violence evident in other theories with 
a God ready and willing to receive those who choose to approach Him.
585
  
Conversely, it is argued that MIT fails to take full measure of the power and influence of evil 
and sin. Sin should be understood as a slavery which cannot be overcome by mere appeals to 
follow a good example. Instead, the requirement is for a tangible act of setting free, of re-
creation, indeed, of a redemption which fully respects the humanity of its object.
586
An appeal 
to follow an example, however seminal and inspirational, is unable to change the ontological 
status of individuals ensnared by the Satan, the demonic realm and sin.
587
 Whilst it is biblical 
to set God and others as exemplars, a successful imitation can only occur after atonement has 
been made, the Satan defeated and with the nullifying of Satanic power and the attendant 
overcoming of sin.  
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Abelard disliked the emphasis on God’s judgment required in the satisfaction theory; he also 
objected that God’s attitude is understood to change in regard to the person who accepted 
Jesus’ death on their behalf. Such teaching was impossible for him because the perfect God is 
entirely impassible.
588
 The responsibility for change within MIT therefore shifted from God, 
whether impassible or not, to human beings who have high degrees of passibility and either a 
desire or a need for change.  
Abelard’s atonement theory is primarily epistemological, presenting humans with a message 
of God’s love and the weight of their sin; it is also volitional, offering motivation for humans 
to make a positive response.
589
 MIT is therefore principally concerned with human function 
rather than divine or cosmological ontology. The human seeking salvation through Jesus 
Christ is encouraged to see the cross as a supreme visual aid and stimulus for moral and 
praxiological change. This moves the emphasis away from the Satan, sin and any encounters 
that might occur between God and malevolent forces, thereby removing any accompanying  
need for divine violence. What is required is that a lesson be learnt and an example applied to 
the individual in a subjective manner such that their response lifts them out of sin and into 
right relationship with God through their choice and endeavour.
590
 Scant regard is given to 
the Satan or evil forces actually existing, other than in a metaphorical or symbolic manner.  
MIT presents a way by which God can be absolved from the charge of violence, ontologically 
and functionally. Boersma notes, however, that, “A moral theory of the atonement only truly 
avoids the problem of divine violence if it focuses entirely on the life of Christ, so that there 
is no way in which God uses the death of Christ as a redemptive event.”591 This particularity 
and focus on one soteriological element at the expense of others to explain or deny the charge 
of divine violence belies an inherent weakness of MIT.  
Another problem emerges in the stark disparity between Jesus as exemplar and humans as 
imitators in that Jesus is an example because he alone is the incarnate Son who by the 
enabling of the Holy Spirit remained unfallen whereas humans universally fall.
592
 By 
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analogy, this is like a great athlete being an example to a small, physically-challenged child. 
The athlete could inspire the child to achieve its best in response to her example and 
exhortations and yet, by definition, because of his inherent limitations, the child would 
ultimately be unable to attain all that the role-model requires. This scenario provides the 
definition of an exercise in futility and frustration – both for model and imitator.  
3.3 Christus Victor – Cosmological Violence.  
The CVM will be considered in more depth later; for now it suffices to introduce only its 
central features. Aulén veers away from using ‘model’ to describe Christus Victor; instead, 
speaking of it as a ‘drama’, a ‘classic’ view or an ‘idea’593 noting that,  
Finally, I would call attention to the terminology which I have employed. I have tried to 
be consistent in speaking of the classic idea of the Atonement, never of the, or a, classic 
theory; I have reserved the word theory, and usually the word doctrine, for the Latin and 
the ‘subjective’ types. For the classic idea of the Atonement has never been put forward, 
like the other two, as a rounded and finished theological doctrine; it has always been an 
idea, a motif, a theme, expressed in many different variations. It is not, indeed, that it has 
lacked clearness of outline; on the contrary, it has been fully definite and unambiguous. 
But it has never been shaped into a rational theory.
594
 
Likewise, Gunton is cautious in ascribing a description, noting that against Aulén it must be 
emphasised that a basis for a theory of the atonement is not found, particularly if such a 
theory is opposed to other supposed options; instead, for Gunton, the CV ‘model’ is merely a 
group of metaphors.
595
 Whilst acknowledging these caveats, the term ‘model’ will, however, 
continue to be used for ease of reference, primarily because it is how it is understood and 
referred to by the majority of theologians in atonement studies.  
Once again, what PSA is to mainstream Protestantism and MIT is to Protestant liberals, so 
CVM was to the early Church in its inception and in the first centuries of theology. The 
RCVM will be considered shortly, but suffice it to say that it provided the foundation and 
basis for the CVM to take shape. There was some level of overlap between the models, both 
of which see God and the Satan in direct opposition and through their respective 
interpretations, God overcomes or deceives the Devil thus securing humanity’s salvation. In 
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case the temptation to read anachronistically into the Patristic era overtakes today’s 
theologian, however, Kelly advises that,  
The student who seeks to understand the soteriology of the fourth and early fifth centuries 
will be sharply disappointed if he expects to find anything corresponding to the 
elaborately worked out syntheses which the contemporary theology of the Trinity and the 
Incarnation presents. In both these latter departments controversy forced fairly exact 
definition on the Church, whereas the redemption did not become a battle-ground for 
rival schools until the twelfth century, when Anselm’s Cur Deus Homo (c.1097) focussed 
attention on it. Instead he must be prepared to pick his way through a variety of theories, 
to all appearance unrelated and even mutually incompatible, existing side by side and 
sometimes sponsored by the same theologian.
596
 
In regards to these early centuries, therefore, Aulén argues that the CVM held complete, 
almost unchallenged, sway as an interpretative model for nearly one millennium; he 
contends, in fact, that if it is asked how widely spread was the classic idea in the early church, 
it may be said that it dominates the whole of Greek patristic theology from Irenaeus to John 
of Damascus who, Aulén argues, is commonly regarded as marking the close of the patristic 
period.
597
 Over time it evolved and changed until it eventually came to be surpassed in the 
Western Church by PSA theories. A number of reasons have been posited for this transition, 
Boersma contending that primarily the influence of Enlightenment thought on the Western 
Church and what he calls its ‘myopic naturalism’ made it difficult to accept supernatural 
influence in the realm of history.
598
 Aulén also unpacks numerous reasons for the neglect of 
the CVM and its replacement by PSA (and other models) noting that an implied demand of 
the Christian faith is that it must be clearly expressed in the form of a rational doctrine.
599
 
Aulén also acknowledges that the CVM is not primarily a doctrine of this kind, but rather a 
dramatic idea.
600
 
In the first half of the Twentieth Century Aulén’s Christus Victor601 proved a seminal book, 
heralding a re-consideration of this ancient doctrine. His ideas have been influential in 
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leading many to revisit CVM as a means of interpreting and understanding the atonement; 
Aulén synthesised the doctrine saying that,  
The central idea of Christus Victor is the view of God and the Kingdom of God as 
fighting against evil powers ravaging in mankind. In this drama Christ has the key rôle, 
and the title Christus Victor says the decisive word about his rôle.
602
  
Summarising his perspective, Boyd concludes that Jesus came to end the cosmic war that had 
been raging from time immemorial and to set the Satan’s captives free.603 CVM has therefore 
been called the dramatic view
604
 as it presents an understanding of the atonement that is 
broad in its schemata and vivid and poetic in its representation of the eternal, cosmic battle 
between God and the Satan and his malevolent spiritual forces that stand counter to divine 
purposes for humanity. It also speaks to God’s ultimate victory over these forces via the birth, 
life, death and resurrection of Jesus Christ, not merely because of his passion through the 
cross.  
This ‘whole life soteriology’ is the first of two key differences between CVM and other 
views of the atonement. It is seen as a doctrine concerned with all that Jesus experienced and 
accomplished, including his incarnation and not only with his death and resurrection.
605
 The 
second is that it is cosmological, taking into account the full sweep of salvation history whilst 
embracing a thorough-going theology of the Satan and the demonic realm, not as metaphors 
or symbols, but as ontological beings; it has been some time since even the Church has 
embraced this kind of ‘biblical dualism’.606  
The Enlightenment’s promotion of naturalism has made it difficult for many, including 
Christians, to accept supernatural influence in the historical realm. The idea of a cosmic battle 
between God and the powers of evil has been hard to sustain in an environment where 
science and technology hold pre-eminent sway.
607
 Previously in Church history and theology, 
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a majority had been comfortable in speaking literally of this eternal battle; Athanasius, for 
example, observing that,  
...the air is the sphere of the devil, the enemy of our race who, having fallen from heaven, 
endeavours with the other evil spirits who shared in his disobedience both to keep souls 
from the truth and to hinder the progress of those who are trying to follow it.
608
  
Articulating the issues that CVM addresses he added that the Lord came to overthrow the 
devil and to purify the air in order to make “a way” for humans up to heaven.609  
For advocates of CVM it follows as a (super)natural corollary of their support that holding 
this doctrine necessarily leads to a belief in a spiritual dimension and acceptance of a 
dualistic understanding of the cosmos.  Boersma, whilst not an advocate of the CVM 
nonetheless concedes, for instance, that the Christus Victor theme cannot function without at 
least some degree of metaphysical or cosmic dualism; observing that Boyd and others are 
right in reclaiming this dualism as part of the Christian heritage.
610
 Such theologians, 
therefore, express their understanding through the lens of a first-century worldview, or at 
least an outlook sympathetic to this perspective.
611
  
A position acknowledging continuity between ancient Judaism, early Christianity and then 
Judaeo-Christianity is thereby endorsed; it is also accepted that early Christians inherited this 
dual focus of Judaism and Christianity. This provides a basic framework within which 
Christian thinkers have understood atonement through the ages. Within these two separate 
and yet not disparate religions, atonement involves establishing right relationship between 
God and world through the confrontation of evil.
612
 Not primarily through the defeating or 
forgiveness of sin and then the corollary of evil being dealt with. Rather, as seen in CVM 
there is a direct, violent, pro-active and primary confrontation with evil; all other issues are 
secondary and subsidiary.
613
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CVM does not, therefore, perceive atonement as a visual or moral stimulus or the placating of 
a wrathful God; nor is it a response to one carefully chosen element in the life, ministry and 
death of Jesus Christ. In the fullest sense it is not even a metaphor, rather, for its advocates, it 
is a doctrine about the very character of God and about everything that stands against divine 
purposes. It is the attempt to paint with broad and dramatic brush-strokes an all-
encompassing overview of the eternal unfolding of salvation history. It is, therefore, a 
doctrine concerned more with ontology than function and one providing not only an aid to 
understanding but a full-blown insight into what actually happened and is happening in terms 
of God, salvation, the cosmos and the spiritual realm, both divine and evil. Gunton notes that,  
...the problem that the atonement engages with is primarily theological. It does not 
consist primarily in morally wrong acts whose effect is on human life alone and which 
therefore can be rectified by merely human remedial action, but in a disrupted 
relationship with the creator. As a result of the disruption there is an objective 
bondage, pollution and disorder in personal and social life, encompassing all 
dimensions of human existence and its context. By virtue of both truths, that the 
problem is one we cannot solve and that our being clean and free and upright is the 
gift of the creator, there needs to be a recreative, redemptive divine initiative in which 
the root of the problem, the disrupted personal relationship, is set to rights.
614
  
In CVM atonement is portrayed as a salvation battled for, a powerful, real adversary 
overcome and a war actually won by the Victor God.  
A criticism of CVM, however, is its perceived lack of compelling and explicit biblical 
evidence. Critiquing Weaver’s Narrative Christus Victor,615 Finlan notes this paucity, adding 
that the idea of a battle between cosmic forces of good and evil seems characteristic of the 
worldview of the first and second centuries and is thereby de facto inadequate to answer 
humanity’s philosophic needs today.616 This said, Finlan could be guilty of what Lewis called 
‘chronological snobbery’;617 it is ‘present-centric’ to disregard an opinion because of its 
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perceived anachronism. Instead reconsideration of the original application of CVM is 
required, only after which should a decision be made as to whether its theological themes 
might require revisiting. This is especially the case in regard to its engagement and 
understanding of divine violence and of the way in which it addresses, perceives and 
responds to an actual adversary of God personifying evil in the ontological being of the 
Satan.  
Few support such a position today.
618
 Even those, like Girard, who seemingly endorse a 
personified malevolent being, on closer reflection are less than fulsome in their support. So, 
whilst Girard’s understanding of the functioning of the cross is of revelation and imitation, 
seen in terms redolent of MIT, the revelatory power of the cross serves, and turns out to be 
for him Christ’s victory over Satan.619 This appears to be incontrovertible advocacy for CVM 
and belief in an actual being called the Satan who stands against God’s purposes. The 
position crumbles, however, when it is understood, as we have seen, that for ‘Satan’ in 
Girard’s thought, as with Finlan, one needs to read - the very process of ‘violent contagion’ 
and not someone who really exists.
620
  
Girard apparently gives tacit endorsement of CVM, even its ransom element, although for 
him their themes are dramatically demythologised. This is part of a broader process, coupled 
with the de-prioritising of an awareness of the Satan per se, that originally led to the ransom 
motif being left in antiquity. It was relegated to being at best irrelevant, a theological 
‘museum piece’ and at worst a grotesque abrogation of the Gospel and in particular of God’s 
character and soteriological plans.
621
 It will be argued, however, that a demythologised CVM 
is no Christus Victor model at all.
622
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3.4 Ransom Christus Victor – Deceitful Violence.  
The final metaphor is one out of which CVM evolved, its narrative again depicting the 
atonement in terms of conflict and victory; it is a view that was especially popular between 
the second and sixth centuries.
623
 RCVM is the first to be widely held by Christians as a 
means of understanding God’s achievements through the birth, life, ministry, death and 
resurrection of Jesus Christ of Nazareth; in particular highlighting the soteriological 
significance of the Satan’s overthrow and defeat. Stott crystallises this central role of the 
Satan in early understanding of the salvation drama by noting that in the early church it was 
perceived to be the devil who made the cross necessary.
624
  
Although RCVM was almost universally popular during the first centuries of the Eastern 
Church, it is now perceived as either a theological anomaly or an historical aberration. Heim, 
for example, characterises a recurrent response to the RCVM in noting that early Christian 
writers are famous for their fondness for two images which he argues have perplexed and 
often embarrassed later theologians; the two images he highlights are Jesus’ death as a 
ransom and as a trick or ‘deceit’ of Satan. He concludes that in discussions of atonement 
these views, whilst prominent in the early centuries, are now usually passed over lightly.
625
 
Certainly, no major part of the worldwide Christian Communion currently retains these two 
perspectives and, as will be demonstrated, many theologians not only deny the doctrine but 
distance themselves from it and its ramifications in regard to the character and purposes of 
God.
626
  
So, whilst considering atonement models, Schreiner concludes that PSA provokes the most 
negative response
627
 and certainly it has come in for its share of scholarly criticism of late and 
yet it nonetheless remains premature to affirm it as the least popular model. Historically, that 
accolade still goes to RCVM, a doctrine not merely discounted by the majority of scholars 
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post-Anselm but, as noted, usually discounted and abused in the process; scholars and 
theologians outdoing each other in their quest to add the most discourteous adjectives to it.
628
  
Regardless of its unpopularity, RCVM must be assessed in order to ascertain whether it 
retains theological relevance and might yet be a pertinent means of understanding 
soteriology, the atonement, God, the Satan and divine violence in a modern context. It is easy 
to heap approbation on RCVM model but this falls short of the standards of objective 
theological enquiry and, as noted when considering CVM, likewise invokes Lewis’ charge of 
chronological snobbery.
629
 Aulén notes that it should be evident that the historical study of 
dogma is wasting its time in pure superficiality if it does not endeavour to penetrate to what 
may lay below the outward dress; it is incumbent upon the theologian, therefore, to look for 
the religious values which might otherwise lay concealed.
630
   
Further, an additional method is needed. Finlan, for example, responding to Brown and 
Parker’s critique of atonement theology notes that, 
[But] they do not fill this out with any biblical scholarship, any background in cultic 
theology or the metaphorical appropriation of cultic images, or any history of the 
phases of doctrinal development. Humanistic appeals are not enough to provide the 
ground for a new theology. It is necessary to give a sustained account of how and 
why these doctrines emerged. Strong biblical scholarship is needed; the case against 
traditional atonement cannot be argued with one’s ethical instincts alone. Otherwise 
there is little mooring or depth to one’s attempted new theologizing.
631
 
Putting personal causes, concerns and agendas aside, each doctrine must be approached on its 
own merits, free from ideological constraints of denomination or heritage. Atonement 
doctrine has long existed as a vehicle for conveying information, primarily about salvation 
and, on occasion, the Incarnation. There are always many interpretative vehicles available, 
and there is no reason, as Finlan suggests, why the best one might not be a very old one.
632
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The oldest of all is RCVM and according to its early advocates the Fall had placed human 
beings in the power of the Satan and redemption was envisaged as humanity’s emancipation 
from this actual, personal being of evil.
633
 One of the chief theological concerns of the time 
was for God’s justice; hence the emphasis that it was through free choice that humans had 
fallen into the Devil’s clutches. This human decision gave the Devil the right to adequate 
compensation if he was to surrender humans that ‘belonged’ to him; for God to have 
exercised force majeure at this point would have been construed as unfair and tyrannical.
634
  
Instead God offered Jesus as a ransom to the Devil who when he saw him, born of a virgin 
and a renowned miracle worker, decided the exchange was to his advantage. What he failed to 
realize was that the outward covering of human flesh concealed the immortal Godhead. 
Hence, when he accepted Jesus in exchange for mankind, he could not hold Him; he was 
deceived, outwitted and caught, as a fish is by the bait which conceals the hook.
635 
In addition to the previously noted objections to this view of atonement it has been argued 
that ‘deceit’ is beyond the Christian God’s capability. This subjective interpretative caveat 
aside and taken at face value it seems, however, that there is still much to commend this 
outlook; Boersma, whilst ultimately unconvinced of the ‘deception theme’, nonetheless 
admits that the notion of it is fascinating.
636
  
Synthesising central elements of this ancient doctrine, Aulén concludes that the most 
common view is that a postlapsarian Devil possesses an incontestable right over fallen man 
and therefore a regular and orderly settlement is necessary.
637
 This idea of the Devil having 
‘rights’ over humans has caused much discomfort and consternation; there has been more 
recently, however, a willingness amongst some theologians to revisit and reconsider RCVM 
to re-appraise its claims.
638
  
Sometimes, in fact, support has come from unexpected quarters, such as when Girard states 
that Western theology, in rejecting the idea of the Satan tricked by the Cross, has lost a pearl 
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of great price in the sphere of anthropology.
639
 Even given Girard’s reinterpretation and 
demythologising of ‘Satan’ this statement retains force and it is not only anthropology that 
has lost out – theology has too. At the very least it has forgotten its historical forbears and 
thereby its foundations and mission and at worst is missing the possibility of a modern re-
appropriation of a potentially key doctrinal understanding of the Christian God, divine 
violence and the means by which salvation has been won. 
In the context of ascertaining ‘what is’, Anderson tells the joke of three umpires having a 
beer after a baseball game and reflecting on what it is ‘all about’. One contends that there are 
balls and strikes and that he calls them the way they are; another responds that there are balls 
and strikes and he calls them the way he sees them. The third says that there are balls and 
strikes and they are nothing until he calls them.
640
 This assessment of baseball metaphorically 
conjoined with theology needs to allow a fourth position - that there are balls and strikes and 
whether or not they are seen or called they are nonetheless real. The issue is about putting 
aside personal perspectives, the influence of others and the need to be ‘right’ or palatable; 
what matters is being true to the call, whatever the call is and however unpopular it might be. 
It is what it is. 
It is of course understandable that some baulk at the notion that God practices deceit in order 
to overcome the Satan and of thereby potentially utilising violence to finalise such a 
deception. There is also the issue, as noted, which particularly challenges modern 
sensibilities: the acceptance of an actual adversary for God – a personified evil being who 
ontologically exists. We will revisit RCVM later and so for the time being its potential and 
ongoing validity as a means of interpreting the atonement and the overall life, mission and 
accomplishments of Jesus Christ will be acceded. Having reflected on Reformation theories 
of the atonement, in particular the absolute depravity of humans, of universal guilt and the 
subsequent transfer of divine wrath to the undeserving Son, Finlan concludes their 
cumulative worth as “monstrous teachings.”641 He then asserts that the only atonement 
explanation that is consistent with the goodness of God is the old rescue theory, where God 
tricks the devil.
642
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RCVM is a contentious doctrine that has stirred controversy since its inception in the Patristic 
Era. This does not have to disqualify it, however, from further consideration, reappraisal and 
re-application to hearers in a postmodern context. Regardless of its challenging ramifications 
to the Christian God and divine purposes, it might yet remain a way by which God and His 
soteriological plans can be understood. In particular, RCVM could still provide a means by 
which divine violence can be explicated to incorporate God’s endorsement and utilisation of 
violence.
643
   
3.5 The Use of Metaphor. 
Further to our assessment of some of the main atonement models and to aid understanding of 
whether divine violence might be intrinsic or extrinsic, a function or an ontological trait of 
God, it is important to reflect upon the nature and use of metaphor. This linguistic and 
conceptual device is used repeatedly in theology and the Bible to express otherwise 
inexplicable elements of divine existence, being, nature, praxis and purpose – particularly in 
regard to soteriology. It is in regard to life’s great ‘unknowns’ which, according to McFague, 
include mortality, love, fear, joy and hope, that the poets use metaphors as an epistemic 
bridge. Religious language, she argues, is deeply metaphorical for the same reason and it is 
therefore not a surprise, she concludes, that Jesus’ most characteristic form of teaching, the 
parables, should be extended metaphors.
644
 
Aware of this theological and linguistic conundrum Weil suggests, in regard to the existence 
of God that it is,  
A case of contradictories, both of them true. There is a God. There is no God. Where is 
the problem? I am quite sure that there is a God in the sense that I am sure my love is no 
illusion. I am quite sure there is no God, in the sense that I am sure there is nothing which 
resembles what I can conceive when I say that word…645  
To counter this seeming impasse metaphors become essential in the endeavour to speak of 
God; indeed, it is impossible to express ideas about God, His action and being, independently 
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of the biblical metaphors in which they were first given.
646
 Further, the study of metaphors 
may yet also provide important clues towards understanding the nature of religion itself.
647
  
As already considered, there are various ways to interpret and understand the salvific 
significance of Jesus Christ dying on a cross.
648
 The apostle Paul was particularly exercised 
in this area and yet for him the quest for a particular atonement metaphor was not of primary 
concern. In fact, the desire to promote one means of understanding at the expense of another 
was not an issue; instead he even used one metaphor to interpret another.
649
 The issue 
nonetheless remains that throughout the whole endeavour he relied heavily, if not 
exclusively, on metaphors as a means of engaging with and explaining both Jesus Christ’s 
death and all that this death accomplished. Perhaps this dependence was linked to Paul’s 
realisation early on that there is in fact, no explicit and distinct New Testament “doctrine” of 
atonement but rather, as den Heyer argues, only a “multiplicity of images” that “influence 
one another... but also contradict one another.” 650   
Each image or metaphor could therefore be used, Heyer asserts, to illustrate or illuminate a 
particular element of understanding, but no one image should be allowed to take precedence 
in any ultimate sense. He concludes that there are no dogmas formulated in the New 
Testament but that there is instead a rather surprising and confusing variety.
651
 The absence 
of explicit dogma or doctrine further highlights the use and value of the constituent 
metaphors that provide each element of insight. The prolific use of metaphors by such a 
seminal biblical figure as St. Paul is however, at the very least, indicative of their theological 
importance, again especially in regard to soteriology. 
For example, Finlan notes that the various soteriological metaphors used in Romans 8 are 
judicial, commercial, and ritual images for the efficacy of the death of Christ, picturing that 
death as bringing about acquittal, constituting a payment, or functioning as a cultic event.
652
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In this manner Paul is forwarding metaphorical ideas as an essential means of understanding 
and expressing atonement.  
Further, Richardson notes that Paul and other New Testament writers do not offer theories 
but rather vivid metaphors, which can, if the recipient allows them, operate in the human 
imagination, making real the saving truth of redemption by Christ’s self-offering on the 
behalf of humans.
653
 He concludes, in fact, that it is a rather unfortunate kind of 
sophistication which believes that the only thing to do with metaphors is to turn them into 
theories.
654
 The central importance of metaphorical language and imagery for Paul and other 
New Testament writers is therefore patent, both for theological understanding and for 
discourse on salvation and atonement. 
This is not to say that the use of metaphors is without potential pitfalls. In fact, due to their 
central theological significance and powerful emotional resonance to the believer and their 
beliefs, metaphors are open to abuse and misuse.
655
 They are, however, indispensable to the 
language of religion and their facilitation as a primary vehicle by which the otherwise 
inexpressible or incomprehensible or, in the case of divine violence, the unpalatable, can be 
made tangible; they nonetheless remain potentially dangerous.
656
 The main concern for 
Combes in this regard is that over time metaphors might in some cases lose their obvious 
identity as metaphors, and instead become confused with literal truths.
657
 The critical level of 
importance for metaphors, coupled with this scope for confusion and error, mean that it is 
essential to reflect on exactly what metaphors are and how they are used.  
3.5.1 The Primacy of Metaphor.  
Given this level and means of engagement it is apparent why metaphors are invaluable to 
those seeking to delineate, understand and express theological truths, perhaps in particular 
theological expressions which, like divine violence, might otherwise remain inaccessible. 
Theology is concerned with those parts of existence and reality that fall outside the normal 
sphere of human understanding and therefore require a ‘bridge’ to facilitate engagement and 
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cognition.
658
 The lens of metaphor is both informative and cognitive, giving access to fact 
which would otherwise be unobserved or to truth which would otherwise remain hidden.
659
 It 
is this ‘bridge’ or ‘lens’ (both metaphors of course...) of metaphor that provide its efficacy as, 
an albeit shocking, way of facilitating understanding. Metaphorical talk effects a familiarity 
or ‘intimacy’ between speakers and between them and their world enabling people to feel ‘at 
home’ and it is this quality that explains why metaphorical discourse is so pervasively 
engaged in.
660
 
To understand God, His nature and purposes it is patent that without some degree of 
ideological and conceptual resonance all propositions would remain abstract and 
ungrounded.
661
 To fill this conceptual chasm a system has been sought; a linguistic and 
perceptual method by which humans can span the otherwise insuperable gap between them 
and deity. Kittany argues,  
Some order, at least one intelligible to ourselves and to those with whom we share our 
space and our words, none the less remains crucial. And a systematic tolerance of a 
‘disorder’ that can be shown to be purposeful and intelligible is equally essential, if we 
are to remain in touch with the well-springs of our creativity and to keep our surroundings 
and our minds adaptable to the changing circumstances of our lives and our world. 
Understanding the workings and the meaning of this latter ‘disorder’ is as much a part of 
understanding meaning and language as is understanding the ‘proper order’. It is within a 
carefully conceived ‘chaos’ that metaphors attain an irreducible cognitive content and 
their special meaning.
662   
In a rudimentary sense religious metaphor is the human attempt to draw upon that which they 
are most familiar with in order to explicate that which they are least familiar with. Thus, the 
everyday world of human activities and relationships is mined to create pictures of that which 
is unknown and thereby otherwise unintelligible. By these means humans can, to some 
degree, engage with, understand and express those areas of belief and existence that would 
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otherwise remain outside the sphere of their lives.
663
 Succinctly put, religious metaphors are 
the transcendent expressed through the mundane. Conversely for Bultmann, such a definition, 
rather than explicating ‘metaphor’ rather describes ‘myth’ which, for him, objectifies the 
transcendent into the immanent, and thus also into the disposable, as becomes evident when 
cult more and more becomes action calculated to influence the attitude of the deity by 
averting its wrath and winning its favour.
664
 
3.5.2 Explicating Reality.  
It is important to note that metaphor is not a linguistic tool peculiar to Christian faith, rather 
all major world religions share a vision, or perhaps a re-description, of reality that is informed 
by a specific cluster of metaphors.
665
 At the heart of Christian faith and therefore at the centre 
of theology is the quest to engage with, understand and then communicate a perception of 
reality as ontological fact. Further and in particular regard to the concerns of this thesis, 
comes the quest to understand and delineate God’s nature, particularly as it pertains to 
violence.  
Metaphors, both new and historic, can have the power to define these realities in a manner 
that is unavailable to any other medium.
666
 They do this through a coherent network of 
entailments that highlight particular features of reality whilst hiding others. The acceptance of 
a specific metaphor forces those accepting it to focus only on those aspects of experience that 
it highlights, thus leading to the view that the entailments of the metaphor are themselves 
true.
667
 Throughout the Pauline letters, as we have seen, a rich and varied range of metaphors 
are utilised in order to express the significance of Christ’s death.668 These metaphors of the 
cross and atonement express and define their own version not merely of the reality of Christ’s 
crucifixion, but of the concomitant aspects of response, action and lifestyle that ought to 
follow as a result of an acceptance of the central metaphor chosen.
 
Dunn highlights the 
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importance of recognizing the character of each of these options as a metaphorical assertion, 
warning against the danger of promoting any one metaphor at the expense of another; the 
metaphor, after all, is not the thing itself but a means of expressing the thing’s meaning. 
Dunn concludes that pushing metaphors too far leads to the unwise practice of translating 
them into literal facts.
669
 
A problem with conventional religious metaphors is that in the time between their creation 
and their current use they lose not only their relevance but also their original meaning and the 
fact that they are actually metaphors. Commenting upon the problem of religious language 
being rich in models, Soskice notes that theology is not alone in this regard; observing that 
science has failed to acknowledge its use and dependence upon models and metaphors to 
understand and explain its findings. She concludes that science too considers one entity in 
terms of another and speaks, for example, of the hypothetical light ‘wave’ or magnetic ‘field’ 
which lies beyond experience.
670
  
The continued advocacy of metaphorical language in other fields demonstrates that theology 
and religion are not alone in facing the danger of metaphors no longer being acknowledged as 
such through protracted usage. Gunton, for example, notes that the word muscle, when first 
used, drew upon some of the associations of the Latin musculus, ‘little mouse’. It was 
originally presented as a helpful metaphor precisely because, in its indirect way, it enabled 
physiologists to name and understand a part of human anatomy. Gunton observes that no-one 
thinks of those associations any longer, but that is because they have been so successful.
671
 
This highlights the problem that metaphors can be perceived as ‘dead’ metaphors, confused 
with literal truth so that the perceptual basis of those interpreting them is warped and 
conclusions drawn which were never intended.
672
 In the dynamic of interpreting and 
understanding a metaphor there is a primary imperative to ascertain the literal meaning 
referenced in the metaphor as well as an acknowledgement of the vehicle’s contrastive and 
affinitive relations which are transferred to a new domain.
673
 It is also important to be aware 
both of the parameters of expectation in regard to the use of language, both literal and 
metaphorical, as well as similarly having an acceptance of particular limitations in modes of 
language, literal and metaphorical, which lead to the more modest demand and expectation of 
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there only ever being the potential of achieving a partial or provisional success within the 
human desire to name and describe.
674
 
Additionally, there is the issue of temporal constraint and to what extent metaphors are 
determined by their original context which, of course, is particularly relevant in regard to 
divine violence. Aware of these constraints McFague asserts that any attempt to speak about 
God is done by beings who are by definition social, cultural and historical and whose 
perspectives, therefore, are necessarily influenced by a wide range of factors.
675
  Conversely, 
metaphors may be able to transcend such limitations and stand for all time as expressions of 
deeper realities and truths about religious belief. Certainly if the use of metaphors is dictated 
by the social environment and the era of the user some change or loss of the language 
correlating to these changes would be expected.
676
  
If, indeed, historical context and original user are linked then perhaps metaphors de facto 
have built-in obsolescence; whereas if they are transcendent of such contextual limitations 
they retain meaning and value theologically and throughout subsequent history indefinitely. 
This commends their use in terms of an ability to capture a potentially problematic theme, 
such as divine violence, thereby encapsulating it to be safely unpacked from its cultural 
dressing in each subsequent era – whether or not the theme itself remains unpalatable or 
troubling. 
The search for meaning free from historicity is notoriously difficult and it has been argued 
that no words are ‘literal’ and therefore unchangeable in all times, places and contexts.677  On 
the other hand, even if a metaphor is inextricably tied to its original cultural context, this need 
not mean that its eventual cultural irrelevance must equate to the loss of the understanding or 
truth for which it was initially formulated.
678
 Each metaphor deserves to be considered 
individually, including its cultural context and original, accepted meaning to ascertain 
whether this meaning remains cogent even if the metaphor itself has long since lost its 
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original potency and cultural relevance.
679
 Further, this provides a basis to potentially link 
originally violent metaphors with a violent interpretation in a modern context; or at least not 
to decry such a link in an a priori manner.   
Consequently, whilst issues of truth do inevitably arise for new metaphors, another question 
facing religious believers is what appropriate belief and action particular metaphors might 
elicit. Gunton goes further than stating the manner in which a believer might respond to 
biblical metaphors; rather than considering only praxiology and function he sets an 
ontological agenda for theological and biblical metaphor. Christian proclamation post-Easter 
for Gunton is not merely a message to be believed but a change in the status of believers and, 
indeed, the whole world and, “The metaphors of atonement are ways of expressing the 
significance of what had happened and was happening.”680  
What is at issue, therefore, is the dual concern for the truth or falsity of a metaphor integrally 
linked to the perceptions and inferences that follow from it as well as the actions sanctioned 
by it. There is, therefore, an essential link between ontology and function – between the 
reality and what response that reality requires. In all aspects of life, not just politics or love, 
reality is defined and expressed in terms of metaphors with the integral and essential 
concomitant process of ascertaining how to act on the basis of metaphors. Inferences are 
drawn, goals are set, commitments made and plans executed, all on the basis of how in part 
experience is structured, consciously and unconsciously, by means of particular metaphors.
681
  
3.5.3 Soteriological Metaphors.  
In his attempt to explain salvation Finlan reverts to metaphors, observing that despite the 
theological influence of atonement-thinking no mention of a sacrificial death can be found. 
He notes that Jesus does not say that faith saves people contingent upon their acceptance of a 
soon-to-come interpretation of his death as a cosmic cleansing, a penal substitution, or a 
massive ransom payment. Rather, faith allows people to be saved because it allows God to 
reach into their lives and heal them; it is God, he concludes, who is doing this saving.
682
 In 
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his desire to circumnavigate metaphors, however, he ironically remains heavily dependent 
upon them with references to God ‘reaching’, ‘saving’ and ‘healing’.   
Finlan does, however, highlight the soteriological primacy of God. The theo-centric nature of 
Finlan’s position and his assertion that divine action is central to the gospel as a means of 
interpretation and understanding lends itself to the view that the whole arena of salvation is 
better viewed as an epic, spiritual conflict and drama rather than merely a delineation of 
definition and formula. Riddell agrees, admitting that many contemporary notions of 
Christian evangelism betray their modernist and rationalist origins with their ‘highly 
manipulative’ agendas which are designed to get prospective customers to ‘sign up’ to a 
particular understanding of doctrine and propositional beliefs.
683
  
Likewise, Macquarrie notes that within theology there is instead a demand to find a truth that 
is not an abstraction, attained by mere intellectual effort, but rather for one requiring that 
those seeking it are true to each other and live in the sometimes hard and occasionally painful 
discipline of the spirit.
684
 Again, Riddell observes that in Jesus’ own attempts to ‘convert’ 
people he did not ask them for a statement of belief or a commitment to a programme of 
action; instead, his invitation is one in which he simply asks them to accompany him as he 
moves on.
685
 It is the response to this metaphorical invitation of ‘travel’ and ‘journey’ rather 
than the propositional nature of the message that causes Walker to assert that,  
Christianity is in effect a rescue mission for humankind, for through the telling of the 
story, people find themselves enabled to indwell it, make the story their own, and 
discover in it ultimate concern – their true end.
686
 
Such an outlook presupposes that humankind requires rescuing from something, or someone, 
whilst also taking the theologian and thereby theology into the realm of worship in addition 
to, or perhaps even instead of, mere academic theology. Indeed, McFague acknowledges 
what she calls the ‘great tradition’ of deeply religious people, especially the mystics of all 
religious traditions, for whom the conviction of their belief in God is found at the level of 
experience - in worship, but who nonetheless maintain great uncertainty in regard to their 
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words, which they know are inadequate to express God’s reality.687 There is a further 
suggestion that the dramatic action of Christian worship might in fact serve as an 
indispensable metaphoric commentary upon all that the Church believes about God’s action 
for humans in Christ.
688
  
Such a movement equates to a shift in soteriology from the exclusive realm of words, 
propositions and theories; not supplanting them with metaphors and symbols, but adding 
these to an overall understanding of the living, indwelt and ongoing heilsgeschicte. It is in the 
salvation story and its intertwined metaphorical accoutrements and means of engagement that 
the believer finds and lives faith; for example, the cross of Jesus itself, according to 
Middleton, whilst the centre of the biblical salvation metanarrative, is not merely symbolic 
but rather a living element of the story.
689
  
This is the story, Middleton claims, of the Creator’s unsurpassing love for a world gone 
astray and a love that ultimately leads him to the cross, to enter into human pain, bearing 
human suffering and sin and then to hand it back to humanity as redemption. He concludes 
that,  
This is the story of the unswerving narrative intent of the Author of creation to liberate 
his creatures from their bondage, untangling the dead-end plots of their stories by 
incorporating them into his grand design, through what Jesus has done.
690
 
This dynamic perception of bondage, liberation, salvation, story and metaphor prompts 
Niditch to suggest that, if properly read, myths and metaphors may, in fact, be the truest 
indicators of essential human perceptions of existence itself.
691
 Or rather, in terms of 
soteriology and metaphor, there can never be a case of having one without the other. Instead, 
an organic tension and link exists between the two such that a soteriology without metaphor 
would be impossible for humans to access and receive whilst metaphor without soteriology 
would lack substance and be incapable of saving.  
Or as Newbigin puts it, the Christian story provides a set of lenses that provide the believer 
not with something to look at, but rather for them to look through. He concludes that the 
Christian community is one which is invited to indwell the story, tacitly aware of it as 
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shaping their understanding but focally attending to the world they live in so that they are 
able to confidently, but not infallibly, increase their understanding of it and their ability to 
cope with it.
692
 Christian soteriology, therefore, is ultimately not a stagnant and static story to 
be read and assented to, rather it is a violent battle delineated and a narrative to be believed, 
indwelt and lived. 
Further than the Christian gospel therefore being a set of propositions, further still in fact than 
it being a story to be indwelt it is, in its deepest and most profound sense, the offer of a 
relationship with God, on God’s terms, His purposes being linked to humanity’s purposes and 
His enemies becoming humanity’s enemies. Or, as Walker puts it, the Gospel story,  
…is not a set of propositional truths, or a manual of systematic theology. It is the story of 
Christ, that, once written on our hearts, shows us how we should treat each other, how to 
live together, how to become persons. Ultimately, if we cannot demonstrate the proof of 
our story by living it, we will never convince people of its truth by talking about it. A 
story is telling, after all, only if it produces a striking effect on its listener.
693
 
It is this element that McFague refers to as the new ‘root-metaphor’ of Christianity, relating 
to the Kingdom of God, exemplified in Jesus’ parables and presented in Jesus himself as 
parable of God; it describes a mode of being in the world as the free gift of God. Its 
distinctive note, she argues, is not merely a new view of God or a new image of human being 
with neither divine nor human nature at its centre – rather, it is a new quality of relationship, 
a way of being in the world under the rule of God.
694
 
In such a scenario, Jesus is not merely another leader with a set of creeds and doctrines to be 
affirmed and accepted. In fact, according to Wright,  
All suggestions that Jesus was simply a ‘great religious teacher’ telling his 
contemporaries about a new pattern of spirituality or even a new scheme of salvation 
must be set aside (unless, of course, we are to rewrite the gospels wholesale, which is 
what many have done in their efforts to domesticate Jesus and his message).
695
 
Instead, Wright argues that Jesus himself was conscious of the various human and societal 
powers which opposed him but, more importantly he was also aware that if God was going to 
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become king it would be and could only ever be attained by some kind of violent 
confrontation with these forces or, more saliently, the forces that actually stood behind 
them.
696
 
3.5.4 Closing the Epistemic Gap.  
This accommodation and incorporation of metaphor into soteriology can be taken further to 
argue that not only is metaphor merely a good and appropriate way to engage in God-talk, 
instead it is the very best way to speak of God and salvation and His means of accomplishing 
it. This is because of the epistemic gap between finite, flesh-bound humans and an infinite, 
spiritual God which cannot otherwise be directly crossed. Although this is what God did 
literally and historically in the incarnation when Christ transcended the sociological reality of 
the Church so that,  
Even while He was within history in the days of His flesh, He belonged at the same time 
to the fullness of eternity because He is God, not only in His Godhead but because His 
humanity itself transforms life – finite, precarious, transitory as we know it – into life 
eternal, stable and victorious.
697
  
Mediated language is therefore required and this is the semantic domain of the metaphorical; 
comparison, of course, being one of the most valuable sources of human knowledge and a 
primary means of connecting the known to the unknown.
698
 Such mediated language 
comprises both a large part of daily speech and almost all the language of theology; God 
Himself speaks to humans in similitudes, and man has no language but analogy for speaking 
about God, however inadequate it may be.
699
  
Perhaps the only way that this gap can be crossed is therefore via metaphorical language that 
facilitates associations enabling a sense of meaning where ‘literal’ language is limiting, brittle 
and self-consciously finite. The very indirectness of metaphorical language gives it its 
inherent strength and value as the world can only be known indirectly and metaphor, being 
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indirect is, according to Gunton, the most appropriate form that a duly humble and listening 
language should take.
700
  
The ultimate function of theology, however, is not to explain the possibility of the person and 
work of Christ because in the presence of the unfathomable love of God all attempts toward a 
rational explanation remain useless.
701
 Barth notes the ‘human impossibility’ of the attempt to 
speak of God and yet does not advise against the endeavour of theology and the preached 
word to proclaim God’s truth; instead he cautions those involved to operate with humility and 
care, conscious both that God does not belong to this world and that He also does not belong 
to the series of objects for which we have categories and words by means of which to draw 
the attention of others to them, thereby bringing people into relation with them.
702
 Further, 
the word “God” itself can be seen as an embarrassment, even to theologians, in their attempts 
at Christian proclamation inasmuch as it prevents secular people from understanding the 
proclamation.
703
 As such, the problems of attempting to understand and express ideas about 
God, His nature and His engagement with violence, whether metaphorical or not, are self-
evident.  
Thus it is appropriate to affirm that there is more to the truth than words can convey and yet 
since words remain the primary means of human communication, use them we must. In using 
them, however, we remain acutely conscious of their limitations so whilst not jettisoning their 
usefulness, the user must utilise them with the full incorporation of the mediums of analogy, 
myth, symbol and metaphor. In a postmodern context, there is undoubtedly a surfeit of words, 
information and modes of communication; metaphor and the imagery invoked could yet 
prove to be the most apposite means of engaging a populace jaded by this profusion.
704
  
A startling modern representation of this postmodern principle is demonstrated by the 
character Beatrice, a donkey in a play about the holocaust within Martel’s novel. She wryly 
observes that, “Words are cold, muddy toads trying to understand sprites dancing in a field – 
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but they’re all we have.”705 Whilst the observation is useful as a means of expressing the 
limitations of language, it is nonetheless poignantly inconclusive as evidence against the 
efficacy of words themselves, especially words that contain metaphors; ‘spoken’ as they are 
in this instance by a donkey to a monkey in an allegorical novel about the holocaust set on the 
back of a striped shirt!   
Just as in this case of arguments against the relevance and usefulness of words which are 
nonetheless made using words, likewise arguments against metaphor that depend heavily 
upon metaphor should be taken lightly. Two key areas of reflection for our thesis relate to 
how the significance of the work of Jesus Christ, that is the basis of salvation, is to be 
understood and how the presentation of the gospel is to be explained in contemporary society. 
These two closely related issues are the most important that can be put to biblical scholars 
and theologians by the church today.
706
 
We have reached, however, along with Cooper, the ‘commonsense’ conclusion that the 
presence of the metaphorical requires the presence of the literal.
707
 This ineluctable union of 
ontological reality and that which reveals it is essential to our reflection upon both God and 
His engagement with and endorsement of violence.   
3.6 God & Metaphor. 
Having considered the concept and use of metaphors the focus now is their application in 
understanding divine attributes and the relationship, if any, which violence has to God. There 
is a tendency to see metaphor as a poetic ornament illustrating an idea or adding rhetorical 
colour to otherwise abstract or prosaic language. It can appear to have little to do with 
‘ordinary language’ except that such language is often composed of “dead metaphors,” some 
blatant such as “the arm of the chair”, others less obvious such as “tradition,” meaning “to 
hand over or hand down.”708  
Metaphor is seeing one thing as something else, pretending “this” is “that” because there is 
no knowledge of how to think or talk about “this,” so instead “that” is a way of saying 
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something. Thinking metaphorically means spotting a thread of similarity between two 
otherwise dissimilar objects, events, or whatever, one of which is better known than the other, 
and using the better-known as a way of speaking about the lesser known.
709
  
Given the aims, nature and content of theology metaphor is, as we have shown, an essential 
element - foundational and irreplaceable. The epistemic chasm between a transcendent, 
ethereal God and human beings can only be ‘bridged’ (a metaphorical term) by means of 
metaphor since humans know little of ‘this’ and so must lean heavily on ‘that’. This does not 
mean that metaphorical language is conceptually or epistemologically secondary; rather, far 
from being an esoteric or ornamental rhetorical device super-imposed on ordinary language, 
metaphor is ordinary language; it is the way humans think.
710
 Metaphorical language is, 
therefore, the means par excellence of exploring and explaining the attributes of God and His 
association and advocation of violence.
711
  
3.6.1 Pushing Too Far… 
There remains, however, the theological danger of pushing metaphors too far. For example, 
Scripture and tradition have often used juridical metaphors to describe the divine-human 
relationship; this does not mean that the metaphor can be pressed to the extent that it reduces 
human engagement with God to a merely legal transaction, rather than a true relationship.
712
 
Metaphors provide a means of pursuing, engaging with and understanding the attributes of 
God; they alone, like every other medium are, in and of themselves, incapable of providing 
definitive, ontological insights and answers. Instead they exist as signs along the traveller’s 
journey towards realisation and engagement rather than being literal definitions of what the 
journey and the destination are. Lakoff and Turner reiterate the pre-eminence and importance 
of this life-as-a-journey metaphor which, they argue, is so taken for granted in the Judaeo -
Christian tradition that when it is used people instantly understand that God is a guide, that 
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there are alternative paths of good and evil through life, and that death hangs over humanity 
throughout.
713
  
Metaphors therefore serve the essential service of pointing the way towards God and offering 
insight into His ontology and (or) function; whilst never ‘just’ metaphors, they nevertheless 
remain ontologically less than the reality they are expressing. Ricoeur acknowledges this in a 
chapter entitled ‘Ontological Clarification of the Postulate of Reference’; asserting that the 
relation of language to its counterpart, reality, concerns the conditions for reference in 
general, and thus for the meaning of language as a whole.
714
 He postulates further on the 
limitations of language and yet accedes to the on-going centrality of the importance of 
language; arguing that in the relation of language to reality it is not possible to speak of such 
a relation because there is no standpoint, as we have shown, outside language and because it 
is and has always been in language that men claim to speak about language.
715
 He therefore 
posits the adage that, “Something must be for something to be said”, concluding that such a 
proposition makes reality the final category upon which the whole of language can be 
thought, although not known, as the being-said of reality.
716
  
In the context of violence therefore, there might then be an extrinsic or intrinsic violent 
element of God’s being, but this does not have to equate to Him ‘being’ violent per se but 
rather, for instance, that He accommodates violence when it is the only way to achieve His 
ends, particularly in a soteriological context.
717
   
3.6.2 Cultic & Ritual Metaphors.  
If God does accommodate violence in an extrinsic manner it might be that He works via the 
ritual that metaphor is linked to; cultic metaphors, for instance, express God’s choice to 
recognise the crucifixion as an effective ritual and respond to it. In this cultus Christ’s death 
functions as the ritual act whilst the resurrection corresponds to God’s positive response; 
reconciliation and justification therefore correspond to the transformed or cleansed status that 
                                                             
713
 G. Lakoff and M. Turner, More than Cool Reason – A Field Guide to Poetic Metaphor, Chicago: University 
of Chicago Press, 1989, 10.  
714
 P. Ricoeur, The Rule of Metaphor: Multi-Disciplinary Studies of the Creation of Meaning in Language, 
London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1978, 303. 
715
 Ricoeur, Metaphor, 304. 
716
 Ricoeur, Metaphor, 304. 
717
 This idea will be pursued in greater depth when we consider Wolterstorff in 4.3.  
157 
 
ritual participants receive. This is the case whether in ritual or in ritual metaphors, the point 
being that what is done evokes and elicits a desired response from God.
718
  
Consequently, God either uses and endorses or accommodates ritual and metaphor in His 
dealings with humans. The process whereby God utilises and humans understand atonement 
and its ritual uses a variety of metaphors, these together express the separated brought near, 
the distorted being untwisted and the broken mended and made whole. These metaphorical 
expressions present a further range of ideas including the battlefield, the courtroom and 
courtly love, whilst key concepts include those of justice, mercy, sin, love, obedience, 
compensation, substitution and representation.
719
 A wide spectrum of metaphorical imagery 
is therefore employed to express a kaleidoscope of concomitant characteristics and attributes 
for the God behind them.
720
 
3.6.3 The Poetry of Metaphor.  
Metaphors might be understood therefore as being to talk of God what songs and poetry are 
to the language of love. Zbikowski, for example, discusses the history and current 
understanding of how music has been understood both by those interested in semiotics and 
metaphor. He observes that,  
…the notion that music is language is the basis for some of the most prevalent metaphors 
used to describe music. But music is also not like language in at least one important 
respect: aside from a limited number of exceptional cases when music mimics natural 
sounds, music makes no reference to the outside world. Music does make reference to – 
or perhaps embody – the interior world of emotions or physiological states, but it is just 
this world that typically escapes the grasp of non-metaphorical language.
721
   
Schleiermacher too, in his consideration of the nature of religion, argues that if it is to be 
compared with anything it would be with music, which is closely connected with it. Music, 
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he asserts, is one great whole, it is special and a self-contained revelation of the world.
722
 
Finally Žižek, reflecting on whether poetry might be redundant after Auschwitz, concludes 
that the opposite is true and that only poetic evocation is capable of succeeding where prose 
fails in expressing something of the unbearable atmosphere of a camp; he further suggests 
that no fear should be involved in taking a step further and referring to the old saying that 
music comes in when words fail.
723
 
Power, insight and poetry are therefore presented as opposed to static, prosaic propositions 
that fall short of their aspirational aim.
724
 The distinction between prose and poetry, or 
rhetoric and poetry, is usually accompanied by the assumption that the first is direct and the 
latter indirect. Ricoeur states that this, however, is a false dichotomy as the duality of rhetoric 
and poetics reflects a duality in the use of speech as well as in the situations of speaking.
725
 
He further observes the different purposes of these forms of speech; for example, for oration, 
persuasion and the purging of feelings concluding thereby that poetry and oratory mark out 
two distinct universes of discourse and that metaphor has a foot in each domain.
726
 In fact, as 
we have seen, both prose and poetry are indirect for humans think by indirection; the 
difference is only that people have grown accustomed to the indirections of ordinary 
language which is then perceived as conventional.
727
  
3.6.3.1 The Limitations of Language.  
A great deal of so-called mythical language is in fact analogical or symbolical language in 
which talk about the God laying beyond the grasp of literal expressions is undertaken with 
analogy to humans.
728
 A case in point is the multiplicity of titular ascriptions for Christ in the 
New Testament; he is regarded as both Messiah and Last Adam and his death as both a 
sacrifice and a cosmic event while God is portrayed simultaneously as Father and King. 
These seemingly diametrical statements are attempts to speak of transcendent realities which 
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one human concept alone is unable to encapsulate; no contradiction is thereby incurred in 
using all of them at once.
729
  
Accordingly, when the New Testament speaks of the life, and particularly the cross, of Jesus 
as a sacrifice, a victory and the justification of sinners, these are not ‘mere’ metaphors but 
ways of incorporating new thinking into theological engagement with God. Here is real 
sacrifice, victory and justice, here too can be both divine love and divine violence so that 
what words were originally thought to mean is shown to be inadequate and in need of 
reshaping by that to which the language refers.
730
 The use of language and metaphor may 
‘restrain’ those using it and yet these attempts remain a primary means by which expressions 
about God, His character and His purposes, including violence, are made. Metaphor and 
language must not be rejected, but their use must incorporate awareness of limitation in order 
to guard against the presumption that all that can be known and expressed about God could 
ever be encapsulated within any finite human medium.
731
  
3.6.4 Anthropomorphism.  
Another shortcoming in the use of metaphors in theology, perhaps particularly in regard to 
God’s use or endorsement of violence, is the anthropomorphism which can ensue. Ray 
observes that,  
Metaphors intended to characterize God have a dual directedness. On the one hand, they 
point toward the absolutely indescribable – God, the infinite, ultimate reality, the ground 
of being. At the same time, they direct attention toward the finite, for it is only in and 
through the language and conceptualities of finite beings that any God-talk at all is 
possible. The problem with traditional notions of God, then, is not that they are 
metaphorical, since theological language is inevitably so. Rather, the problem is that they 
draw on and reflect only a small segment of reality and experience, granting it unlimited, 
universal, and exclusive relevance and authority.
732
 
Consequently, metaphors are essential in order to understand and express God’s attributes, 
especially potentially difficult or unpalatable ones such as violence; Hanson observes of 
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Gregory of Nyssa that he explains anthropomorphisms in the Bible as God accommodating 
himself to our understanding, rather like a mother talking baby-language to her children.
733
 
Likewise, Goldingay notes that this idea of God’s accommodation is taken up by other 
Fathers such as Origen and Chrysostom, in part as an equivalent to the modern discussion in 
terms of analogical language. Origen, for example he argues, sees the anthropomorphisms of 
Scripture as instances of God’s willingness to adapt language to hearers in this way.734 
Without such a concession, humans would be left gazing across an otherwise impassable 
epistemic chasm between their finite selves and an infinite God.
735
  
Further, without divine violence, whether intrinsic or extrinsic, it is questionable whether 
God could both achieve a decisive victory against a violent enemy and whether violent 
humans would be able to engage with, understand and accept God’s message of salvation, a 
salvation which could only be ultimately wrought by direct and violent means.  
Section 4 – Scholars on Violence.  
4.1 Rudolf Otto 
It has been demonstrated across both Testaments that God has been, at the very least, 
implicated in acts of violence and at most potentially has violence as an intrinsic or extrinsic  
element of His being. In fact, as Rollins notes, the supposed dividing line in the Bible 
between violence and nonviolence is not to be found, as commonly thought, between the Old 
and New Testaments. The fault line, he asserts, does not lie between two documents, but 
between two psychic attitudes that run longitudinally through both Testaments, and by 
inference through every stratum of the history of the human race.
736
 These ‘two psychic 
attitudes’ are the concurrent human desires for peace and the irresistible propensity for 
violence.  This is a theologically controversial assertion and conscious of this, Otto’s ideas 
are presented as a useful means of facilitating understanding of these violence-related 
claims.
737
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The problem that the proposition that God is implicated with violence raises is primarily 
connected to the nature of modern theology and the framing of dogma and doctrine itself; its 
practice, its modus operandi and its purpose and expression. These rather prickly issues 
exemplify a pursuit that has often found itself unable to do justice to the non-rational aspects 
of its subject; far from keeping these aspects alive in the heart of religious experience, 
orthodox Christianity has instead too regularly failed to recognise their value and by this 
failure has given to the idea of God a one-sidedly intellectualistic and rationalistic 
interpretation.
738
  
 
In Ware’s reappraisal of Otto’s position he argues that there are two main arguments to be 
considered. The first is the attack on Otto’s epistemology in his attempt to account for the a 
priori necessity of the transition from numinous experience to ‘rational’ religious faith. The 
second is Otto’s relationship with mysticism, whereby he places the numinous, wholly other 
in contrast to the predominantly non-dual character of mystical experience.
739
 It is this failure 
to acknowledge and explore supposedly non-rationalistic elements of divine attributes that 
has contributed to violence being rejected in an a priori manner because it is perceived as a 
non-rational concept which is inappropriate to align with a God perceived as being 
ontologically good. 
  
Further, Raphael notes that Otto is ‘audacious’ in requesting at the beginning of his thesis that 
those who have not actually experienced, “…a moment of deeply-felt religious experience”, 
should, “…read no further.”740 She nonetheless concludes, however, that to reject Otto’s 
claim that the numinous is sui generis, immediate experience, unconditioned by its context, 
does not mean that numinous experience is thereby vacated of meaning and function in 
theology.
741
 Bultmann too acknowledges the need for the exegete to have a thoroughgoing 
understanding of the topic being studied in order for them to engage with and understand it 
correctly. In short, he argues that to have historical understanding presupposes an 
understanding of the subject matter of history itself and of the men and women who act in 
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history; concluding that historical understanding always presupposes that the interpreter has a 
relation to the subject matter that is both directly and indirectly expressed in the text.
742
 
 
4.1.1 Palatable Attributes.  
 
There is, however, no inherent, definitive reason why potential divine attributes have to be 
construed as either ‘acceptable’ or ‘rational’ in order to be considered theologically feasible.  
The issue of God-talk and its concomitant problems, conceptually and theologically, are 
addressed by Hart, who notes that,  
 
...while in obedience we are called to speak of God in this language and not other 
language of our own choosing or devising, the fact remains that of ourselves we do not 
know what we are saying when we say that God is love, so far as its reference to God 
himself is concerned. We do not, in other words, know the nature of the dissimilarity 
between what our human words signify in ordinary discourse, and what they signify in 
theological discourse. Precisely because, in revealing himself, God takes human form, all 
revelation is at the same moment a veiling.
743
 
 
There is therefore no potential attribute which must be jettisoned a priori on the basis of it 
being comprehended, in some sense, as being either unpalatable or unacceptable. For this 
reason violence must not and cannot be disavowed in advance and certainly not before it has 
been acknowledged as a possible attribute or element within the Godhead and the functions 
and purposes thereof. Rather, it should be brought into theological reflection, regardless of 
any potentially negative praxiological consequences or perspectives and then be opened to 
consideration as to its viability and whether or not it might be allowed to stay.
 
 
The problem of Christians engaging with and responding to a theology of ‘God’s violence’ is 
difficult, in fact it has sometimes been linked with horrific acts perpetrated in God’s name, 
based upon His supposed character and actions. A worst-case example is that of Michael 
Bray, a Lutheran Pastor and spokesperson for an extreme wing of the anti-abortion movement 
that justifies killing medical personnel involved in providing abortion services. Bray argues 
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that Christians have long been willing to sacrifice their own lives and those of others in 
service of God’s Kingdom, citing William Carey as an example.744  
 
Bray further likens these sacrifices to those that might need to be made to protect unborn 
lives through the killing of ‘abortuary’ (sic) workers; his justification based upon the 
understanding that God sanctions and supports violence in a ‘just cause’ and his contention 
that, indeed, the Christian God, even the Lord Jesus Christ, is a forceful and some would say 
“violent” God.745 Terrifying though such clumsy theological associations are, they should not 
a priori disavow theological exploration of God’s possible advocacy of violence or whether 
violence can be an attribute of His being. This would be doing theology in reverse; a 
principle which will shortly be considered in more detail.   
 
4.1.2 The Numinous.  
 
In order to counter the ‘one-sidedness’ of a de-spiritualised theology that is willing to 
sacrifice non-rational concepts so that a supposedly intellectually satisfying dogma can be 
presented, Otto coins the word ‘numinous’746 from the Latin numen to suggest the theological 
concept of a spiritual element that cannot be taught or learnt but only perceived, considered, 
discussed and experienced through an individual having it stirred into their consciousness.
747
 
It is this elusive and yet, for Otto, tangible quality that commends it in the face of 
controversial and potentially divisive issues. The numinous provides an epistemic bridge 
linking the rational and the supposedly irrational, thereby providing the possibility of 
facilitating understanding of God’s relationship to violence.748 
 
Otto defines ‘Mysterium Tremendum’ as part of his understanding of the numinous, noting 
that conceptually mysterium denotes that which is hidden and esoteric, beyond conception or 
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understanding, extraordinary and unfamiliar.
749
 If this is the case then a problem arises in 
Otto’s argument as to whether this ‘wholly other’ being can be perceived as truly numinous 
and if so, how can it truly be considered Divine; more specifically, how can it refer to the 
God referenced in the Judaeo-Christian Scriptures. Poland notes how uncanny experiences 
can unsettle theistic descriptions of the transcendent; Otto’s mysterium tremendum, she 
argues, seems both to entertain the possibility of a truly uncanny “wholly other” only to close 
it again, by finding that the uncanny is “completed” and “schematicized” by rational and 
moral ideas of the Western God.
750
 Ware concedes that whilst Otto tries to close off and 
demarcate the theistic boundaries of the wholly other, the logic of his argument often caves in 
under its own pressure.
751
 The way in which mysterium tremendum manifests itself for 
humans is to fill them with a ‘numinous dread’ or awe of that beyond humanity or ordinary 
conception or experience; in other words, in the context of engagement with the divine, to 
‘shudder’ beyond horror and fear in the face of God and the spiritual realm.752 Tillich echoes 
Otto, stating that,  
 
In revelation and in the ecstatic experience in which it is received, the ontological shock 
is preserved and overcome at the same time. It is preserved in the annihilating power of 
the divine presence (mysterium tremendum) and is overcome in the elevating power of the 
divine presence (mysterium fascinosum). Ecstasy unites the experience of the abyss to 
which reason in all its functions is driven with the experience of the ground in which 
reason is grasped by the mystery of its own depth and of the depth of being generally.
753 
 
Otto admits that whilst this concept is deeply troubling and perplexing for modern people this 
was not the case for those extant at the manifestation of God’s biblical wrath. Instead, for 
religious people of the Old Testament the wrath of God, so far from being a diminution of 
His Godhead, appears as a natural expression of it, an element of His ‘holiness’ and a quite 
indispensable one.
754
 Green and Baker challenge this, noting that ‘Old Testament scholars’755 
today are debating in what sense anger can be attributed to God, “…in any way other than 
metaphorical.”756 This is a one-sided way to consider the meaning of biblical teachings, 
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utilising a subjective and arbitrary decision to ascribe an unpalatable theological concept as 
metaphorical and therefore a diminution of ‘reality’, whilst other, less controversial ones, are 
deemed literal and therefore a more accurate representation of reality. Green and Baker make 
no attempt to describe their methodology in choosing between the literal and their perception 
of the lesser concepts of the allegorical or metaphorical; instead leaving the charge 
unanswered that they make hermeneutical choices on personal a priori theological 
dispositions. 
 
4.1.2.1 Numinous Wrath.  
 
The theological and biblical use of the word wrath, Otto argues, is not concerned with being 
perceived as a genuine intellectual ‘concept’, but rather as an illustrative substitute for a 
concept.
757
 Indeed, for Otto, ‘Wrath’ is the ‘ideogram’ of a unique emotional moment in 
religious experience, a moment whose singularly daunting and awe-inspiring character must 
be gravely disturbing to those persons who will recognize nothing in the divine nature but 
goodness, gentleness, love, and a sort of confidential intimacy, in other words, only those 
aspects of God which turn towards the world of men.
758
 He concludes that ὀργή is quite 
wrongly spoken of as ‘natural’ wrath; rather it is of an entirely non- or super-natural quality 
or, more pertinently, it is numinous.
759
  
 
4.1.3 The Sublime.  
 
The concept of the sublime is used by Poland, linking it to the numinous, in order to present a 
similar argument to Otto’s in regard to the responses it elicits from those experiencing it.760 
When it is encountered in the natural realm, perhaps in a scenario in which that experienced 
is beyond the usual human sensual limitations, then the sublime is that emotion that 
overwhelms the human receptor, evoking a sense of other so that in what is perceived to be a 
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positive moment, dread gives way, not only to joy, but to an apprehension and engagement 
with transcendence; it therefore exists as a passage from external nature to internal force, 
from corporeal to spiritual.
761
  
 
This is the same experience of being overwhelmed which is often recounted in the Bible as 
occurring when a human encounters God. Initially there is the moment of dread and fear in 
the face of a being of limitless, untamed potential; the exchange ultimately giving way to joy 
in the realisation that this God, whilst capable of unimaginable and infinite power, is 
nonetheless personal, knowable and ontologically good.
762
 These predicates form the 
foundation of understanding this God and the context in which God then exerts, utilises or 
endorses violence in the human realm.  
 
4.2 René Girard.  
In terms of the level of influence exerted on the understanding of religion and violence across 
numerous and perhaps otherwise divergent academic disciplines, it is impossible to ignore 
René Girard. He is described by McDonald as both one of the twentieth century’s most 
prominent theorists of culture and a devout Roman Catholic.
763
 Fleming, after describing 
Girard as one of the most original and influential cultural theorists on the contemporary scene 
goes on to enumerate Girard’s considerable accomplishments, including honorary doctorates 
from half a dozen European universities, the awards of both the Prix de L’Académie 
Française and the French Academy’s Grand Prix de Philosophie, the latter in recognition of 
his position as one of the outstanding philosophical anthropologists of his generation. 
Fleming also acknowledges the substantial and ever-growing body of secondary literature 
utilizing Girardian themes and hypotheses; his work, he concludes, has extended across a 
remarkably wide range of disciplines including psychology, systems theory, economics, 
political science, religious studies and even musicology.
764
  
Finally, in his Foreword to Schwager’s Girardian re-consideration of violence and 
redemption in the Bible, Daly proffers a wide-ranging overview of Western intellectual 
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history, offering Machiavelli, Luther, Calvin, Hobbes and others such as Marx and Barth as 
influential cornerstones, concluding that whether or not posterity accords Girard a place in 
this august pantheon, the mere fact that he is thought of in such comparisons in attempting to 
assess the import of his work is some measure of its significance.
765
 Girard comes to this 
issue of violence and to the Bible in particular, therefore, primarily as an anthropologist of 
religion rather than a theologian
766
 and yet argues that the Bible, as a text available to anyone 
regardless of religious commitment, discloses a distinctive anthropological perspective, 
which because of its accessibility, brings to light essential insights into the workings of 
culture in a way in which other texts do not.
767
 
Coupled with the primacy of biblical teachings, examples and stories, Girard has also been 
hugely influenced by key figures of world literature and draws upon the insights gained from 
selected works of Cervantes, Stendhal, Flaubert, Proust and Dostoevsky.
768
 From the universe 
of novels imagined by these writers Girard has argued, or rather, as he puts it, has allowed his 
subjects to contend, that human desire is anchored neither in (desiring) subjects nor in 
(desired) objects, but in the imitation of the former from which the individual learns the value 
of the latter.
769
 
Girard insists that these writers are a surer guide to human truth than present-day human and 
social sciences, a position which puts him in opposition to contemporary philosophical and 
aesthetic theory which postulates that literary texts can only ever relate to other fictional 
texts.
770
 Kirwan, for example, asks whether literature has anything to do with the reality of 
human life, questioning whether anything can be learnt from writers like Dostoevsky, Proust 
and Shakespeare, about what human beings are like and how they should lead their lives. It 
should be noted, Kirwan contends, that Girard does not show much interest in literature as a 
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whole, but only in a particular ‘canon’ of texts – consisting, as it happens, of writers who are 
concerned with the same themes as he is!
771
 
At the very least Girard has prepared the way for further debate about the prevalence of 
deceit and violence in the Bible and at most he has presented a coherent, elegant and rational 
explanation to satisfy the needs of the exegete, the theologian and the Christian believer in 
regard to biblical and divine violence.
772
 Daly reiterates that the Western Christian mind has 
been trained to skip over the massive presence of violence and deceit found throughout the 
Scriptures, usually in the form of self-deception.
773
 Conversely, Williams notes of Girard’s 
reading of the gospel narrative that it is certainly selective and even at times cavalier.
774
 
4.2.1 Doubles Theory.  
His theory has been characterised by various versions of a story in which two children are 
playing in a room full of toys. At the moment in which one of them reaches for a particular 
toy, and not before, that one toy becomes the object of desire for the children, making them 
doubles in their focus; the first child becomes a model and the second child imitates the first. 
Or, in other words, both parties now desire to acquire the same item which thereby causes 
them to be in competition and to present themselves as a double of each other. As the 
children focus their attention on the toy, a rivalry ensues and the model issues a double-bind 
in her act of reaching. On the one hand, she makes the toy an object of desire by reaching out 
for it, occasioning mimesis, whilst on the other hand, as soon as she reaches for the toy an 
implied prohibition is expressed; the toy now ‘belongs’ to her since she reached for it first. 
This rivalry, in one form or another, inevitably turns to violence which can only end with the 
expulsion or victimizing of one of the two rivals vying for the toy.
775
 
Girard’s radical theory of violence is controversial in both secular and religious communities, 
with both groups concurrently impressed and reviled by him; as McDonald illustrates, 
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His cultural analysis has been praised by secular critics, even as his insistence that this 
very analysis should lead to Christian affirmation has shocked them. Christians are 
pleased that a giant of modernist and postmodernist thought is a solid Christian, but some 
are disturbed that he seems to “debunk” the propitiatory view of Christ’s death on the 
Cross.
776 
This position of being caught between two camps has not stymied his ability to produce 
influential work. His study and championing of contemporary fictional texts and mythology 
has, for example, led him to develop his theory of acquisitive mimesis and rivalry, from 
which all violence originates,
777
 and the surrogate victim, from which originates ritual as the 
ameliorative factor for violence.
778
 He believes these social mechanisms are hidden within 
the great novels, myths and historical texts and especially “texts of persecution”, leading to 
their final revelation in the Christian Gospel.
779
 
The beginnings of religion and culture are, for Girard, inextricably intertwined, and religion 
can properly be said to be at the origin of culture; indeed, archaic religion is the institution 
that recalls the founding violence in myth and ritual thereby legitimatising a particular form 
of violence as the antidote to the ever-present danger of a relapse into a more primordial 
chaos.
780
 
4.2.2 Mimesis. 
The most distinctive element of Girard’s theorization of desire is that it is grounded in 
imitation, thus his invocation of the Greek term – ‘mimesis’.781 He points to the centrality of 
imitative behaviour in human social and cognitive development and asserts that without the 
ability to copy the behaviour and speech of others human capacity to inhabit a culture would 
be impossible.
782
 Human desire is also constitutionally imitative and mimesis does not 
involve the simple representation of other forms of cultural memory – it rather incorporates 
acts of and intentions towards acquisition.
783
 This second element is essential to his theory, as 
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for Girard humans only learn what to desire from copying the desires of others.
784
 Mimetic 
theory grapples with three simple questions: what causes social groups and societies to come 
together and cohere successfully? What causes those groups to disintegrate? What is the 
function of religion in these two groups?
785 
Mimesis is a phenomenon which evokes desire, the corollary being that this desire then 
structures mimesis which means that human beings are not primarily perceived as individuals 
who have desires, but rather as persons who, in a real sense, are their desires.
786
 Alison 
argues that since the ‘me’ of each person is founded by desire, we cannot say that desire is 
our own, as though it belonged to some pre-existent ‘me’. The ‘me’ is radically dependent on 
the desires whose imitation formed it and this means, Alison argues, that there is no ‘real me’ 
at the bottom of it all, after I’ve scraped away all the things I’ve learned, all the influences 
I’ve undergone.787 This view is in line with Girard’s primary focus which is not ontological, 
he is in fact more interested in functions and choices as defining factors.  
Consequently, Girard argues that if acquisitive mimesis divides by leading two or more 
individuals to converge on one and the same object with a view to appropriating it, 
conflictual mimesis will inevitably unify by leading two or more individuals to converge on 
one and the same adversary that all wish to strike down.
788
 This cause and effect element 
within mimetic theory is particularly pronounced in terms of the contagious nature of 
acquisitive mimesis which leads to the multiplication of people polarized around a particular 
object, ultimately resulting in mimetic frenzy. This inevitably leads to conflictual mimesis 
when the community unites against an arbitrarily chosen enemy who will be sacrificed, thus 
facilitating the death of a victim who the community unshakeably holds to be the one and 
only cause of its trouble.
789
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4.2.3 Violence. 
There is for Girard nothing inherently bad or destructive about mimetic desire, it only 
becomes problematic when two or more people desire the same object; until this is activated, 
mimetic desire lays dormant and passive. When activated the situation rapidly degenerates 
into violent conflict which, given the mimetic character of desire, is eminently contagious. As 
the mimetic contagion spreads, the condition of society deteriorates, rent by division and 
violence; the ensuing chaos can only be curtailed by the group’s selection of a victim who is 
identified as the cause of the present crisis.
790
  
It is this new mimesis of ‘all against one’ that unites rather than divides, providing 
reconciliation and a sense of unity and purpose for the lynch mob as their violence and 
hatred, previously manifest against one another, can now be unleashed upon a single 
victim.
791
 Girard represents violence as an otherwise overwhelming and unstoppable force 
which can debilitate or destroy a society once unleashed – barring the intervention of the 
victimage mechanism.  
At this point in Girard’s theory the origins of cultural, social, and political distinctions are 
traced back to fundamental distinctions between “good” sacred violence that brings unity and 
peace and “bad” profane violence resulting in chaos. Certain kinds of violence are granted 
legitimacy in the interests of preserving civilization, while illegitimate violence is banned.
792
 
In this milieu, violence is a primary and necessary cultural force out of which society is 
formed and framed and also part of the means by which it grows, evolves and is sustained.  
4.2.4 Scapegoat. 
Violence has thus been inherent and central within human culture since its inception and is an 
intrinsic element of societal and cultural formation and identity.  The uniting of the majority 
against an arbitrary victim is, for Girard, the only available means by which violence can be 
held in check. It is important to note that, for him, only violence can effect reconciliation and 
provide the basis on which a culture can ultimately thrive. The cultural and societal beneficial 
effects of the scapegoating of a single victim are the grounds upon which ritual is instituted 
and in which the community will engage from that point on. It is the ritual re-enactment of 
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the sacrificial victimage mechanism which safeguards the community from further 
spontaneous outbursts of violence.
793
 
The finding and ritual expulsion or victimhood of a scapegoat does not address the disorder 
itself; rather it diverts attention long enough to allow the underlying causes to remain in 
place. DeLay characterises Girard’s theory as a mathematical formula in which: Person (A) 
offends another (B) which creates a third element of conflict (X). The surrogate sacrifice (-X) 
cancels the conflict, but leaves A and B to conflict again later. This equation of (A+B) =X+ -
X becomes ritualized so that the offense is continually mitigated and the community can 
survive. The violence against a surrogate is so important to the community that it eventually 
becomes sacred.
794
 The practice of ritual sacrifice therefore reinforces and legitimizes the 
very disorder which continues to threaten the social order even as its continuance constitutes 
the status quo.
795
 The victimage mechanism, therefore, is not a definitive or decisive action 
but rather an on-going ritual which saves the community from the worst excesses of frenzied 
mimeticism; at the same time perpetuating its own worth as the only means of serving this 
societal need.
796
  
Ellens agrees, noting that, even a superficial consideration of history informs of the fact that 
violence breeds further violence rather than eradicating it. He concludes that,  
The most common and most universally agreed-upon reality of history is the fact that 
quelling violence and social or intrapsychic dissonance by a violent or physically 
aggressive action that victimizes a person or a people as scapegoat merely breeds a 
festering and irrepressible counter force and ferment. This eventually manifests itself in 
another revolution.
797
 
Violence and its antidote, the scapegoat, are for Girard inextricably linked in a symbiotic 
relationship - violence requires sacrifice and sacrifice is unnecessary without violence.  
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4.2.5 Sacrifice.  
In response to the accusation that he endorses a ‘non-sacrificial reading of the death of 
Christ’ Girard states his belief in two kinds of sacrifice.798 Using the story of Solomon’s 
judgement of the two prostitutes and the baby, recounted in the third chapter of 1 Kings 
(perhaps the only place, he contends, where both kinds of sacrifice are presented), he 
interprets them as doubles engaging in mimetic rivalry.
799
 Solomon offers to split the child 
between them; one agrees, seeking to triumph over her rival, whilst the other, seeking only 
the child’s well-being, says the other can have it. On the basis of this act of love, the king 
declares her ‘the mother’.  
Girard notes that it does not matter who the biological mother is; the one willing to sacrifice 
herself for the child’s life is, in fact, the mother. Again, he is not primarily concerned with 
ontology but function, with sacrifice providing the only possible solution to mimetic rivalry 
whilst also being its foundation. The second woman, he states, is willing to sacrifice 
everything she wants for the sake of the child’s life and this is sacrifice in the sense of the 
gospel; it is in such manner that Christ is a sacrifice since he gave himself “for the entire 
world.”800 Conversely, ‘bad sacrifice’ is the kind of sacrifice that prevailed before Christ and 
which originates because mimetic rivalry threatens the survival of a community. In Christ’s 
death, as the ultimate ‘scapegoat’ he, as the Son of God, and since he is innocent, exposes all 
the myths of scapegoating and reveals, once and for all, that the victims of scapegoating have 
all been innocent whilst the communities were guilty.
801
 
Admittedly, Girard presents an unorthodox view of sacrifice in the gospel accounts, arguing 
that they are only spoken of in order to ultimately be rejected and denied validity.
802
 Jesus, 
for instance, counters the ritualism of the Pharisees, he says, with an anti-sacrificial quotation 
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from Hosea: ‘Go and learn what this means, “I desire mercy, and not sacrifice.” ’ (Matthew 
9:13)
803
 
4.2.6 Theory Conclusion. 
In his teachings on Gospel sacrifice, McDonald observes that Girard lost much of his 
previous acclaim when he dared to assert that the ‘shackles of sacrificial religion’ were 
broken for a large portion of mankind by the force of the biblical story in which a number of 
narratives reversed the classical mythological pattern by exonerating the scapegoat and 
showing the community to be guilty of gratuitous murder.
804
 
Girard places primary emphasis on the acceptance of this volte-face and presents his position 
that the Gospels express the message that to escape violence it is necessary to love one’s 
brother completely and to thereby abandon the violent mimesis involved in the relationship of 
doubles. He argues that there is no trace of this outlook in the Father, and therefore all that 
the Father asks of humans is that they too might likewise refrain from it.
805
 Jungel notes that 
if this reading is followed, the argument can be made that the Father did not, in fact, require 
the sacrifice of the Son, but only the obedience of love. Violence, like love, he states, can 
effect reconciliation; unlike love, which is self-giving, violence is life-taking, so whilst 
violence sacrifices the life of an “innocent other” to prolong the life of the community, love 
gives its life for the sake of the other.
806
 
In his foreword to Girard’s I see Satan fall like Lightning, Williams notes that,  
The desire that lives through imitation almost always leads to conflict, and this conflict 
frequently leads to violence. The Bible unveils this process of imitative desire leading to 
conflict and violence, and its distinctive narratives reveal at the same time that God takes 
the part of victims. In the Gospels the process of unveiling or revelation is radicalized: 
God himself, the Word become flesh in Jesus, becomes the victim. The innocent victim 
who is crucified is vindicated through his resurrection from the dead. The disciples of 
Jesus finally undergo a complete conversion as they move from being lost in the mimetic 
desire of the crowd to imitating Christ, which occurs through their experience of Jesus’ 
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resurrection. Their conversion and the resurrection of Christ are two aspects of the same 
event.
807
 
For Girard, therefore, the life of Jesus Christ is the life of a nonviolent human being whose 
“project” was to rid humanity of violence by bringing violence out into the open and 
exposing its lies.
808
 
The hypothesis of Girard in regard to violence is elegantly straightforward and yet belies 
many layers of depth. Indeed, Hardin observes that Girard has presented a theory which is 
both disarmingly simple in its structure and yet complex and subtle in its comprehension.
809
  
Ranieri adds that the test of a theory is its explanatory power and on this count he contends 
that Girard’s theory is particularly strong. His fundamental insights not only discern a 
comprehensive intelligibility in the biblical text, Ranieri concludes, but they also help to 
explain an enormously wide range of cultural, social, and political phenomena.
810
  
What the theory lacks, however, is an ontological base. Certainly, the idea of Christ 
overthrowing the sacrificial cultus is suggestive and yet without an ontological force of evil, 
let alone a ‘personified’ Satan, Girard’s argument lacks ultimate substance and foundation. 
Christ is presented as no more than a moral visionary and a model of resistance and 
iconoclasm, rather than being perceived as an actual victor over an actual adversary.
811
 In 
this regard Girard’s conclusions are redolent of the MIT; concurrently, they are far removed 
from the perspective of this thesis which upholds at least a personification of evil in the Satan 
and at most an actual, ontological being standing against and at war with Jesus Christ.  
Girard has presented a view of salvation history in which God has used the sacrifice of Jesus 
on the cross as an ultimate means of expressing the futility of sacrifice. The fact remains for 
Girard that sacrifice and violence have nonetheless been used by God in order to accomplish 
His ends prior to their being used to herald the end of divine violence. We conclude, 
therefore, in agreement with Girard, that divine violence is not part of God’s ultimate plan, 
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but that violence has unequivocally been a primary function of God and a key means for him 
to accomplish the end of facilitating peace amongst humans perhaps through, in Girardian 
fashion, the scapegoating of the Satan in his being overcome at the cross.  
Girard’s theories provide interesting and apposite cultural and anthropological insights into 
societal and biblical violence. What they fail to take account of, however, is any transcendent 
or spiritual analysis or understanding; Girard actively discounts such talk, claiming that the 
language of the time must be spoken which, for him, is naturalistic.
812
 The setting of arbitrary 
and inhibiting parameters upon research and understanding is, however, by definition limiting 
of a fully inclusive and holistic theory.  
So, whilst we embrace Girard’s criticism of a propitiationary reading of Christ’s death, we 
look beyond him for understanding of the primary reasons for the cross, seeing Girard’s 
conclusions as secondary, or even tertiary, to Christ’s ultimate and primary goal of defeating 
an actual Satan and thereby setting humanity free from his authority, grasp and power. Also, 
whilst we accept Girard’s contention that God used the sacrifice of Jesus to show the ultimate 
futility of sacrifice, we argue that sacrifice and violence had nonetheless been used copiously 
prior to this final denouement in order for God to accomplish His soteriological ends.
813
  
We are not arguing that divine violence is God’s primary or even ultimate plan. We 
nevertheless contend that it was, and perhaps still is, at least a primary divine function and a 
means by which God facilitates final and lasting peace - both between humanity in a societal 
setting and then ultimately and eternally between humans and God through the forceful, 
irresistible and violent overcoming of humanity’s enemy – The Satan. 
4.3 Nicholas Wolterstorff.  
 
Wolterstorff reveals himself as a scholar with a further suggestive argument for the 
accommodation of divine violence as an unwelcome but necessary accoutrement to God’s 
activity, especially when pertaining to His soteriological purposes. Assessing the 
consequences of this accommodation he observes that love and justice are not to be seen as 
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conflicting elements, but are actually in harmony;
814
 he observes that a love which 
perpetuates injustice is actually a malformed love.
815
 He highlights this perceived conflict 
between love and justice observing that, in fact, to act out of love is perforce not to treat the 
recipient as one does because justice requires it; rather, he argues, to treat someone as one 
does because justice requires it is perforce not to be acting out of love.
816
 
 
4.3.1 Love on God’s Own Terms.  
 
Wolterstorff claims that agapic love is one not motivated or inspired by that towards which it 
is aimed; it comes from within and is sourced by the lover him/itself.
817
 Since there was and 
is nothing inherently lovable about humans God, from himself, loved them on His own terms 
and for His own reasons. He is not beholding to anyone or anything and also has no need to 
justify the ‘terms and conditions’ of His love. Wolterstorff concludes that it is, quite simply, 
the love of God and a love which is given only in accordance to His own nature and being as 
the God who does not just love, but who is love.
818
  
 
4.3.2 Lex Talionis.  
 
Having established the ontological nature and context of God’s love, Wolterstorff asserts that 
a lex talionis interpretation of the Sermon on the Mount is erroneous. In fact he argues that 
Jesus’ message in the Sermon on the Mount is a direct assault upon lex talionis and the 
reciprocity code.
819
 He critiques scholars upholding this hermeneutic
820
 and insists that not 
only do Jesus’ words in these passages not lend themselves to a literalistic interpretation but 
that they go much further. On these Sermon on the Mount precepts Mayhew notes that if they 
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were to be taken literally and were then invariably to be acted on, justice would be flouted, 
chaos would set in, and evil would come to reign.
821
  
 
Further, Wolterstorff contends that, for instance, when Jesus exhorts people, “Do not resist an 
evildoer”, Jesus is not saying, do not resist an evildoer with violence, but, do not resist an 
evildoer, period.
822
 Conversely, Neufeld argues that mostly Jesus and the New Testament 
writers prohibit physical violence and yet, the pervasive presence of warnings of judgement 
for those who do not live in accordance with the will of God, or who do not confess Jesus as 
Lord and Messiah, are seen to constitute not just the threat of violence in the future but a 
form of verbal violence in the present.
823
 
 
It is reasonable to expect that God would then apply these principles to His own dealings with 
those standing against Him; ultimately represented in the cosmic power-encounter between 
the Satan and God. The Satan is the ultimate, ontological representation of ‘evildoer’ whose 
existence stands counter to God’s purposes. Following this argument and employing 
Wolterstorff’s principle, God would be expected to not repay the Satan in a lex talionis 
fashion and actually not resist him at all – letting him do as he pleases with no consequences 
whatsoever. Or, if ‘Satan’ is presented as a non-personified ‘force’, then letting evil follow its 
own chaotic route with no attempt to ‘rein it in’ or to set parameters within which it must 
operate; for Wolterstorff, therefore, “Evil” must be understood as deprivation of some life-
good.
824
 This, however, contradicts the purposes behind the incarnation of Jesus as a response 
to humanity’s enslavement to sin and the Satan and ultimately to subdue and defeat him 
through active engagement and confrontation via God’s soteriological purposes and plans.825  
 
4.3.3 Diminution of Wellbeing.  
 
Wolterstorff also considers the behaviour that Jesus demonstrated when faced with his own 
arrest, countering Hay’s interpretation826 by observing that Jesus’ response cannot be cited as 
a model of mere non-violent resistance in the face of oppression, but rather that of one who 
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did not resist at all.
827
 Wolterstorff therefore initially appears to have definitively closed the 
door to any kind of active response from either humans or God in the face of persecution or 
aggression. On the other hand, Mayhew asserts that, 
 
 
There are occasions when non-resistance and the acceptance of undeserved suffering may 
have a converting influence. Nevertheless, the bully and the robber and the rapist will 
frequently have to be met by the Christian with force. It would normally be quite wrong 
for the Christian to stand by while the weak are maltreated and to call his attitude an 
expression of the ethical teaching of Jesus.
828 
 
Wolterstorff too, however, apparently allows for the possibility that in some circumstances 
the evildoer might be due to receive some sort of diminution of wellbeing if in so doing it 
ultimately serves the good.
829
 This opens the possibility of presenting God as one who 
primarily baulks at expressing retribution, diminution or violence but who, in extreme 
circumstances, keeps open the option to negatively affect a person’s wellbeing if it is 
undertaken purposefully and for The Ultimate Good.  
 
This empowers divine action, freeing God from a priori inhibition in regard to the scope and 
parameters of His response to an abject evildoer and especially when it is not just any 
evildoer, but the author of chaos and evil himself – the Satan; the enemy of God and all He is 
seeking to achieve. Wolterstorff’s position can be presented as an interpretation of his 
perception of Jesus’ own perspective and intent; that is, if a person is to impose an evil or a 
harm or injury upon someone it must only be as a means to, or a constituent of, a greater 
good.
830
 It is therefore our extrapolation and proposal that if it were to serve the good of 
humanity as a whole through the defeat of someone or something standing counter to God’s 
soteriological purposes then He would be capable and willing to unleash an ultimate, decisive 
and irresistible diminution of the Satan. For this to be efficacious in the countering and 
overthrowing of ontological evil, it would de facto have to be violent in delivery. 
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Wolterstorff proposes the further possibility of diminishing the flourishing of another in his 
contention that in the event of someone inflicting evil the person capable of preventing it is, 
in fact, morally required to do so, even if this interference compromises and diminishes the 
one perpetrating the act.
831
 Rahner endorses this position, stating that,  
 
The principle of the absolute renunciation of force would not… be a Christian principle. 
It would be a heresy which misunderstood the nature of man, his sinfulness and his 
existence as the interplay of persons in the one space of material being. An order of 
freedom would be misunderstood, if it were taken to be an order of things in which force 
was considered reprehensible on principle. A fundamental and universal renunciation of 
physical force of all kinds is not merely impractical. It is also immoral because it would 
mean renouncing the exercise of human freedom, which takes place in the material realm, 
and hence it would mean the self-destruction of the subject who is responsible to God.
832
 
 
4.3.4 Promoting ‘Life-Goods’.  
 
A further extrapolation of this principle from humanity to divinity frees God to exhibit and 
practice force and thereby violence in order to promote the greater, ultimate life-goods of 
humans.
833
 Further, Wolterstorff posits that such acts are necessitated by One who is 
ontologically love, since love requires justice to be demonstrated when it is within the 
beholder’s potential to do so. As an omnipotent being whose nature is love God must impose 
evil (i.e. diminish the flourishing) on one such as the Satan who is both ontologically evil and 
diametrically opposed to God’s soteriological plans.834 Such plans represent, in an ultimate 
sense, the greatest possible ‘life-goods’ imaginable; for God to do other than respond and to 
do so definitively with violence would suggest either His impotence or the lack of an 
ontological core of love to His being.  
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In a caveat to his own rule Wolterstorff includes the addition of an ‘Attitudinal corollary’ 
which states that, “One is never to take delight in imposing evil (diminution in flourishing) on 
someone; when necessary to do so, one is to do so with regret.”835 Jantzen laments that 
‘flourishing’ is a theological concept increasingly ignored or de-prioritized and often 
conceptually relegated into the shadow of salvation. She observes that it would be a strange 
theological dictionary or encyclopaedia that did not have substantial entries on ‘salvation’; 
whereas few, she contends, carry more than a passing reference to ‘flourishing’.836 She 
concedes that the significant exceptions to this emphasis on salvation at the expense of 
flourishing are the theologians of liberation, whether Latin American, Black, or feminist, all 
of whom, she argues, see flourishing as far more central to the Christian message than do 
traditional Eurocentric theologians. In Christian theology in Western modernity, she 
concludes that ‘salvation’ has been a key term whilst ‘flourishing’ has not.837 
 
This focus on the diminution of flourishing, however, is in keeping with the outlook and 
practices of God who, whilst deeming it necessary to violently and irresistibly oppose an evil, 
violent and powerful adversary such as the Satan, nonetheless does so with no inherent 
delight. The act is instead merely the regrettable but entirely necessary means to the essential 
end of removing that which blocks the fulfilment of His eternal soteriological plans for 
humankind; flourishing thereby complete - an evil adversary vanquished.  
 
Section 5 - The Primacy of the Christus Victor Model.  
5.1 Revisiting Christus Victor.  
It will now be argued that the corollary of these two perspectives, on divine violence and the 
Satan’s reality, is that one atonement model, the Christus Victor, presents itself as the only 
one capable of conjoining the two into an explicable framework.
838
 It will be argued that the 
CVM is expansive, inclusive and robust enough to explain and express both what occurred 
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and what was accomplished when Jesus Christ went to the cross to die and be resurrected as 
well as providing a lens through which to view and understand divine violence.
839
  
To avoid the danger of endorsing only extant theological models and thereby de facto 
disregarding historical options such as the CVM, it is essential to consider the original 
context and application of other atonement models. The primary locus of theology and 
Christian understanding and proclamation is not, for Bultmann, the biblical record but the 
contemporaneous cultural context in which the proclamation is made. He argues that much of 
the biblical account of Jesus is mythological talk, easily traced and linked to the 
contemporary mythology of Jewish apocalypticism and Gnostic redemption myths. This 
leads him to conclude that insofar as it is mythological talk it is incredible to men and women 
today because for them the mythical world picture is a thing of the past.
840
 Original context 
and its modern irrelevance is for Bultmann the deciding factor as to the cogence and 
credibility of Christian kerygma.  
On the contrary, it will be shown that ancient theology, including the CVM, remains relevant, 
especially in terms of understanding spirituality, cosmic forces and divine violence, at least 
until there is compelling evidence to suggest otherwise. This rather than simply endorsing a 
de facto overdependence upon the modern as preferable over the ancient; Walker, for 
example, links Christian praxis with acceptance of The Divine Drama in both ancient and 
modern theology claiming that,  
In order to understand how we are to fight the Devil today, we need to realise that our 
fight is directly related to Christ’s own victory over the Evil One. If we push into the 
background God’s warfare with the rebel Lucifer, we are liable to underestimate its 
importance in our own spiritual lives. Some theories of the atonement do precisely this.
841
  
The CVM was, of course, conceived closer to the time and experience of Jesus Christ and his 
original followers; an era conversant and comfortable in dealing with these, by modern 
reckoning, overtly violent and spiritual issues. Indeed, as far back as the second century AD 
Kelly notes of Irenaeus that he is quite clear that Christ redeemed us with His blood and that 
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when using the imagery of our enslavement to the Devil he is prepared to speak of the 
Saviour’s blood as a ransom.842  
Also, in the age of the early Church Fathers, the human predicament was, according to 
Fiddes, frequently understood as that of being oppressed by hostile spiritual powers; people 
lived in fear of the baleful influence of astral deities or of demons who inhabited the natural 
world. The victory of Christ over the Devil and all the powers which threatened the life and 
health of humankind therefore became, he argues, the most popular way of understanding 
atonement.
843
 Conversely Girard, as we have seen, contends that what is instead incumbent 
upon philosophers and theologians is to speak the language of these times, which he contends 
are naturalistic.
844
  
According to Wright, however, in the CVM God set a clear precedent for the Christian and 
the Christian Church in terms of the violent manner of His dealing with spiritual enemies, 
thus advocating the way in which Christian faith should be understood and practiced. He 
argues that,  
The church of Jesus Christ is the church militant. We are engaged in spiritual conflict and 
need to be equipped for this task. To be sure, the conflict is like no other form of battle 
and the weapons quite different from any other weapons. We must re-imagine our notions 
of warfare. Yet the analogy is valid. It would be a pity if embarrassment at the military 
language or misplaced political correctness were to deprive us of the challenge.
845
  
Walker concurs, claiming that Aulén’s attack on the Western development of the doctrine of 
the atonement is irrefutable.
846
 Further, Walker contends that Aulén’s portrayal of the early 
Fathers’ understanding of God’s war with the Devil has been obscured by rejigging the 
expansive, cosmic drama of what he calls the Great Battle into a rather more prosaic legalistic 
framework.
847
 In other words, the macro has been jettisoned in favour of the micro; the 
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dramatic in the stead of the juridical and the cosmic and spiritual for the human and earth-
bound. This ideological and interpretative paradigm shift has incurred huge theological 
ramifications, not least in terms of understanding God’s nature, especially in regard to any 
perceived relationship and engagement with violence He might have.  
The fear of colluding God with violence intrinsic to His being has perhaps also removed the 
possibility of considering whether there might at least be violence that is extrinsic to God’s 
nature and function. This fear has also inverted the importance of that which would come to 
be seen as, at best, His rather ethereal and insubstantial ‘enemy’: the Satan. Indeed, starting 
with Anselm and continuing on into modern representations of PSA there has been a down-
grading of the Satan’s importance; certainly, Anselm was principally concerned, according to 
James, with the relationship of God and humankind, whereas the ransom theories tend to 
concentrate on God and the devil.
848
 
5.1.1 Breaking with Tradition.  
A theological paradigm shift of this kind, including the absolute removal of the potential of 
violence – either intrinsic or extrinsic is, however, out of keeping with a Christian faith that 
had previously readily embraced and kept continuity with Judaic theological principles; 
Hurtado argues that in the early Christian Church understanding of Jesus is accepted along 
broadly Jewish theological lines. He notes that the Christian appropriation of the Jewish 
divine agency category shows a significant mutation in the tradition and in monotheistic 
devotion, whilst insisting that there are nonetheless clear marks of the category being 
appropriated.
849
 In this schema, the Christian conception of the exaltation of Christ 
demonstrates a concern for the uniqueness and supremacy of the one God, as seen in the 
Jewish evidence dealing with chief agents. Christianity is therefore presented as a mutation of 
Judaism rather than an evolution; there is not in other words, for Hurtado, a profound schism 
or divergence between the two.  
Conversely, Dunn, having considered examples of Christian and Jewish understanding of 
intermediate beings between God and man opines that,  
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…if pre-Christian Judaism was already thinking in terms of divine hypostases and 
intermediaries then to that extent Judaism’s monotheism was already diluted or at least 
modified, to that extent precedents were being evolved for a Christian doctrine of Jesus as 
divine mediator, and to that extent room was being made for a Christian doctrine of 
incarnation, that is of a Jesus Christ who was the incarnation of one of these 
‘intermediary beings’.
850
  
The transition of theology from Jewish to Christian is for Dunn, therefore, not a mutation but 
an evolution. 
The first Christians also inherited a dual focus providing the basic framework within which 
Christian thinkers have understood atonement through the ages; within Judaism and 
Christianity, then, atonement involves the establishing of right relationship between God and 
the world through avert confrontation with evil.
851
  
Certainly, such an apparently blatant expression of divine violence is not entirely denied by 
PSA, but is rather subjugated in favour of a primary emphasis on legalism and juridical 
transaction. It has the corollary loss, however, of cogent understanding and engagement with 
both the potential of divine violence, whether intrinsic or extrinsic, or of the primary 
importance of an ontological enemy of God who would need to be confronted and defeated. 
Hanson, for example, criticises PSA for presenting a repulsive view of an incensed, 
provoked, wrathful and indignant deity whose demand for propitiation should be banished 
finally from Christianity, regardless of the degree to which it may figure in other religions.
852
 
PSA therefore certainly acknowledges divine violence but a violence that is destructive and 
negative casting profoundly unbiblical aspersions upon God’s nature. So, instead of a 
redemptive or soteriologically-based violence it is rather a cruel and vindictive violence that 
satisfies God’s own needs rather than over-coming an enemy or primarily freeing an 
incarcerated humanity.  
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The CVM, conversely, provides the required redress of this proposed movement away from 
God as One who, in a positive sense, is at least extrinsically violent and engaging in a 
necessary, mortal and cosmic conflict with an actual enemy that had to be forcefully and 
irrefutably subjugated and defeated. Aulén states, in fact, that a certain double-sidedness is an 
essential feature of the classic idea of the Atonement. On the one hand, he argues, the drama 
of redemption has a dualistic background; God in Christ violently combats and prevails over 
the ‘tyrants’ which hold mankind in bondage. On the other hand, God thereby becomes 
reconciled with the world, enmity is taken away, and a new relation between God and 
mankind is established.
853
  
This is an ineluctable caveat in understanding God’s relationship with violence, both in terms 
of His character and His soteriological modus operandi. It also safeguards against the 
inclinations of PSA to present God’s character in a manner befitting Western conceptions of 
jurisprudence which have, by definition, no place or regard for positive and necessary 
violence; not extrinsic and certainly not intrinsic. Hanson counsels, however, that it would be 
an error to regard God from the perspective of liberal democracy, however strong the 
temptation to do so.
854
 This warning prevents advocates of PSA from a priori rejection of the 
possibility of positive divine violence, especially in response to the interpretative danger of 
prioritising contemporary culture and outlooks above the biblical record, theological tradition 
and history. 
5.1.2 Atonement & Violence.  
Indeed, after outlining the salient features of the three main atonement motifs Boersma 
concedes that whilst the three interpretative strands differ in significant ways it is nonetheless 
essential to note that however God is associated with the cross, whether in terms of a 
demonstration of His love, of punishing His Son, or battling with the Devil – God somehow 
is always associated with violence.
855
 The corollary of this admission, for Boersma, is that 
such association with violence potentially undermines any atonement model. In regard to the 
violence he admits to being naturally inherent in each motif, he nonetheless asserts that each 
model’s respective level of violence is closely assimilated with its claim for validity; the 
higher the level of violence associated with a view, the more likely that it is either illegitimate 
or invalid. Boersma argues that penal substitution is, therefore, de facto the worst kind of 
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metaphor, followed by CVM then, seemingly innocuous in terms of violence, the MIT, which 
though apparently the most hospitable nonetheless, he concedes, still involves God in the 
violence of the cross.
856
   
In regard to sacred violence, or the lack thereof, Finlan considers various approaches to the 
atonement and in particular, their occurrence in Pauline writings. He observes that both the 
problematic aspects of atonement and the effective answer to those problems are found in the 
Bible; concluding that the Bible is part of the problem and most of the solution.
857
 Finlan 
acknowledges the conundrum of presenting a definitive doctrine of atonement - that such is 
difficult, if not impossible, to ascribe. The only option, he proposes, is a ‘working model’ 
acknowledging eclectic, overlapping and aposiopetic elements of this seemingly multifarious 
doctrine.
858
  
Whether dealing with a ‘working model’ or not, deconstruction of the central themes and key 
characters necessary for a basic soteriological and atonement model presents God, the Satan 
and humans as essential, non-negotiable constituents.
859
 A similar simplification of the PSA 
and MIT models likewise forces the concession that the Satan has been either side-lined or 
removed from their doctrines with differing consequences; conversely, to some extent, the 
CVM de-prioritises humans. The result of this synthesis presents the latter as both best and 
preferable model in its ability to make sense of God’s endorsement and utilisation of positive 
violence – whether represented as intrinsic to His being or extrinsic to His actions. By such 
means, it is possible to uphold both divine sovereignty and freedom through a model taking 
seriously original biblical evidence for the Satan as an ontological being and a dangerous and 
powerful enemy of both God and humans. As Watt notes,  
Inherent to the gospel narratives is the presence of Satan and evil. None of the gospels 
can be read without acknowledging the contrasting presence of evil and Satan. The reality 
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of the presence of God in Christ is unfolded in the context of conflict with and eventual 
victory over evil.
860
 
Barth concurs with the primacy of God’s right and ability to choose, stating that God initiates 
the covenant of grace as the beginning of all His works and ways and to destroy the rule of 
the Satan over mankind, thus opposing the kingdom of Jesus Christ to the Satan in triumphant 
superiority.
861
 
For a particular soteriology to be resonant with the original biblical representation of both the 
Satan and God’s use and endorsement of violence, therefore, particularly in regard to 
atonement violence, it is theologically necessary to present the imperative of an ontological 
enemy of God: the Satan. Illustrating this point and further to the biblical quote, “The reason 
the Son of God appeared was to destroy the works of the devil” (1 John 3:8) Wright asserts 
that the removal of this element of conflict from the Gospels would lead to a major 
misunderstanding of the mission of Jesus.
862
 This, of course, is also true of the perception of 
this mission for First Century believers and, more tellingly, for Jesus himself.  
We contend, therefore, that the best way for such an understanding to be presented is through 
the CVM which takes seriously both the original cultural milieu of soteriological theories and 
their expression in a modern context. However profound the problems are regarding 
traditional interpretations of atonement and in particular their association with divine 
violence, it is essential to understand properly and engage thoroughly with the experiences of 
the earliest Christians; denying this historical context promotes, according to Ray, an 
untenable ahistoricism.
863
  
5.2 A Cosmic & Ontological Model.  
Summarising the CVM Boyd, for example, argues that the timeless cosmic significance of 
Christ’s work is ontologically more fundamental than its soteriological significance. He notes 
that the soteriological significance of the cross is the meaning that is perhaps most important 
to human beings and should never be minimized and yet concludes that there can only ever 
be an accurate understanding and appreciation of this significance if it is understood in the 
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context of the cosmic significance of Christ’s actual victory.864 Elsewhere, Boyd notes that 
biblical understanding of spiritual warfare requires, as a central component, a belief in angels, 
Satan and demons as real, autonomous, free agents, as well as a belief that the activity of 
these beings intersects with human affairs, for better or for worse. He accepts, however, that 
many modern people, including many Christian theists, find this belief inherently 
implausible.
865
  
It is this cosmic, ontological element that, for us, further commends the CVM and its unique 
ability to link God’s nature and purposes and His coalescence with positive divine violence. 
Rather than speculating about various ethereal outcomes to the atonement in regard to sin and 
forgiveness, the CVM is instead a model concurrently both metaphorical and yet beyond 
metaphor. It has previously been noted that McFague describes a metaphor as seeing one 
thing as something else, pretending that, “this” is “that” because we do not know how to 
think or talk about “this,” so we use “that” as a way of saying something about it.866 This 
leads to the proposition that metaphorical thinking means spotting a thread of similarity 
between two otherwise dissimilar objects, events, or whatever, one of which is better known 
than the other, and thereby using the better-known as a means of speaking about the lesser 
known.
867
 Whilst this is the case with other atonement models and metaphors, it is our 
contention that uniquely in the CVM “that” is not being used to refer to and explain “this”; 
but in a literal and connected way, “this” - the CVM - is being used to explicate “this” - the 
death and resurrection of Christ and the consequences thereof. It is therefore unequivocally 
the only model that represents an explanation and description of what, in both the broadest 
and most specific theological and cosmological senses, actually happened in the atonement in 
terms of the necessary and violent overcoming of an actual adversary – the Satan.  
Gunton disagrees, stating that it would be overly literalistic to construe the metaphorical 
elements of an understanding of the atonement as a victory as if such language was 
naturalistic. This, he argues, is the problem with those patristic formulations of the atonement 
that are linked with the CVM which wrongly, he claims, overlook the metaphorical nature of 
soteriological language.
868
 In fact, Gunton further notes that only the literal-minded would 
ask the question as to whom was the ransom paid when Christ died on the cross which, he 
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suggests, means that it is usually not the Bible but its interpreters with whom issue ought to 
be taken.
869
  
Conversely, in his consideration of the ransom motif Wright posits that when Jesus sought to 
prepare his followers for a gigantic and previously unimagined vision that he used many 
strands to do so including story, symbol and meaning. These, he argues, are woven together 
so that it becomes difficult to follow a single thread without realizing how tightly it belongs 
to the others as well. When trying to explain how the powers of this world would be held to 
account, therefore, Jesus spoke in terms of giving his life as ‘a ransom for many’ (Mark 
10:45) which, Wright argues, is a concept so outside their worldview that they could not 
understand it; he notes that at this point such was their inability to interpret and comprehend 
that they were not even able to appreciate the fact that when he spoke about his forthcoming 
death, he meant it in a literal, concrete sense.
870
 
Likewise, it might be that other seemingly inexplicable stories and events might also be 
understood more literally. Specifically, for instance, God irresistibly and violently confronts 
evil present in the person of the Satan and forcefully and powerfully overcomes him, 
resulting in the Satan’s defeat and the liberation of humans to whom he had previously laid 
claim, whether legitimately or not. Or as Neufeld puts it in his assessment of the CVM,  
Humanity is not so much ‘bad’ as ‘captive’, not so much perpetrator as victim. Humanity 
is thus less in need of punishment than of liberation or salvation. Humanity is not saved 
from God’s wrath but from Satan’s hold on it.871 
As Athanasius notes, the air is the sphere of the Devil, the enemy of the human race who, 
having fallen from heaven, endeavours with the other evil spirits who shared in his 
disobedience both to keep souls from the truth and to hinder the progress of those who are 
trying to follow it.
872
 In other words, an ontological enemy of God exists and has to be 
defeated in order for humans to be free and salvation won – in this manner, metaphor and 
actuality perichoretically intertwine.   
This representation of Christ’s mission, of atonement and of God’s nature, including positive 
violence - whether intrinsic or extrinsic - and in association with soteriological purposes, 
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finds its culmination and fullest, ontological expression in the CVM. Aulén himself 
synthesises his perspective of the model, stating that,  
The central idea of Christus Victor is the view of God and the Kingdom of God as 
fighting against evil powers ravaging in mankind. In this drama Christ has the key rôle, 
and the title Christus Victor says the decisive word about his rôle.
873
 
It is a model that is not, therefore, ‘once-removed’ from spiritual and ontological reality by 
metaphor or symbol; instead it represents an historical event expressing and marking an 
historical moment in which a spiritual and theological event was actualised. 
This point is illustrated by Placher who observes that Christ is not merely a scapegoat, 
randomly dragged to the Temple for sacrifice, but is a volunteer in the battle against evil; to 
be sure, Placher concedes, there is still suffering, which is celebrated – but not because it is 
good; rather, because it is the agent of the transformation of the world.
874
 Not only a myth, a 
symbol or a metaphor of something that ‘sort of’ happened, but that would remain inevitably 
invisible and impervious to outside observation; but rather a chosen, divine event leading to 
actual transformation in time, space, history and the cosmos. A real model expressing and 
representing reality, that God positively and violently overcomes the Satan – or rather that the 
actual actually exists and does so as an integral part, in fact in symbiosis with, that which it 
actualises.  
5.3 A Violent, Dramatic & Holistic Model.  
Although the CVM provides an explication of soteriology in the overall life of Jesus, this 
does not denigrate the on-going centrality of Christ’s passion. Aulén is right to note that if the 
earthly life of Christ as a whole is to be regarded as a continuous process of victorious 
conflict, it is His death that is the final and decisive battle.
875
 It is only the CVM that sees this 
final event as a battle, or at least presents it in a manner consistent with the normative use of 
warfare terminology.
876
 The CVM presents itself, therefore, as the only model to explain both 
the ontological and cosmic nature of the atonement whilst also engaging with and integrating 
the concept of divine violence.  
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All the atonement models agree that the problem is humankind’s radical and complete falling 
away from God’s best purposes; relationship between them is shattered and division 
engendered, with no possibility of human rectification.
877
 A divine paradigm shift had to 
occur if the way was to be opened for God and humankind to be back in right relations - a 
new epoch had to be heralded. Indeed, the mark of this new era is, according to Moltmann, 
the crucified Christ, or as he calls this event, the specific thing about Christian theology, both 
as regards its identity and as regards its relevance. For Moltmann, Jesus Christ on the cross 
does not merely stamp its content, but rather gives Christian theology its form and its Sitz im 
Leben.
878
 The theological and historical paradigm shift was brought about, for Moltmann, 
through this particular Christ-event and so in regard to an authentically Christian future and 
sense of hope the starting point lies in faith’s fundamental recognition that the anticipation of 
the divine future took place in the crucified Christ.
879
  
In a similar vein, Boyd notes that humans are reconciled because the cosmos has been 
reconciled and this because the rebel powers have been put in their place in order that humans 
can once again be presented “holy and blameless” before God.880 This emphasises the 
spiritual and cosmic nature of the problem and its solution – a situation that only God could 
rectify and then only with the exercise of positive violence, albeit reluctantly and in a 
primarily spiritual context; for God alone can atone, because only God can bear the cost of 
atonement.
881
 
In his explication of what happened in this ‘spiritual context’ Wright notes that when Jesus 
explained the meaning of his forthcoming death, he did not give his followers a theory, 
neither did he give them a set of scriptural texts; instead, he gave them a meal.
882
 This 
Passover meal, Wright contends, was not one in which they only looked backwards to the 
miracles by which God had released the Jews from Egypt; but rather it was a meal which also 
pointed forwards to the great sacrifice by which God would rescue His people from the bonds 
of their ultimate slavery. This, he argues, would be the real Exodus and one in which the 
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tyrant defeated would not be Rome, but rather the dark power standing behind that great, 
cruel empire.
883
  
Wright further delineates what, or rather whom, this ‘dark power’ would be, arguing that 
somehow, Jesus’ forthcoming death will constitute his victory, or rather God’s victory, over 
‘this world’s ruler’, who is not merely the Caesar, but rather the power that stands behind the 
Caesar, using him for its dark, destructive purposes.
884
 Likewise, in assessing salvation in the 
book of Revelation Grimrud observes that the veneer of respectability and claim for divine 
support for the way of empire is torn away and that John’s intent is to reveal the ‘beastly’ 
nature of Rome and thereby to lay bare the actual source of Rome’s power – not God at all 
but the Dragon, the Satan, himself.
885
 
Whereas other atonement theories are by their own definition and understanding 
metaphorical
 
the CVM is instead, we again assert, simultaneously both a metaphor and an 
actual representation of the ontological, cosmic and spiritual reality that there is a Devil who 
reigns and rules over a dark kingdom. On the other hand, Wink, in his consideration of the 
eventual overthrow of various systems, such as Eastern Europe and China, by means of their 
new desire to embrace democracy, compares them to a time when God’s system will replace 
the Domination System, a term which he has previously closely associated with Satan – and 
by  “Satan” he is referring to the world-encompassing spirit of the Domination System.886  
This will be a ‘replacement’, Wink argues, not achieved by violent confrontation, but rather 
by means of a movement whereby increasing numbers of people find themselves drawn 
towards the values of ‘God’s system’.887 This optimistic, humanistic and profoundly 
metaphorical perspective finds a parallel with MIT and is a representation of a means by 
which God will ‘overcome’ a conceptual evil via a bloodless and peaceful ‘coup’; there is, of 
course, no ontological enemy for Wink and therefore no need to confront and defeat this 
‘adversary’ in anything other than a metaphorical sense. 
Conversely, we assert that in his Virgin Birth, life, teaching, example, death and resurrection 
and not at the cross as an isolated event, Christ actually overcame and defeated this being, the 
Satan, literally and violently wresting back from him the humans that he had previously 
                                                             
883
 Wright, Simply, 176-177.  
884
 Wright, Simply, 178. 
885
 Grimsrud, Atonement, 222. 
886
 Wink, Engaging, 9. 
887
 Wink, Engaging, 58. 
194 
 
owned through their conscious disobedience and concomitant slavery. This macro-narrative 
element represents another key constituent of the CVM which differentiates it from other 
atonement models in that it is not only concerned with the events of Jesus’ passion, 
crucifixion and resurrection.
888
 Instead, the CVM acknowledges and expresses every single 
aspect of Christ’s life – from incarnation to resurrection - and presents them as being 
fundamentally about one thing: victoriously manifesting the loving kingdom of God over and 
against the destructive, oppressive kingdom of the Satan.
889
  
It is, therefore, not a doctrine of a moment or of a singular event, a mere time-specific 
theological proposition; rather it is a dramatic, dynamic and all-encompassing narrative of a 
seen life and an unseen spiritual reality
890
 – the human and the divine realms conjoined and 
symbiotically linked in an expression of ultimate duality. This rather than the cosmology 
claimed by Bultmann who contends that the cosmology of the New Testament is essentially 
mythical in character and that the world is presented there as a three-storied structure, with 
the earth in the centre, the heaven above, and the underworld below.
891
  
This ‘structure’ is populated, according to Bultmann, with various celestial beings, the angels 
above and hell below as a place of torment. Even the earth, he states, is not merely a place of 
natural, everyday events but is rather the scene of supernatural activity. His simplification of 
New Testament cosmology is an overstatement of extant views illustrating his thesis that first 
century understanding of the universe was at best naïve and at worst abjectly erroneous in 
correctly understanding the world as it really is; in other words, how secular people and 
liberal Christians perceive it today. 
The CVM, therefore, presents a compelling and dramatic account of God and His character, 
including His use and expression of violence, as well as His purposes and in a manner which 
surpasses the theological scope of any other atonement model. It is this holistic quality, in 
fact, that commends it in regard to its expression of the full sweep of salvation history, inter-
related and inter-dependent as part of a holistic soteriological picture and not one which 
limits atonement to a momentary theological ‘snap-shot’.  
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Further, it also makes sense of salvation as a narrative, a story with a symbiotic beginning, 
middle and conclusion, re-affirming the theological truth of the unity of otherwise seemingly 
separate, disparate and supposedly unrelated elements of Christ’s life, ministry, death, 
resurrection and purposes.
892
 Thusly, Gregory of Nazianzus’ comment on the purpose of the 
incarnation - that God, by forcefully overcoming the tyrant, might set us free and reconcile us 
with Himself through His Son - can be contextually understood, both in its original setting 
and its modern representation.
893
  
The CVM therefore does more than merely provide understanding and insight into the 
atonement; like one of its descriptors, the Dramatic Model, it presents the atonement of Christ 
as more than something which occurred only in the last week of his life on earth. Instead the 
CVM is an atonement model which focuses upon God – what He set up, what He won back 
and how His purposes are always fulfilled regardless of what the Satan or humanity does to 
oppose Him. The fulfilling of these purposes will be accomplished by whatever means are 
necessary, even when these means run counter to God’s own, expressed ideals in terms of His 
character and predicates. This is the case in terms of the atonement when, against His own 
ontology of love, he nonetheless utilises positive violence as not merely the best, but the only, 
means by which humans can be set free from the Satan’s ownership and grasp, whether 
legitimate or not.  
We conclude, therefore, that the CVM is the only interpretation of Jesus Christ’s crucifixion 
which holds together and explicates the full interpretative weight and otherwise divergent and 
mutually exclusive elements of God’s character in regard to positive divine violence and the 
existence and necessary defeat of an actual enemy. It is not merely the best or primary means 
of interpreting the atonement; it is, in fact, the only way the atonement can be expressed 
ontologically and without the concurrent dis-acknowledgement, denial or loss of both 
positive divine violence and of an ontological, evil enemy of God in the Satan.
894
 
                                                             
892
 See Walker, Telling, 13-14, for a nine-point overview of the Gospel’s elements in ‘grand narrative’ form. 
893
 “Holiness had to be brought to man by the humanity assumed by one who was God, so that God might 
overcome the tyrant by force and so deliver us and lead us back to himself through the mediation of his Son.” St. 
Gregory Nazianzen, Oration 45, 9, 26.  
894
 Considering the role of theology, Bell observes that important though it is for it to engage with the narrated 
world and the telling of myths it also needs to do work on myths; thereby engaging with the discussed world in 
which it is necessary for theology to articulate the ontological status of the Satan. In this manner, theology will 
be able to form a bridge across from mythology to metaphysics. Bell, Deliver, 116. We contend that the CVM 
and the manner of its understanding and engagement with the Satan is an important element in building this 
‘bridge’.  
196 
 
Final Conclusion.  
 
We have demonstrated throughout this thesis that the theological task of ascertaining the 
degree to which God is associated with, or utilises force and violence is, of course, fraught 
with controversy and difficulties. In order to reach a position from the evidence rather than 
prior to it, however, it has been shown that it is essential to be free of presupposition and 
agenda that might otherwise colour or influence the parameters and context of theological 
reflection and exploration. Hart notes that,  
 
As in christology we cannot simply construct a portrait of the human Jesus rooted in our 
own perceptions of empirical humanity, but must always reckon with those things which 
differentiate his humanity from ours, precisely because it is in these very elements that his 
revelatory and salvific significance resides, so too in this matter of theological definition, 
while our starting point must inevitably be with our own creaturely and sinful perceptions 
and experience of love, fatherhood, righteousness and the rest, we must expect and allow 
the limits of these perceptions to be ruptured and their content to be transformed as they 
refer us beyond the ordinary and familiar to the humanity of God, and beyond still, to 
God’s own life and being.895   
 
It is this endeavour to understand and explicate God’s ‘own life and being’, rather than the 
projection of human mores and post-modern perspectives and sensibilities upon God, in 
regard to force and violence, that is central to this thesis.  
 
All too often the proposition that God is love negates even the possibility of entertaining 
divine violence whether intrinsically, extrinsically, ontologically, functionally or as an 
attribute.
896
 This position, however, repudiates a full and thorough understanding of God and 
the complexity of His nature and how He has revealed Himself historically through the 
Scriptures. Barth, for instance, upholds the biblical tension between freedom and love as the 
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basic and foundational concept in the doctrine of the divine essence and attributes, not the 
thought of love alone.
897
  
 
This freedom can be exercised by God in any manner He sees fit, including His divine right 
to freely choose to manifest power, force, violence and perhaps, as we considered, even 
abuse, in order to fulfil His soteriological purposes. This freedom is essential for the 
accomplishment of God’s plans and as Rahner notes, the exercise of freely chosen divine 
power is not irrelevant to salvation – rather, it is a process either of salvation or perdition.898 
Rahner observes that since might is a real characteristic and natural creation of God it is not, 
in and of itself, simply sinful and anti-god. Rather, he notes, it is because it is a natural divine 
creation that it can be used for good ends as well as being perverted to serve sinful ones.
899
 
Finally, because it is a characteristic creation of God’s it is also one that cannot be suppressed 
whilst this world lasts – it cannot ever be eliminated.900 Might, force and violence are here to 
stay – how they might be utilised by God and humans is beyond the scope of this thesis - 
what is clear is that they will not cease to be associated with God and His activity simply by 
theological denial.   
 
Throughout this thesis, therefore, it has been demonstrated that atonement, understood as the 
reconciling, redeeming, liberating activity of God in Christ, is an essential Christian belief.
901
 
Further, and more pertinently, the subject of the atonement is absolutely central to Christian 
theology; directly related to the perception of God’s nature and, in our case, to what degree 
violence, whether intrinsic or extrinsic, is evident.
902
   
In regard to the current theological milieu and in particular the practice of selectively 
accepting particular Scriptures to the exclusion of others, with their perceived erroneous 
concomitant theologies and perspectives, Marcion provides a helpful illumination to our 
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thesis.
903
 It is our contention that, in one form or another, Christian theology risks falling into 
various manifestations of conscious or unconscious neo-Marcionitism.
904
 This is not to say 
that an individual theologian would be actively pursuing a Marcionite perspective; instead it 
is that whether or not they were consciously advocating Marcionite hermeneutics they would 
nonetheless be following a similarly selective methodology. The impending danger is the 
rejection or at least reinterpretation of those parts of Scripture, in a Marcionite manner, that 
present a view of God that is thought to be unpalatable or does not fit into a pre-ordained 
theological perspective. Enslin notes of Marcion, for instance, that he made a choice between 
a God he liked and one he did not; then simply choosing to accept and worship the one that 
met his own sensibilities whilst vilifying and rejecting the one that did not. For Marcion, 
therefore,  
 
The true God, the hitherto undivulged God of love, who is himself goodness and love and 
who desires love and faith from men, was thus totally other than the wrathful, jealous, 
and capricious God of the Jewish Scriptures, who demanded from his worshipers (sic) not 
love and faith but fear and obedience couched in terms of outward righteousness.
905
  
 
Such an outlook, of course, could include consideration and acceptance of divine violence.  
  
We have rejected such neo-Marcionite perspectives and instead, when encountering 
compelling but challenging notions of God’s nature, such as intrinsic or extrinsic violence, 
we have, at the very least, been open to its consideration and thereby its potential 
incorporation into a broader schema. This has facilitated a more textured and nuanced view 
of God, including His extrinsic use of violence, as revealed in the Judaeo-Christian canonical 
Scriptures. It has been a demanding methodology and yet one inclined to present a robust and 
authentically biblical account of God in whose image humans are made. This chosen route is 
posited as opposed to one in which there is a deconstruction and subsequent reconstruction of 
a god made in the image of humans according to their era, denomination, outlook, 
predispositions, sensibilities and preferences.  
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As we have shown, in fact, every atonement theory, model or motif has inevitably leant upon 
and drawn from its extant social structure so that, for instance, in the eleventh century 
Anselm’s view of debt payment was set in the historical milieu of medieval feudalism.906 In a 
similar vein, Gorringe adds that Anselm witnessed the birth of a new world that was reflected 
in his work and that the field of law, in particular had an obvious bearing on his theology.
907
 
Gunton, on the other hand, notes that not only was this not actually the case but, in fact, 
exactly the opposite is true in that the feudal rulers duty was to maintain the order of rights 
and obligations without which society would collapse and, Gunton argues, Anselm’s God is 
understood to operate analogously for the universe as a whole: as the upholder of universal 
justice.
908
  
For Ray, however, the Anselmian model includes a purely juridical notion of justice and one, 
she asserts, that is untempered by love or compassion; indeed, as a result of the original 
rebellion, obedience becomes the prerequisite of love.
909
 Southern accepts that Anselm’s 
thesis could stand on its own with every trace of feudal imagery removed whilst also 
conceding that his arguments were nonetheless clearly coloured by the social arrangements 
that surrounded him.
910
 The point is that every theologian and every theology is de facto 
subject to environment, culture and worldview, with the corollary that each current atonement 
model is invariably adjudged by some in the following era to be defunct, redundant or 
worse.
911
  
Consequentially, both subliminally and overtly the culturally extant, socially and 
theologically acceptable parameters within which understanding God’s nature occurs 
inevitably take centre-stage; necessarily dominating and subjugating all other modes of 
perception and interpretation. Belousek, for example, argues that the overriding paradigm in 
post-modern culture is that of retribution. It is this principle, he argues, that provides the 
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rationale for an understanding of justice, capital punishment, just war and, theologically, for 
PSA.
912
  
Rather, therefore, than endorsing a particular perspective on the atonement (or indeed on any 
theological position) because of a pre-held tradition or stance there must instead be awareness 
and engagement with the relevant issues and the context in which each era does its theology 
coupled with close consideration of what the theology is responding to.
 
Certainly, the history 
of dogma and doctrine is not one without nuance and texture. In regard to the ‘Arian 
Controversy’ of the fourth century, for example, Hanson concedes that this term itself is 
flawed and represents an over-simplification of both the theological debates and the historical 
context of the time. These caveats aside, he nonetheless acknowledges that the ideas of Arius, 
whether or not they explicitly found their genesis with him or not, forced the Christian 
Church and its theologians to address issues on both monotheism and the worship of Jesus as 
divine being, which might otherwise have remained unresolved.  
The theologians of the Christian Church were slowly driven to a realization that the 
deepest questions which face Christianity cannot be answered in purely biblical language, 
because the questions are about the meaning of the biblical language itself. In the course 
of this search the Church was impelled reluctantly to form dogma.
913
 
Only when these concerns are properly acknowledged and addressed will it be possible to 
avoid jettisoning, in a wholesale manner, all that has gone before; wrongly ascribing all 
ancient theology to be terminally culture-bound and therefore redundant to a post-modern 
world, its sensibilities and worldview.
914
 Even by the time Christianity was introduced into 
Black Africa in the fourth decade of the nineteenth century, for instance, the worldview of the 
Christian theologian retained only a veneer of the biblical worldview. It had become, 
according to Imasogie, a ‘quasi-scientific worldview’ and whilst the Christian missionary 
might still mouth references to demon possession, angels and spiritual forces they did so with 
diminished emotional overtones.
915
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Instead of embracing such an unqualified bias for that which is perceived to be the new at the 
expense of the ‘old’, acknowledgement must be made that history might, in fact, turn full 
circle in its perceptions; in this case - of the metaphysical. Consequently, older theological 
models might yet maintain relevance today in their means of understanding and expressing 
the atonement. More pertinently for our thesis is the further issue of God’s nature and in 
particular the place of extrinsic violence in the divine economy; it might transpire to be that 
these ‘older models’ have as much or even more theological and praxiological insight than 
when first posited. Boyd, for example, argues that in the majority of global cultures there is 
now an increasing appreciation and validation of what he calls the “commonsense” 
assumption that the world is not simply physical. There are now instead, he notes, fresh 
attempts at giving nonreductionistic interpretations to the nearly universal conviction that 
reality is both physical and spiritual, visible and invisible, and that these two dimensions are 
two sides of the same coin.
916
 
So, theology has always necessarily been produced within an extant cultural context and 
worldview and also often appears in response to a particular party, perspective, issue or group 
of its day. Ferdinando, notes for example that,  
Many Western interpreters have responded to Biblical demonology with attempts to 
contextualise it in such a way that it still has something to say within the rationalistic 
worldview. Such hermeneutical manoeuvres normally entail a reinterpretation of the 
language of demons such that its referents are understood in terms of tangible realities in 
the material world.
917 
Rare, therefore, is the theological dictum that comes about in an initiating manner, merely 
through the desire of a particular theologian to embark upon theological speculation for its 
own sake. Instead, most, if not all, historic, orthodox Christian theology has emerged because 
of a pre-existing heterodoxy or worldview that required countering.
 
There have, of course, 
been multifarious instances of this phenomenon; suffice it to allude to one representative case 
in the form of Newbigin’s response to the secularism, pluralism and humanism he 
encountered in England on his return from cross-cultural missionary work in India. In 
delineating his method for engaging with these societal elements he asserts that, “…it is quite 
certain that long-established dogma only gives way to critical attack when that attack is based 
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on some other beliefs. Criticism does not come out of a vacant mind.”918 This being the case, 
one of the pressing issues for Christian theology becomes the quest to ascertain what the 
current heterodoxy, worldview or issue is that must be engaged with, responded to and 
answered.  
Each era or group of course has a natural, contextual propensity towards particular outlooks 
and outcomes, for instance, Twenty First Century America’s favour of Capitalism and a Star 
Trek fan’s preference for science fiction as a literary genre. In the same manner theologians, 
who are predominantly and stereotypically stylised as conservative, intelligent, literate, 
logical, male, academic, diligent, white and middle class (to name but a few generalising 
traits) tend to favour a theological schema perceived as logical, consistent and juridical.  
Gorringe argues, in fact, that from Anselm onwards satisfaction and sacrifice have been read 
together, and sacrifice has therefore been understood as propitiation. Even today, he 
contends, such a connection is felt by many Christians to be self-evident and thereby a 
testament to the power of the intellectual and emotional structures which have reinforced 
retributive theory.
919
 Further, Ray notes in her panegyric to feminist thought and ideology 
that traditional Christian theology has been revealed to be androcentric and that,  
Beginning with the recognition that theological doctrines and traditions have been shaped 
almost exclusively by men, whose ideas and interpretations have been erroneously 
promoted as value-free and universally applicable, feminists and other contextual 
theologians have further noted that these ideas and interpretations inevitably reflect the 
experiences and interests of their authors, who tend to be members of society’s educated 
elite.
920 
Conversely, followers of the more metaphysical and, by implication, less academic Christus 
Victor model might equally then be characterised by said theologians as at best old-fashioned 
and caught in a long-distant worldview and at worst as subjective, sensual, non-theologians 
who are more interested in feelings, drama and subjective experiences than theological facts 
and theories. In his assessment of Aulén’s understanding of New Testament language for that 
which holds humans in bondage and about the demonic in general Gunton, for example, 
concludes that the texts present the reader not with superhuman hypostases ‘trotting about the 
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world’, but rather with what he calls the metaphorical characterisation of moral and cosmic 
realities which would otherwise defy expression.
921
 
To counter such negative ascriptions, more credence should be given to those eras and 
theologians, both Jewish and Christian, who risked bloodshed and pain for their beliefs, thus 
forging their theology in a crucible of suffering, in response to victimisation and attempted 
subjugation. Volf argues that it is slightly too arrogant to presume that contemporary 
sensibilities about what is compatible with God’s love are so much healthier than those of the 
people of God throughout the whole history of Judaism and Christianity. He further contends 
that in a world of violence it would, in fact, not be worthy of God not to wield the sword; if 
God were not angry at injustice and deception and did not make the final end to violence, 
Volf concludes, God would not be worthy of human worship.
922
 Volf’s self-stated intention is 
not, therefore, to demonstrate that God’s violence is unworthy of God, but rather that it is 
beneficial to humans.    
Having a theology set in antiquity and forged in suffering does not, of course, in itself 
guarantee theological orthodoxy and yet it should at least earn the respect of an undoubtedly 
more privileged era of academic theologians. This might equate, quite simply, to the 
acceptance that it is arrogant to de facto cast historical theology aside in preference for 
contemporary theology with its distinct agendas and a primary desire to protect its 
denominational base. For example, some modern outlooks lead to predetermined 
representations of God and the atonement from the theological setting of predominantly non-
violent and pacifistic frameworks.
923
 Blumenthal notes that the choice to erase certain biblical 
themes is, however, both necessary and inevitable for certain groups on what they see as 
‘spiritual grounds’. He cites the instance of the Quaker, Ellwood924, who after compiling a 
group of violent biblical passages disavows them in an act of piety, claiming that ultimately 
for the Friends it is not the written page but the Light within that provides final authority on 
God and theology.
925
 Such methodology, claiming that unpalatable actions cannot represent 
the true God or be scriptural is unsophisticated, suppressing the difficult side of both human 
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and divine being and thereby the personalist image which, Blumenthal concludes, is the bond 
between God and humanity.
926
 
On the contrary, instead of allowing any consideration to predetermine theological 
perspective and understanding it is our contention, especially in the context of such a 
contentious issue, that theology must let God be the God that the canonical Scriptures reveal 
regardless of any fallout or controversies engendered. An extreme representation of this 
methodology is proposed by Atlan who, in his consideration of referring to God in relation to 
the struggle against violence, concludes that it is perhaps more economical, indeed more 
effective and less dangerous, to refer to the God of violence rather than the God of love.
927
 In 
stating the stark contrast between ‘the God of violence’ and ‘the God of love’ Atlan does not 
oppose the two, but rather uses the phrase ‘the God of violence’ to refer to a God who takes 
upon Himself what he calls the ‘founding violence’ and is therefore not ‘entirely love’ in 
relation to the world.
928
 
In a similar, but less stark assertion, we therefore present God as One who is ontologically 
love, but crucially is both capable and willing to use and utilise extrinsic violence, even when 
this is against His best intention and desire when this is required; in the majority of biblical 
instances this will especially be manifest for His soteriological purposes. Boersma illustrates 
our contention, noting that,  
Violence can be a positive expression of love. But this is not to say that violence is so 
pervasive as to lie at the heart of the created order or of human culture. Human (as well as 
divine) acts of hospitality may be characterized by the presence of some degree of 
violence, but these acts are still acts of hospitality as long as the violence is limited to that 
which is justifiable in the interest of the absolute hospitality of the eschatological 
future.
929  
The ends for Boersma, therefore, justify the means; whilst another attempt to square this 
theological circle of God’s ontology of love and His use of extrinsic violence has come from 
feminist theologians who oppose traditional atonement models as being both male-orientated 
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and supportive of abuse.
930
  Critiquing this perspective it has been observed that their 
argument is not expanded with biblical scholarship, background in cultic theology, 
metaphorical appropriation of cultic images or any history of the phases of doctrinal 
development.
931
 Feminist appeals of this kind, it is contended, are thereby not enough on their 
own to provide grounds for a new theology; it is instead necessary to give a sustained account 
of how and why these doctrines originally emerged. Strong biblical scholarship is therefore 
needed and the case against traditional atonement cannot be argued with ethical instincts 
alone, otherwise there is little mooring or depth to the new theologizing.
932
   
Ironically, in his judgements Finlan utilises the very methods he condemns, pre-concluding 
that the RCVM is a ‘crazy-making’ theology leading to a false representation of God’s ‘true’ 
character whilst producing suicidal saints and rage-dominated parental figures who think they 
are helping their children by beating them.
933
 Any theologian claiming to be consistent to a 
clarion call to Good Theology, however, needs to be cautious about ascribing any atonement 
model as ‘unpalatable’ in such an a priori manner. Instead, it is irrelevant whether a particular 
theology or doctrine is perceived to be unpalatable or difficult; Christian theology does not 
have to pass human tests of acceptability in order to be deemed orthodox. Rather, as argued 
against some feminist theologians, what is required is a vigorous process of appropriate 
research and an unwillingness to give in to emotional agendas or a priori positions.
   
 
Perhaps both of these charges can be made against Spence who, in his critique of a 
soteriological model based on victory and power, as seen in CVM, concludes that conversely 
the notion of biblical peace has to do with reconciliation with God, between humans and with 
creation. His own understanding of the biblical evidence facilitates what he argues to be the 
sort of peace that is brought about by a mediator not a SWAT team, or rather one whose 
holocaust has the fragrance of a lamb-offering rather than the smell of cordite.
934
 
A process of this kind, however, does not and must not de facto disallow linking extrinsic 
violence with a God who has, as we have demonstrated, long endorsed, embraced and utilised 
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it, both in a cosmic and historical context. A corollary of this perspective, which has in fact 
become the prolegomena, is the focus not on whether God has extrinsic violence as an 
element of His being, but rather what consequences might follow for humans who, as a result 
of their view of divine violence, seek to thereby endorse violence or use it themselves.
 
In a 
modern representation of this argument, Northey makes a claim against Boersma’s 
argument.
935
 Boersma, Northey contends, introduces into his reading of the atonement a 
concept of ‘violence at the boundaries’ which, Northey argues, is simply not evident in the 
founding texts.
936
 Northey then concludes that,  
If violence is the ultimate addiction of the human race, Boersma with most of his 
Reformed and Western theological colleagues would not join Violence Anonymous – or 
the church! – to learn the ways and practices of abstention from it.937 
This concern that an advocation of divine violence will potentially cause human violence and 
perhaps especially Christian violence, has been prevalent for many centuries. It has, in fact, 
caused some to jettison the notion or potential of divine violence for fear of the praxiological 
ramifications that might be incurred. In his assessment of the Church in relation to Knights 
and chivalry in the medieval period Kaeuper notes that it was both sheer necessity as well as 
intellectual heritage which gave the medieval Church a tradition of ideas which opposed 
some but not all violence; further, he claims, even within Christendom none could doubt that 
the evils inherent in an imperfect world would require the use of armed force in their 
solution, as they always had.
938
 Certainly a Church which embraces, to one degree or another, 
the notion and potential advocation of violence is potentially open to being used as a wing of 
the secular state in its desire to resolve difficult issues. Kaeuper concedes that whilst clerical 
theory accepted violence for right causes and not for wrong it remains a distinction that is 
tricky to make at the best of times, and especially so in an imperfect world.
939
 
This is undoubtedly a controversial theological issue and a conclusion is not to be entered 
into lightly or without due diligence to biblical and historical evidence; remaining conscious, 
but not led by, potential praxiological consequences that such opinions might incur. The 
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biblical witness to a violent God, albeit extrinsic violence, has nonetheless often been used to 
encourage and justify innumerable human acts of violence not least, for instance, that 
perpetrated in the current so-called ‘war on terror’.940 This corollary cannot be overlooked 
and yet neither can it be allowed to hold primary influence, thereby adversely affecting the 
formulation and structure of a theological position - especially not in an a priori manner.  
Indeed, in regard to an adherent’s praxiology the three primary monotheistic world religions 
(Christianity, Islam and Judaism) have at their core a religious metaphor grown into a 
psychological archetype that legitimates violence in the grossest imaginable forms, justifying 
it on the grounds of divine order and behaviour.
941
 Nelson-Pallmeyer observes that violence-
of-God traditions are, in fact, the very heart of the Bible, representing an ‘elephant in the 
room’ of which nobody dares speak.942 For there to be progress in understanding the truth of 
such a controversial issue the Church and theology have to be forthright,
943
 battles of old re-
examined and perhaps re-fought, especially in regard to the atonement and God’s nature, 
including violence and the purpose and perception of a dualistic worldview.  
Once theology has re-presented its beliefs on Jesus Christ, the man from Nazareth, crucified 
under Pontius Pilate and the cornerstone of Christian faith it must demonstrate the 
praxiological consequences of these outlooks. Moltmann asserts that throughout history the 
crucified Christ challenges Christian theology and the Church which dares to call itself by his 
name.
944
 In re-considering ancient atonement theories, divine violence and the reappraisal of 
the ontological nature of evil and the demonic realm, the challenge for theology is all-
encompassing and culturally pertinent.   
The Church and its theology therefore continually face choices as to whether their 
perspectives will be defined primarily by modern sensibilities or by the biblical record and 
historical theology. So, it should be noted that whilst modern sensibilities might baulk at 
affirming the ontological reality of the Satan and the demonic realm the New Testament does 
not share these concerns. Indeed, Bell claims that the New Testament assumes that the devil 
“exists” every bit as much as it assumes that God “exists”.945 More in keeping with the extant 
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‘received wisdom’ of Western Christian theology, however, Cupitt, in an open letter to the 
Archbishops, Bishops and members of the General Synod of the Church of England 
celebrates what he calls the ‘liberation of mankind’ from demonological and similar beliefs, 
which since the Reformation and the rise of modern science has been a great blessing.
946
 
In such a theological context, non-violent doctrines can de facto appear more appealing than 
violent ones and are thereby pursued as a ‘best choice’ to avoid the kind of ‘challenges’ that 
Moltmann regales.
947
 An a priori irenic and non-violent route therefore prioritises palatability 
and accessibility above the content of a doctrine. Finlan argues, for instance, that if the 
Gospel could be communicated without violent metaphors, there may be people who will 
receive this message with joy, whose faith will be reborn.
948
 Undoubtedly, some would 
embrace such a Gospel – conversely others, however, would reject it on the same terms. The 
issue, therefore, must not primarily be one of popularity, presentation and palatability, but of 
actuality. 
In his consideration of the quest to achieve an attractive and plausible rationale of human 
interaction with the world in language and to avoid the choice between ‘objectivist’ and 
‘subjectivist’ epistemologies, Gunton concludes,  
That is not to deny, however, that a choice of some kind is required, for it must be true 
that, finally, we are either talking about something beyond the structures of the human 
mind or we are not. We may see the world through such structures and with their 
assistance, but unless it is the world we see, our position is finally completely subjectivist 
or even solipsist.
949 
Therefore, whether people will be better disposed towards the message should never be the 
defining concern as to how theology is approached in terms of understanding and defining the 
Gospel. There is always a danger in ‘letting go’ of certain doctrines and beliefs950 but there is 
the further hazard of redefining theology or the biblical record in order to match and appeal to 
extant cultural liberal sensibilities.  
Another problem causing interpretative labours to explain away the characterization of God 
as a divine being linked with extrinsic violence is the increasing awareness of the abusive 
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character of religion itself in the name of God.
951
 This is an understandable consideration and 
yet one that ultimately remains irrelevant to the ascription of attributes to God; it is primarily 
concerned with modern cultural mores and of their being erroneously and anachronistically 
placed into ancient biblical perspectives.  
Žižek challenges this kind of practice in his observations on the contemporary perception of 
mercy, turning the argument of anti-death penalty advocates around who claim that it is an 
act of arrogance to punish or kill other human beings. Instead, he argues that what is truly 
arrogant and sinful is to assume the prerogative of mercy. Who amongst ordinary mortals, he 
reflects, especially those who are not the culprit’s immediate victim, has the right to erase 
another’s crime or to treat it with leniency. He contends that such a role can only be fulfilled 
by God and that only He can erase another’s guilt, concluding that the duty of humans is to 
act according to the logic of justice and to punish crime. In fact, not to do so entails what he 
calls the true blasphemy of elevating oneself to the level of God, of being seen to act with His 
authority.
952
 Žižek therefore ignores current social perceptions and mores, instead reaffirming 
the primacy of God’s timeless authority over contemporary human concerns, issues and 
cultural outlooks. 
In response to this argument that there might be a correspondence between divine action and 
human behaviour Volf counters that the thesis has one small but fatal flaw: humans are not 
God; he further notes that,  
There is a duty prior to the duty of imitating God, and that is the duty of not wanting to be 
God, of letting God be God and humans be humans. Without such a duty guarding the 
divinity of God the duty to imitate God would be empty because our concept of God 
would be nothing more than the mirror image of ourselves.
953
 
The proposition that God entertains or utilises power, force and extrinsic violence certainly 
has profound and far-reaching praxiological implications for Christian and Church.
954
 It is 
important to recognise with Turner therefore the difference between Christian passivism and 
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Christian pacifism.
955
 This is also true of God, who on innumerable occasions intervenes in 
history in a demonstrative and sometimes violent manner, to protect those who cannot protect 
themselves. Turner therefore concurs with Žižek when concluding that, “To surrender our 
rights is one thing, to surrender the rights of others is to surrender what it is not ours to 
give.”956 Mayhew further observes that force may indeed lead to violence, neither of which 
will, themselves, build up the kingdom of God. On the other hand, he argues that a failure to 
use force may lead to cruel repression rather than to God’s kingdom; the great offence against 
human and Christian values, according to Mayhew, and which may require Christians and 
others to employ force is therefore injustice.
957
 
Whether a particular theological position might or might not lead to negative praxiology has, 
however, no bearing whatsoever on the search for God’s nature and functions. This remains a 
concern, however, for Juergensmeyer who addresses the affect that theological perspectives 
have on those with an agenda of violence. He asserts that for those ascribing violence to God 
there is no need to compromise an individual’s goals in a struggle that has been waged in 
divine time and with the promise of heaven’s rewards. There is also no need, he argues, to 
contend with society’s laws and limitations when one is obeying a higher authority; in 
spiritualizing violence, he concludes, religion has given terrorism a remarkable power.
958
 
Whilst these concerns are real we nonetheless contend that a theology primarily born out of 
extant human outlooks, concerns and considerations would be a great deal worse than 
worthless, defined by emotions rather than biblical evidence, by feelings and fears rather than 
by theological outlooks and evidence. If it is therefore concluded that God’s nature 
incorporates violence this must be expressed with no attendant attempt to re-define Him and 
His character in a manner more acceptable or palatable for those preferring a gentler, kinder 
and more ‘safe’ God. Instead, theology must be articulated in terms of what is found and not 
led by any a priori agendas and perspectives that are brought. This will curtail the current 
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desire or inclination to re-model Him, His character or His purposes in terms which might be 
perceived to be more pleasant, expedient and comfortable for a post-modern audience. 
In a chapter entitled ‘Defending God’s Behavior (sic) in the Old Testament’, Siebert notes, 
before assessing the various means that have been presented, that one of the primary reasons 
so many people find God’s behaviour in the Old Testament unsettling is because it does not 
conform to their fundamental beliefs about God as being good, loving and fair; going on to 
ask whether these beliefs about God are actually unwarranted or, at least, overstated - 
concluding that it might actually be the case that God is both good and bad, just and unjust, 
loving and abusive.
959
 
On another issue that might be difficult for some to consider, let alone accept, Boyd asks 
whether such a modern audience might find it too much to consider the possibility that angels 
and one fallen angel in particular might be centrally relevant to understanding evil in the 
world. He argues that, in fact, it is not asking too much and neither is it apologetically 
disastrous.  
To the contrary, in this present climate such a postmodern (and yet biblical) approach 
will, if anything, be prima facie judged by many as inherently compelling. Far from being 
a liability, the supernatural dimension within the warfare worldview may increasingly be 
one of its strongest apologetic features. Indeed, it is likely that future theologies and 
theodicies that persist in operating within the narrow structures of modern Western 
naturalistic categories will increasingly find themselves irrelevant to Western minds.
960
 
Our conclusion is that God is and has always been embroiled in extrinsic violence and 
necessarily so, since without it there would be no possibility of Him overcoming a 
definitively, and perhaps even ontologically, violent adversary in the Satan.
961
 Just as Adolf 
Hitler and the Third Reich
962
 would not have been placated and defeated by love, good will 
and committees, so the Satan would not be defeated by love alone, but only by a forceful, 
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robust and irresistible love that manifests itself in the bloody, gory, violent and victorious 
death of Jesus Christ.
963
 
We have shown it to be incontrovertible that God has, throughout history, demonstrated His 
reluctant willingness to do whatever is necessary, culturally intelligible and appropriate in 
order to fulfil his purposes. In the Old Testament this meant responding with explicit but 
extrinsic violence in a culture drenched in blood and inculcated in war. Indeed, in his 
assessment of God’s activities in the Old Testament, Gibson notes of the examples he cites of 
God behaving ‘very unpleasantly indeed’, that he has simply spelt out what the text itself 
says. He claims to have not read anything into the stories that is not already there; concluding 
that the only way to make these Scriptures acceptable to modern perceptions of God is to do 
‘quite a bit of doctoring’.964 
Further, in the New Testament Jesus is seen to overtly and violently confront both religious 
authorities and spiritual powers and principalities. The same word is used to both expel 
demons and to expel those in the Temple, Hauck observing that when ἐκβάλλειν is used in 
the New Testament it has the sense of “to expel” or “to repel”, especially in the case of 
demons, who have settled in men as in a house into which they have unlawfully penetrated.
965
 
Jesus’ confrontation with demonic forces was, therefore, a direct power-encounter; ultimately 
between God and the Satan constituting, by definition, an act of warfare and therefore 
violence.  
In a similar fashion, Jesus’ act in expelling, or throwing out, those in the Temple who would 
otherwise have wanted to stay, is an expulsion which, as we have demonstrated, was directly 
against their best interests and, tellingly, also against their volition. It should therefore be 
considered de facto as a violent act. If indeed Jesus’ encounters with the Satan are violent, so 
are his actions in the Temple Incident; both of which find their ultimate conclusion in God’s 
violent overcoming and defeat of the Satan at the cross.
966
  
This thesis has argued that it would be both futile and impossible to overcome an 
ontologically violent and evil being with anything less than irresistible force. Further, in the 
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eschaton Jesus the Messiah will return, framed in violent concepts and imagery, to herald an 
eternity of peace, love and non-violence. Indeed, in answer to the question as to who should 
be engaged in separating the darkness from the light and who should finally exercise violence 
against the ‘beast’ and the ‘false prophet’ Volf posits that echoing the whole New Testament, 
the Apocalypse mentions only God.
967
 Certainly this theme of holy war plays a prominent 
role in Jewish eschatological expectation with the future bringing the final victory of the 
divine Warrior over his enemies and over the enemies of his people. The tradition of an 
eschatological or messianic holy war, according to Bauckham, can be divided into two forms, 
one in which the victory is won by God alone or by God and His heavenly armies and another 
in which God’s people play an active part in physical warfare against their enemies.968 Either 
way it is, to say the least, rather a violent prospect. 
Until then, violence continues to exist, exerting and manifesting itself through sin, the flesh 
and the Satan as a means of power, protection and of achieving desired ends; a non-violent 
God seeking to confound and still such violence would have been doomed to failure. Instead, 
a God with an element of severity is required, a concept often neglected but which prevents 
thinking of God in a manner akin to a doting grandparent or a celestial Santa Claus figure. 
Volf critiques such an outlook noting that many people think of God in this way, as merely a 
Santa Claus conveniently enlarged to divine proportions. He concludes that such a ‘Santa 
Claus God’ demands nothing from us; a divine Santa is the indiscriminately giving and 
inexhaustibly fertile source of everything that is, and everything that is to come our way.
969
 
On the other hand, the idea of a necessary divine severity rightly preserves genuine moral 
gravitas, particularly righteousness, in God and in God’s vigorous dealings with humans.970 
An element of these ‘vigorous dealings’ is seen in several strands of first-century Judaism 
where Israel expected either to fight a crucial war or battle, or perhaps to have her God fight 
it on her behalf – or perhaps, in some traditions, to have the Messiah fight it for her.971 
Anyone telling a new story about this kingdom has to include this as one element, whether in 
the form of the battle for the ‘human’ to stay alive under the tyranny of the ‘beasts’ (which 
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story could be translated into other imagery, such as the lion waging war against the eagle), 
the struggle for Yahweh’s righteous victory to be won against the evil hordes that ranged 
themselves against Him and His people or the war of the children of light against the children 
of darkness, or in some other form.
972
  
Further, in Patristic atonement models, the Divine Drama is pulsating with the tension and 
conflict of the Great Battle; it is ironic that when soteriology was put on the map in the 
eleventh century much of this drama was lost.
973
 The newly-adopted PSA view brought with 
it an almost exclusive focus on Jesus’ death on the cross as the substitutionary means. It 
should be noted, however, that Anselm himself, in the delineation of his theological position 
on atonement does not highlight substitution but rather satisfaction. This is seen explicitly in 
Cur Deus Homo where, for example, chapter 20 is entitled, “That the Satisfaction should be 
Proportionate to the Transgression, Nor can Man Make it for Himself”.974  
The PSA position, however, represents a means by which God exercised His soteriological 
purposes with the central doctrine of the atonement, according to Nicole, being in the 
substitutionary interposition of a sin-bearer who absorbs in himself the fearful burden of the 
divine wrath against human sin and secures a renewal of access to God and of the reception 
of His grace. This is a process which, he argues, was figuratively foreshadowed in the Old 
Testament sacrifices and was then factually accomplished in one all-sufficient and effective 
sacrifice of the God-man, Jesus Christ, on Calvary; Nicole concludes that substitutionary 
sacrifice is therefore the fundamental basis of the whole process of salvation according to 
Scripture.
975
 
The CVM, on the other hand, whilst incorporating the cross into its schema, does so in the 
broader context of the whole birth, life, teachings, death and resurrection of Jesus.
976
 The 
corollary of this more expansive position is that instead of abstract juridical propositions 
about Jesus as seen in PSA and, indeed, in many if not most of the ancient creeds which leave 
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out huge swathes of Jesus’ life and ministry in their proclamation of theological ‘truth’. It is 
noted of the Apostle’s Creed, for instance, that in the teaching of the Christian faith it is used 
as the framework for the teacher’s exposition; when used in this way, according to Wiles, it is 
however more like a syllabus to be worked at than a set of propositions known to be true and 
calling only for expansion and clarification.
977
  The CVM, on the other hand, incorporates the 
whole of the story and the whole of the drama.
978
 It represents, therefore, a more inclusive 
and less esoteric understanding of both ontology and soteriology and thereby a more dramatic 
and expansive view of God, His nature, character, purposes and desires.  
Therefore, according to Aulén, not only is Christ’s work not limited to the cross but it is 
rather an event that continues to have an effect, even to the present day. Aulén asserts that the 
note of triumph which rings through what he calls this ‘Greek theology’ depends not only on 
the victory of Christ over death accomplished once and for all, but also on the fact that His 
victory is the starting-point for His present work in the world of men, where He, through His 
Spirit, ever triumphantly continues to break down sin’s power and ‘deifies’ men.979 In 
addition, Küng describes Jesus as one not concerned with observing the Torah for its own 
sake but one who was rather interested in the ongoing well-being of actual individuals. It 
was, in fact, this freer attitude to the law and his dealings with those who were ignorant of it, 
or who indeed broke it, Küng argues, which led to such serious confrontations.
980
 The point is 
that Jesus is here portrayed as the very antithesis of one who is intent on primarily upholding 
or promulgating a juridical doctrine. 
When Jesus, for example, prepared his followers for the final, previously unimagined, vision 
of the crucifixion, the many strands of story, symbol and meaning are woven together so that 
it is difficult to follow a single thread without acknowledging how tightly it concurrently 
belongs to all the others.
981
 The importance of recognizing the character of each of the 
interpretative options as metaphorical assertions and the danger of promoting any one at the 
expense of another has been noted. The metaphor, after all, is not the thing but an essential 
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means of expressing the thing’s meaning, which can be extrapolated to the proposition that 
pushing metaphors too far leads to the unhelpful practice of translating them into literal 
facts.
982
  
The issue remains, however, that unless a metaphor is linked to the reality it represents in a 
meaningful manner it will be of no final, definitive worth.
983
 In addition, without a critical-
mass of correspondence the metaphor itself is open to laissez-faire, subjective and 
existentialist metaphorical construction that ignores the limits or parameters as to the 
metaphor’s suitability of use in a particular situation. 
Our understanding of metaphor depends on our knowledge of the presupposition pool of 
the creator of the metaphor, and is further enhanced by the availability of a cotext from 
which the purpose of the metaphor might be deduced. Metaphorical language is like any 
other manifestation of real language in that it is to be understood only in a context.
984
  
In other words, whilst the metaphor is, indeed, not the thing being represented it remains, by 
definition, the only means by which finite language and image-bound humans can even begin 
to express transcendent reality.
985
 As such, the metaphor, as we have seen, becomes a great 
deal more than ‘mere’ and instead takes on an ontological link with that which it is 
expressing. So, until the thing can be ‘grasped’ in any kind of literal sense, then the metaphor 
is not only the next best thing available, but it is rather the only thing available. Indeed, for 
Urban, reality is, in a sense, doubtless beyond language, as he argues that Plato felt so deeply, 
and yet he nonetheless contends that whilst reality cannot be wholly grasped in its forms, it 
remains unwise to seek to abandon linguistic forms, because then, he concludes, reality, 
much like quicksilver, will run through our fingers.
986
 
Gunton notes that,  
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The key to the relation between language and world is something we have met already, its 
indirectness. The world can be known only indirectly, and therefore metaphor, being 
indirect, is the most appropriate form that a duly humble and listening language should 
take. In all this, there is a combination of openness and mystery, speech and silence, 
which makes the clarity and distinctness aimed at by the rationalist tradition positively 
hostile to the truth. Thus the tables are turned: metaphor, rather than being the Cinderella 
of cognitive language, becomes the most, rather than the least, appropriate means of 
expressing the truth. If, then, we are to be true to the way things are in our world we must 
see metaphor as the most, not the least, significant part of our language.
987
 
If priority is to be given to a particular atonement model, a viable way of doing so might be in 
regard to how the metaphor explicates, amongst other issues, an overarching image and 
understanding of God, His purposes and character, of humanity and its specific situation and 
needs and of the Satan, his role and plans and of the cosmos as a whole in the eternal, 
metaphysical realm. This said, we choose the CVM as the one which most effectively 
addresses and answers the greatest number of them; atonement has always been a vehicle for 
conveying information about salvation and the Incarnation but there are, of course, many 
other vehicles, the best of which, as Finlan has already noted, might yet be a very old one.
988
  
A key area of emphasis in comparing the most ancient with the relatively newer atonement 
models is that a central characteristic of the so-called objective models is their “Godward” 
focus.
989
 Alternatively, there is a marked ‘Satanward’ thrust in the CVM which might, at first 
glance, present the PSA view as more appropriate and desirable in its explicit theo-centricity; 
exactly opposite, however, is the case. Whilst it is true that the ‘objective’ models place God 
at their centre this importance is focused on perceived needs within Godself for appeasement 
or satisfaction.
990
 Put crudely: a needy God demands His due before He can deal with 
wayward humans. For Weaver, this means that regardless of how the satisfaction theory of 
atonement is defended there is, in fact, no consensus amongst scholars on how to do so. 
Instead he argues that amidst their ‘diverse and mutually contradictory strategies’, is the 
indication that the preeminent concern of such writers is more to defend satisfaction by any 
means available than to ask whether satisfaction atonement truly reflects biblical 
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understandings of the life and work of Christ.
991
 This is the case even when the view of God’s 
nature engendered by such a defence is almost entirely at odds with their previously 
perceived notions of God’s love and mercy.  
In the CVM, however, whilst the thrust is nominally towards the Devil it nonetheless leads to 
a rather different perception of God as One who is so desperate to win back and to win over 
lost humans that He will do whatever it takes to achieve this end.
992
 In this sense, in both the 
RCVM and the later CVM the central focus and thrust is neither God nor the Satan but is 
instead towards an otherwise helpless and captive Humankind.
 
It would, however, according 
to Wright, require conflict to overcome humanity’s gaoler – a battle to defeat a powerful 
enemy.  
So whether it is the Sermon on the Mount in Matthew 5-7 or the Nazareth Manifesto in Luke 
4; or a consideration of what Wright calls the strange language about ‘binding the strong 
man’ in Matthew 12 or the even stranger language about the ‘coming of the son of man’; 
wherever we look, he argues, it appears that Jesus was aware of a great battle in which he was 
already involved and that would, before too long, reach some kind of climax.
993
 Wright 
concludes that whilst the Bible is never precise about the exact identity of this figure, this 
enemy of God, it was ‘the Satan’ whom the biblical writers had in mind as the one Jesus was 
ultimately fighting against.
 
Not primarily, therefore, a God needing reparation, nor a Devil requiring payment but a 
Humanity requiring saving from an Evil Enemy and a God willing to pay ANY price 
imaginable to secure them, including the endorsement and use of extrinsic violence – a 
message, in fact, of sacrificial Good News. For Aulén therefore, the point of emphasis is 
clear,  
In the classic type the work of the Atonement is accomplished by God Himself in 
Christ… He is reconciled only because He Himself reconciles the world with Himself and 
Himself with the world. The safeguard of the continuity of God’s operation is the 
dualistic outlook, the Divine warfare against the evil that holds mankind in bondage, and 
the triumph of Christ. But this necessitates a discontinuity of the legal order: there is no 
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satisfaction of God’s justice, for the relation of man to God is viewed in the light, not of 
merit and justice, but of grace.
994
  
The point to reiterate with this conclusion, however, is that God is not an angry or violent 
God per se and therefore certainly does not have or use violence in a manner intrinsic to His 
being. Rather both His wrath and punishment are extrinsic and reserved for those who 
actually deserve it – not for those, like His innocent Son, who do not. Ellens, for example, 
whilst noting that defenders of PSA utilise ‘sentimental and well-frosted theological terms’ in 
order to turn substitutionary atonement into a ‘remarkable act of grace’, concludes that within 
such a model, the only way for God to ‘get his head screwed back on right’ is to kill 
somebody, whether humans or Christ.
995
 Further, as Hanson notes, God’s punishment is not 
retributory, but it is reformatory, remedial and deterrent. God does not therefore, according to 
Hanson, punish in anger and He is never angry with anyone. In fact, Hanson asserts that what 
he calls the ‘nightmare’ of such an angry God, should be exorcised from our thinking.996  
So, God does exhibit extrinsic, functional violence and confrontation, battle and the ultimate 
defeat of any who stand against Him and against those He loves, this violence is manifest, in 
particular, against the Satan and on behalf of humans – in other words, those who truly and 
eternally deserve God’s wrath, violence and anger get it in order to implement the liberation 
of those who are the centre of His affection and purposes – human beings.997 
The PSA model should, then, be caricatured as an inherently ‘Religious View’ upholding, as 
it does, central notions of the Old Testament and the Judaic Cultus, indeed in large measure 
fulfilling and completing them. Whatever atonement symbol is preferred it must have original 
relevance, application and meaning to those who first witnessed and sought to apply the 
truths of Christ’s death and resurrection. Marshall, whilst looking at Paul’s interpretative 
methodology, considers the ‘atoning deaths’ of Israelites in 4 Maccabees and notes that Paul 
interprets the sin-bearing death of Jesus in terms of the Jewish cult, in the same kind of way 
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as martyrdom was interpreted as sacrificial; there is, he concludes, nothing incongruous about 
the apparent shift from forensic imagery to sacrificial imagery.
998
  
Conversely, the CVM is a grand, sweeping meta-narrative favouring a comparatively ‘non-
religious’ view of God and humanity – spiritual yes, religious no.999 The God of PSA is stiff, 
angular, officious, unyielding, interested in the minutiae of law and its application rather than 
the spirit which the law embodies, He is fascinated by, endorses and encourages religion and 
personal satisfaction at all costs. Green has further concerns with the penal substitution theory 
and after flagging the potential breakdown in God’s perichoretic union he states that he is 
unsure how the model generates transformed life as it is focused, he argues, on the individual, 
on forensic judgment and on the moment of justification. He also speculates as to how such a 
model can keep from undermining any emphasis on salvation as transformation as well as 
obscuring the social and cosmological dimensions of salvation.
1000
  
The God of Christus Victor, on the other hand, is presented as One who is accessible, 
powerful, purposeful and interested more in people than in elements of law. Overall, we 
contend that the God revealed in the Old Testament is represented as One who can be more 
closely and readily aligned with Penal Substitution while the God of Christus Victor better 
represents the God found in the New Testament, manifest in the person of Jesus Christ.
1001
  
Each atonement model, as we have shown, leads to particular praxiological consequences, 
imperatives and outlooks both for those embracing them and for those receiving the message. 
In fact, Ray argues that what is at stake in the endeavour to understand atonement is the 
moral authority of Christianity itself. She argues that unless Christians can find ways to 
effectively articulate in this day and age their faith in a God who liberates from evil then they 
will, in fact, have no good news for today’s world.1002  
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To illustrate this expression of good news and its praxiological corollary, in the theatre, 
methexis is presented and understood as a form of "group sharing" in which the audience 
participates, creates and improvises the action of the ritual; traditionally it is concerned with a 
sharing of being and knowledge in the Divine.
1003
 This posits an intriguing notion of the 
involvement required in salvation – an involvement that finds its supreme expression in the 
CVM as an integral element of an overall heilsgeschicte in which, by definition, the subject is 
inclusive and active in the over-arching ‘narrative curve’ of God’s unfolding salvation story 
and purposes.
1004
  
Not the witnesses and recipients of an ancient judicial transaction but players and participants 
in which the subjects transcend the role of ‘making up an audience’. Rather, this is how Jesus 
puts his kingdom-achievement into operation: 
…through the humans he has rescued. That is why, right at the start of his public career, 
he called associates to share his work and then to carry it on after he had laid the 
foundations, particularly in his saving death. It has been all too easy for us to suppose 
that, if Jesus really was king of the world, he would, as it were, do the whole thing by 
himself. But that was never his way – because it was never God’s way. It wasn’t how 
creation itself was supposed to work. And Jesus’ kingdom-project is nothing if not the 
rescue and renewal of God’s creation-project.
1005
  
Instead of mere ‘audience participation’, therefore, the players instead find themselves fully 
embroiled in the story, essential elements in an ongoing dramatis Dei, caught up inexplicably 
in God’s immediate and eternal plans for Divine-human unification. McKnight argues, in 
fact, that the gospel is all about the Story of Israel coming to its resolution in the Story of 
Jesus – the believer, he contends, needs to let that story become their story. In order to come 
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to terms with this ‘story-shaped gospel’ McKnight concludes that believers will have to 
become People of the Story.
1006
 
Simply put and in conclusion, humans, even Christian ones, have never embraced and 
practised a love like God’s and should likewise never attempt to utilise violence unless it is in 
anything like the kind of purposeful, righteous and redemptive way that God does. This 
comparison focuses on human frailties and sinful incapabilities rather than on God, who He is 
and what He does. Put another way, just because humans mess up love it does not follow that 
God is not ontologically love. Further, because violence has been the bane of human history 
it does not follow that God does not have the ability either to endorse or even utilise extrinsic 
violence as a means of accomplishing His goals. Volf notes that it is important to preserve the 
fundamental difference between God and nonGod, because the biblical tradition insists that 
there are things which only God may do - one of them, he insists, is to use violence.
1007
   
Christians nonetheless find themselves paradoxically embroiled in a metaphysical conflict 
and so, after questioning the portrayal of Christianity in this war with the Satan as one in 
which it is a ‘big outfit’ or even ‘well equipped’, Walker states that,  
I believe it is both more biblical and closer to the reality of our present historical situation 
to realise that we are the despised irregular soldiers of Christ – hit-and-run guerrillas, 
resistance fighters – and that at our strongest we are commando units behind enemy 
lines.
1008
  
Walker acknowledges that these images are distasteful to moral-majority America or middle-
class Britain as such sentiments are more usually associated with terrorism and anarchy. The 
crucial point, however, is that until God’s invasion of the world, in His final campaign in the 
Great Battle when the Devil will be finally and ultimately defeated, Christians remain God’s 
militants in enemy-occupied territory.
1009
 
We conclude that the best way to understand and represent this scenario is to acknowledge 
God’s irresistibly forceful power, His extrinsic violence, and His willingness to use it, albeit 
reticently, in His actual battle with and eventual, definitive overcoming of the Satan. God, 
therefore, has always been willing to reluctantly exert extrinsic violence, especially for 
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soteriological purposes.  Certainly this doctrine has, according to Boyd, praxiological 
implications for the Christian, drawing the believer’s personal and social victories into 
participation in Christ’s cosmic victory, because everything the New Testament says about 
the soteriological significance of Christ’s work is predicated on the cosmic significance of his 
work. Only the CVM, he concludes, captures the centrality of this cosmic, warfare 
significance; thus properly expressing the soteriological significance of Christ’s work.1010  
In Aquinas’ Summa, after giving arguments for God’s existence, Aquinas views what God is 
(quid sit) primarily from the standpoint of what He is not – excluding things that are not 
compatible.
1011
 Whilst it might be argued, using Aquinas’ perspective, that a God who is 
ontologically love is definitely not evil, we conclude that it is not possible, having considered 
the evidence, to likewise definitively maintain that God is categorically not extrinsically 
violent.   
In engaging with such a God we argue that salvation is not, therefore, merely the emulation 
of Christ’s example or the abstract and passive observation of a divine, juridical transaction. 
Indeed, in his reflection upon Yahweh’s dealings with Israel in the Old Testament 
Brueggemann observes that the relationship is redolent of a marriage, but a marriage between 
a loving, passionate and demanding husband and an unfaithful wife. In one instance Yahweh 
admits to an, “…overflowing wrath for a moment” (Isaiah 54:8) which culminates in His 
massive act of destroying Jerusalem; Brueggemann concludes that this appears to be the work 
of a wronged lover who determines to humiliate, and finally destroy, the erstwhile object of 
His love.
1012
 When God chose Israel He did so not with a binding, legal contract, but with an 
exclamation of love (Deuteronomy 10:15), Brueggemann concludes that,  
This is no casual, formal, or juridical commitment. This is a passion that lives in the 
“loins” of Yahweh, who will risk everything for Israel and, having risked everything, will 
expect everything and will be vigilant not to share the beloved with any other. This is no 
open marriage. The outcome of passion so intensely initiated has within it the seeds of 
intolerance, culminating in violence. There is indeed a profound awkwardness in this 
presentation of Yahweh, but Israel does not flinch in its testimony. The God who has 
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been madly in love becomes insanely jealous, which is Israel’s deepest threat and most 
profound hope.
1013
  
Neither should modern believers flinch in their testimony of engagement with this 
extrinsically violent God which entails the mixed-metaphor of being caught up concurrently 
in a passionate love affair with a demanding partner, conjoined with enlistment in an army 
headed by a mighty, demanding and capable ‘general’.1014 This army remains at war and new 
‘recruits’, whilst loved, nonetheless have to work with each other and their Leader, their 
lover, in order to secure their ultimate liberation through a final, decisive victory  against an 
evil, powerful adversary who can only be subjugated and given over to ḥērem by this God of 
insurmountable love and irresistible force.  
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Testament, Volume 2, ἐξ-ὀψωνιον, Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2000, 70-74.  
 
Tan, C.E.L, ‘Humanity’s Devil’, Evangelical Review of Theology, Vol. 34, Issue 2, April 
2010, 136-154.  
 
Tidball, D, ‘Penal Substitution: A Pastoral Apologetic’, D. Tidball, D. Hilborn and J. 
Thacker (eds.), The Atonement Debate, Michigan: Zondervan, 2008, 345-360.  
 
Tillich, P, Systematic Theology, Volume 1 & 3, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1951.  
 
                , What is Religion?, New York: Harper Torchbook, 1963. 
 
Tirosh-Rothschild, H, ‘Sefirot as the Essence of God in the Writings of David Messer 
Leon’, Association for Jewish Studies Review, 7-8, 1982-1983, 409-424.  
 
Tracy, D, ‘Metaphor and Religion: The Test Case of Christian Texts’, S. Sacks (ed.), On 
Metaphor, Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1978, 89-104.  
 
Turner, H.E.W, Jesus Master and Lord, London: Mowbray, 1957.  
  
Turner, L.A, Genesis, Sheffield: Sheffield Academic Press, 2000. 
 
Twelftree, G, Christ Triumphant: Exorcism Then and Now, London: Hodder & Stoughton, 
1985.  
xxi 
 
Unger, M.F, ‘The Babylonian and Biblical Accounts of Creation’, Biblioteca Sacra, 109, 
No. 436, O-D, 1952, 304-317.  
 
Urban, W.M, Language and Reality, London: Allen & Unwin, 1939.  
 
Vanhoozer, K.J, ‘Theology and the condition of postmodernity: a report on knowledge (of 
God)’, K.J. Vanhoozer (ed.), The Cambridge Companion to Postmodern Theology, 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003, 3-25.  
 
Volf, M, ‘Divine Violence?’, Christian Century, 116:27, 1999, 972-974.  
 
             , Exclusion and Embrace: A Theological Exploration of Identity, Otherness, and 
Reconciliation, Nashville: Abingdon Press, 1996.  
 
             , Free of Charge: Giving and Forgiving in a Culture Stripped of Grace, Grand 
Rapids: Zondervan, 2005. 
  
Vries, H. de, Religion and Violence: Philosophical Perspectives from Kant to Derrida, 
Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 2002.  
 
Von Rad, G, Holy War in Ancient Israel, Michigan: William B. Eerdmans, 1991. 
 
                    , Old Testament Theology, Vol. 1, The Theology of Israel’s Historical Traditions, 
London: Oliver and Boyd, 1957.  
 
Walker, A, Enemy Territory: The Christian Struggle for the Modern World, London: Hodder 
& Stoughton, 1987.  
 
                  , Telling the Story: Gospel, Mission and Culture, London: SPCK, 1996.  
 
Ware, O, ‘Rudolph (sic) Otto’s Idea of the Holy: A Reappraisal’, Heythrop Journal, Issue 1, 
Vol. 48, Jan 2007, 48-60.  
 
Watt, Jan G. van der, ‘Soteriology in the New Testament: Some Tentative Remarks’, J.G. 
van der Watt (ed.), Salvation in the New Testament: Perspectives on Soteriology, Leiden: 
Brill, 2005, 505-522.  
 
Weaver, J.D, ‘Narrative Christus Victor: The Answer to Anselmian Atonement Violence’, J. 
Sanders (ed.), Atonement and Violence: A Theological Conversation, Nashville: Abingdon 
Press, 2006, 1-32.  
 
                     , The Nonviolent Atonement, Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2001.  
 
                     , ‘Violence in Christian Theology’, CrossCurrents, 51:2, 2001, 150-176.  
 
Weil, S, Waiting for God, New York: Harper & Row, 1951.  
 
Wenham, G.J, The Book of Leviticus, Michigan: William B. Eerdmans, 1979.  
 
xxii 
 
                        , Word Biblical Commentary: Volume 1, Genesis 1-15, Milton Keynes: Word 
Publishing, 1987.  
 
Westermann, C, Genesis 1-11: A Commentary, Minneapolis: Augsburg Publishing House, 
1984. 
 
                                        , ‘The Complaint Against God’, T. Linafelt and T.K. Beal (eds.), God in the 
Fray: A Tribute to Walter Brueggemann, Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 1998, 233-341.  
 
Wiles, M, ‘Creeds’, A. Hastings (ed.), The Oxford Companion to Christian Thought, Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2000, 144-146.  
 
Williams, A.N, ‘Contemplation – Knowledge of God in Augustine’s De Trinitate’, J.J. 
Buckley and D.S. Yeago (eds.), Knowing the Triune God – The Work of the Spirit in the 
Practices of the Church, Cambridge: Eerdmans, 2001, 121-146.  
 
Williams, D.H, Retrieving the Tradition and Renewing Evangelicalism, Cambridge: 
Eerdmans, 1999.  
 
Williams, R, ‘Girard on Violence, Society and the Sacred’, M. Higton (ed.), Wrestling with 
Angels: Conversations in Modern Theology, 171-185.  
 
                    , On Christian Theology, Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 2000.  
 
Wils, J.P, ‘Violence as an Anthropological Constant? Towards a New Evaluation’, W. 
Beuken and K-J. Kuschel (eds.), Religion as a Source of Violence? London: SCM Press, 
1997, 110-118.  
 
Wink, W, Engaging the Powers: Discernment and Resistance in a World of Domination, 
Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 1992.  
 
               , Naming the Powers: The Language of Power in the New Testament, Philadelphia: 
Fortress Press, 1984.  
 
               , The Powers That Be: Theology for a New Millennium, New York: Doubleday, 
1998.  
 
               , Unmasking the Powers: The Invisible Forces that Determine Human Existence, 
Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1986.  
 
Winter, M, The Atonement – Problems in Theology, London: Geoffrey Chapman, 1995.   
 
Wood, L.J, ‘םָרָה’, Harris, R.L (ed.), Theological Wordbook of the Old Testament, Volume 1 
& 2, Chicago: Moody Press, 1980, 324-325. 
 
Wolterstorff, N, Justice in Love, Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2011.  
 
Wright, A. T, The Origin of Evil Spirits: The Reception of Genesis 6: 1-4 in Early Jewish 
Literature, Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2005.  
 
xxiii 
 
Wright, N, A Theology of the Dark Side: Putting the Power of Evil in its Place, Carlisle: 
Paternoster, 2003.  
 
Wright, N.T, Jesus and the Victory of God, London: SPCK, 1996.  
 
                     , Surprised by Hope – Rethinking Heaven, the Resurrection, and the Mission of 
the Church, New York: Harper Collins, 2008.  
 
Wright, T, Simply Jesus, London: SPCK, 2011.  
 
Yoder, J.H, ‘If Abraham Is Our Father’, The Original Revolution: Essays on Christian 
Pacifism, Wipf and Stock, 1971, 85-104. 
 
                   , The Politics of Jesus, Cambridge: Eerdmans, 1972.  
 
Young, J, The Violence of God and the War on Terror, London: Darton, Longman & Todd, 
2007.  
  
Zbikowski, L.M, ‘Metaphor and Music’, R.W. Gibbs Jr. (ed.), The Cambridge Handbook of 
Metaphor and Thought, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008, 502-524.  
 
Žižek, S, Violence, New York: Picador, 2008.  
